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ABSTRACT
General Rules in the Philosophy of David Hume
(February 1987)
Marie Ann Martin, B.A.
, Brandeis University
M.A., Northern Illinois University
Ph . D
. , University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Bruce A. Aune
Hume refers to general rules throughout the three books
of the Treat i se . It is clear that these rules play an im-
portant role, for him, in the formation of both causal and
moral judgments, and in the genesis or direction of the pas-
sions. Also, his theory of justice is based on an elaborate
hierarchy of general rules. Yet, in spite of the pervasive
presence of general rules in his philosophy, he never offers
a detailed analysis of their nature and their contribution
the human understanding. Fortunately, when his various
references to general rules and scattered remarks about them
are pieced together, one has an ample basis for constructing
a coherent and unified account of their nature and the role
they play in the interlocking theories that Hume develops in
the Treatise
. My principal aim in this work is to construct
such an account. In doing so, I try to show how Hume's
views on general rules provide important insights into a
number of aspects of his philosophy, particularly his natu-
ralism, his views on rational method, and his skepticism.
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INTRODUCTION
Hume refers to general rules throughout the three books
of the Treatise. It is clear that these rules play an im-
portant regulative role, for him, in the formation of both
causal and moral judgments, and in the genesis or direction
of the passions. Also, his theory of justice is based on an
elaborate hierarchy of general rules. Yet, in spite of the
pervasive presence of general rules in his philosophy, he
never offers a detailed analysis of their nature and their
contribution to the human understanding. Fortunately, when
his various references to general rules and scattered re-
marks about them are pieced together, one has an ample basis
for constructing a coherent and unified account of their na-
ture and the role they play in the interlocking theories
that Hume develops in the Treatise . My principal aim in
what follows IS to construct such an account. In doing so,
I try to show how Hume's views on general rules provide im-
portant insights into a number of aspects of his philosophy,
particularly his naturalism, his views on reason and ratio-
nal method, and his skepticism.
To provide the basic background material necessary to
appreciate the specific function of general rules in the
Treatise
,
I begin with a general discussion of the distinc-
tive features of Hume's theory of the understanding. This
preliminary discussion will constitute Chapter I. In Chap-
1
ter II, I provide a detailed analysis of the structure and
formation of the general rules associated (in Hume's view)
with causal judgment. m Chapter ill, i discuss the justi-
fication of general rules and its relation to Hume's skepti-
cism "with regard to reason". Finally, in Chapters IV and
V, I examine the role of general rules in three other areas
of Hume's philosophy: the passions, morals, and the theory
of justice.
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CHAPTER I
HUME ON THE UNDERSTANDING
In a work on Hume's theory of general rules, a chapter
devoted to Hume's theory of the understanding requires some
explanation. Apart from the general benefits of viewing
particular aspects of a philosopher's work in light of a
more comprehensive framework, I have two more specific rea-
sons for approaching the topic in this manner. First, the
formation and functioning of general rules depends on the
various mechanisms detailed in Hume's discussion of judg-
ment, belief, imagination, and custom. Thus, it is impossi-
ble to explain the operation of general rules without first
explaining these features of Hume's theory of the under-
standing. Yet simply understanding how general rules oper-
ate does not help us to understand the important role of
general rules in Hume's philosophy. Thus, my second reason
for devoting a chapter to the discussion of the basic ele-
ments of Hume's theory of the understanding is to provide
the background material necessary for understanding and for
appreciating the importance of this role.
Judgment
Hume's view of the understanding is, in part, a devel-
opment of the Cartesian or, more specifically, the Male-
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branchian theory of natural judgments. According to the
Cartesians, natural judgments depend entirely on human phys-
iology. As they saw it, such judgments supply only very
limited truths about objects, indicating at best the rela-
tion of objects to our bodies. Their general view was that,
to enable us to preserve our bodies, God fashioned us with
the ability to make natural judgments about things in our
immediate environment. Our knowledge of the real nature of
these things is not derived, they thought, from our natural
judgments; it is attained by the intellect or pure under-
standing. According to Descartes, the ideas of the intel-
lect are innate; according to Malebranche, they are ideal
archetypes in the mind of God, which our pure understanding
directly apprehends. In either case our natural judgments
are regulated and corrected by these "intellectual" ideas.
Hume's account of the understanding differs from these
views i dispensing entirely with the faculty of the pure
understanding or intellect. According to him, we possess no
such faculty. His conviction on this point leaves him with
the task of providing an alternative explanation of how we
are able to regulate and correct those low-level judgments
that the Cartesians termed "natural". He aimed to accom-
plish this task in a thoroughly naturalistic way; the key
elements in the mechanism he described were general rules.
Although Hume continued to speak of judgments, he re-
jected the received view of them expounded in the Port Royal
4
Logi£. [11 He described that view as dividing the "acts of
the understanding into conception
, judgment and reasoning ":
Conception is defin'd to be the simple
survey of one or more ideas: Judgment tobe the separating or uniting of differ-
ent ideas: Reasoning to be the separat-
ing or uniting of different ideas by the
interposition of others, which show the
relation they bear to each other. [2]
Hume did not deny that there are differences between
what we call 'conception', 'judgment', and 'reasoning'; but
he did deny that the differences are as indicated here.
Hume was convinced that a judgment need not involve
more than one idea. in judgments of existence, such as "God
is", existence is not a separate idea joined to the idea of
God. "To reflect on anything simply, and to reflect on it
as existent, are nothing different from each other ... .What-
ever we conceive, we conceive to be existent " (p. 67) . Fur-
thermore, "we may exert our reason without employing more
than two ideas, and without having recourse to a third to
serve as a medium betwixt them" (p . 97n) . Causal inference,
for example, is "a true species of reasoning", yet in causal
inference we "infer a cause immediately from its
effeet . . . " (p. 97n) . Hume concluded that "these three acts of
the underst anding . . . al 1 resolve themselves into the first,
and are nothing but particular ways of conceiving our ob-
jects.... The act of mind exceeds not a simple
conception" (p.97n)
.
[3]
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The relevant distinction does not concern the number of
Ideas involved in the conception or how they are joined and
separated, but the manner of their conception. "The only
remarkable difference, which occurs... is when we join be-
lief to the conception, and are perswaded of the truth of
what we conceive" (p.97n)
. The difference between the "sim-
ple conception" of God and the judgment that God exists is
not one of content. Both involve one and the same idea.
The difference is that in the judgment "God exists" the idea
of God is conceived in a different manner. This different
manner of conception is, according to Hume, belief. A judg-
ment IS simply a belief and a belief is a particular manner
of forming a conception.
To avoid confusion, there is a final point about judg-
ments that should be kept in mind in what follows. Hume
repeatedly refers to judgments as "acts of mind", leaving no
doubt that he views judging as a form of mental activity.
His practice here is entirely in keeping with his view that
belief is a manner of conception. Judgments are therefore
not, for Hume, what philosophers nowadays call "prop-
ositions". When Hume speaks of judgments, he is referring
to specific sorts of mental acts involving conceptions or
beliefs; he is not referring to sentences, abstract objects,
or anything approximating contemporary views of prop-
ositions. This point might seem fairly obvious, but it has
been overlooked or ignored by a surprising number of commen-
6
tators
.
In the Appendix, i shall, in fact, examine a number
of criticisms of Hume that treat his comments about judq-
ments as though they were comments about propositions. My
aim in mentioning this sort of error here is to alert the
reader to it and thereby avoid any problems that may arise
from mistakes of this sort.
Belief
There are difficulties in presenting Hume's theory of
belief. Not only does he make a number of different and
apparently incompatible claims about the nature of belief in
the text of the Treatise but, in the appendix, he presents
what appears to be yet another, equally incompatible view.
At least part of the difficulty can be attributed to prob-
lems with Hume's style. As numerous commentators have
pointed out, Hume's method of presentation in the Treatise
is often very misleading and likely to bewilder an unpre-
pared reader. [4] Often the problem lies in Hume's present-
ing a highly simplified account of some basic doctrine with-
out indicating to the reader that it is a simplified ac-
count. As the Treatise progresses, he fills in the original
account, often a bit at a time, forcing the reader to con-
tinually read the later additions back into the initial ac-
count
. [ 5]
This is certainly true of Hume's account of belief.
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But it would be a mistake to assume that the problems with
interpreting Hume's account can be attributed wholly to sty-
listic infelicities. Hume's initial account was not merely
simplified; it was inadequate. in dealing with its inade-
quacies, Hume was forced to make significant changes. The
end result of these changes was an account of belief that
was incompatible with his initial account. This final and
considered account is presented in the appendix to the
Treatise
.
The best way to avoid confusion about Hume's theory of
belief is to trace its development, noting the problems and
ambiguities that led to modifications and, eventually, to
the reformulation of the theory in the appendix.
Hume s initial account of belief is introduced in the
middle of his discussion of causal inferences. He is at-
tempting to explain how we form beliefs about objects that
are not present to the memory or senses. His answer is that
we form such beliefs as a result of causal inference. Caus-
al inference, in turn, is the result of our experience of a
"constant conjunction" between objects.
We have no other notion of cause and ef-
fect, but that of certain objects, which
have always conjoin'd together, and
which in all past instances have been
found inseparable. We cannot penetrate
into the reason of the conjunction. We
only observe the thing itself, and al-
ways find that from a constant conjunc-
tion the objects acquire an union in the
imagination. When the impression of one
8
becomes present to us, we immediatelyform an idea of its usual attendant; and
consequently we may establish this as
one part of the definition of an opinion
or belief, that 'tis and idea related to
or associated with a present im-
pression. (p. 93)
While this explains how we arrive at the idea of an
absent object, it does not explain our belief. Obviously we
can have an idea or conception without believing it. Belief
IS more than a mere idea. But, Hume asks, "wherein consists
the difference betwixt believing and disbelieving any prop-
osition?” In cases of knowledge, Hume claims, the answer is
clear
.
The answer is easy with regard to prop-
ositions, that are prov'd by intuition
or demonstration.... The person, who
assents not only conceives the ideas ac-
cording to the proposition, but is nec-
essarily determin'd to conceive them in
that particular manner... Whatever is
absurd is unintelligible, nor is it pos-
sible for the imagination to conceive
any thing contrary to a de-
monstration. (p. 95)
In fact, the answer cannot be as simple as Hume claims,
as his comments in later sections make clear. In part VI,
section 1, Hume claims:
In all the demonstrative sciences
the rules are certain and infallible;
but when we apply them, our fallible and
uncertain faculties are very apt to de-
part from them, and fall into error. We
must, therefore, in every reasoning,
form a new judgment, as a check or con-
9
troul on our first judgment or be-lief (p. 180)
Clearly people sometimes make judgments such as 7+5=11. But
If judgment is simply a manner of conceiving, and it is "im-
possible for the imagination to conceive any thing contrary
to a demonstration," it is not at all clear just what a
person is doing when he makes such false judgments as
^ suspect that Kemp Smith was essentially correct
in his observation of Hume's early comments on the distinc-
tion between knowledge and belief.
In distinguishing between knowledge and
belief, what chiefly interests Hume is
the use to which he proposes to put the
distinction, namely, as delimiting the
sphere of knowledge. So long as this is
achieved and in the rough it is
achieved— the nature and grounds of
'ideal' knowledge need only be indicat-
ed; and though this too may be said to
have been achieved, the last thing which
we need to look for in this section is
any really consistent statement of the
grounds upon which the fundamental dis-
tinction rests. [6]
At any rate, Hume supposes that the situation is dif-
ferent with non-demonstrative judgments. "In reasonings
from causation, and concerning matters of fact, this abso-
lute necessity cannot take place, and the imagination is
free to conceive both sides of the quest ion" (p. 95). While
both sides are conceived or understood, only one side is
believed. According to Hume, belief is distinguished from
10
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mere conception by its degree of force and vivacity
first full account of belief is presented as follows:
All the perceptions of the mind are
of two kinds, viz., impressions andIdeas, which differ from each other onlyin their different degrees of force and
vivacity. Our ideas are cop'd from ourimpressions, and represent them in alltheir parts. When you wou ' d any way
vary the idea of a particular object,
you can only encrease or diminish itsforce and vivacity. if you make any
other change on it, it represents a dif-
ferent object or impression.... So that
as belief does nothing but vary the man-
ner, in which we conceive any object, it
can only bestow on our ideas an addi-
tional force and vivacity. An opinion,
therefore, or belief may be most accu-
rately defin'd, A LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO
OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT IM-
PRESSION. (p. 96)
There are two parts to this initial definition. A be-
lieved idea is (1) lively and (2) associated with a present
impression. The parts are related because the liveliness of
a believed idea is "transferred" or "communicated" from the
impression to its associated idea. "When any impression be-
comes present to us, it not only transports the mind to such
ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates to
them a share of its force and vivacity" (p. 98). Consequent-
ly, "when the mind is once enliven'd by a present impres-
sion, It proceeds to form a more lively idea of the related
objects, by a natural transition. .." (p. 99).
Having defined belief, Hume is immediately faced with a
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problem. An impression may give rise to an associated idea
by any of the three associative relations: resemblance, con-
tiguity or cause and effect. But an idea related to a pre-
sent impression by resemblance or contiguity is usually not
a belief. Hume presents the problem as follows:
For it may be said, that if all theparts of that hypothesis be true, viz.,that these three species of relations
are deriv'd from the same principles;
their effects in inforcing and in-livening our ideas are the same; and
belief is nothing but a more forci-ble and vivid conception of an idea, it
shou'd follow, that that action of the
mind may not only be deriv'd from the
relation of cause and effect, but alsofrom those of contiguity and resem-
blance. But we find by experience, that
belief arises only from causat ion.
. .
. (p.
107) . ^
Hume s solution to this problem is complex; fortunate-
ly, a detailed account is not necessary for present pur-
poses. Essentially, his reply is that, in causal associa-
tion, the mind feels determined to form a particular type of
idea upon experiencing a certain type of impression. But
there is no manner of necessity for the mind to feign any
resembling and contiguous objects, and if it feigns such,
there is as little necessity for it always to confine itself
to the same, without any difference or variat ion" (p. 109).
Because the associative principles of resemblance and conti-
guity are "fluctuating and uncertain", they can never "oper-
ate with any considerable degree of force and constancy" (p.
12
109 ) .
This solution requires a modification in Hume's origi-
nal definition. if, in fact, ideas related to a present im-
pression by resemblance and contiguity are not beliefs, then
It IS more accurate to say that belief is a lively idea
— related to or associated with a present impression.
Yet this definition also runs into difficulties. Hume has
made the manner of production part of the very definition of
belief. This means that nay idea or conception that is not
causally associated with a present impression could not be a
belief. But, once Hume shifts his attention away from caus-
al inference, he is forced to modify his view once again,
for he admits that there are beliefs that do not result from
causal association with a present impression.
In the sections following the one where the initial
definition appears, Hume introduces various types of belief
that do not depend on causal association. For instance,
Hume admits that beliefs produced from education (what we
would call indoctrination) arise "without any of [the] curi-
ous and almost artificial preparation required for the in-
ference of causal reasoning" (p. 116). Beliefs arising from
such "education" depend on custom (repetition) but they do
not depend on the observed constant conjunction of objects
or the impression of similiar objects. There are also be-
liefs that do not even depend on custom, for instance, the
beliefs that arise from madness or "poetical enthusiasm".
13
^en the imagination, from any extraor-dinary ferment of the blood and spirits,
acquires such a vivacity as disorders
all Its powers and faculties, there is
no means of distinguishing betwixt truth
and falsehood; but every loose fiction
or idea, having the same influence asthe impressions of the memory, or the
conclusions of the judgment, is receiv'd
on the same footing, and operates with
equal force on the passions. A presentimpression and customary transition are
now no longer necessary to inliven ourideas ....
We may observe the same effect ofpoetry in a lesser degree; only with
this difference, that the least reflec-
tion dissipates the illusions of poet-
ry..
. . 'Tis, however, certain, that in
the warmest of poetical enthusiasms, a
poet has a counterfeit belief, and even
a kind of vision of his objects (p.
123) ^
Hume has clearly abandoned the view that the manner of
production is part of the nature of belief. He is left with
what was initially the 'first' part of his definition: be-
lief is a lively idea. But this aspect of Hume's theory is
also the source of considerable problems. It is not at all
clear what Hume means. In various passages Hume seems to
suggest four different and incompatible views: (1) belief is
equivalent to a lively idea; (2) the liveliness of an idea
produces belief; (3) belief produces the liveliness of an
idea; and (4) "lively" is simply a way of characterizing or
describing a believed idea. In early passages Hume clearly
states that the liveliness of an idea is, at least in part.
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What constitutes a belief. "An opinion
... or belief may be
most accurately defin'd, A lively idea related to or assocl -
£t^ a Eresent impression " (p. 96). "Belief is a more
Vivid and intense conception of an idea...”(p. 103) . "Be-
lief IS nothing ^ a strong and lively idea ..."(p. 105) .
But, in later sections, Hume implies that, at least on most
occasions, beliefs are not equivalent to lively ideas but,
rather, produced by the liveliness of ideas. in contrast-
ing beliefs produced by causal inference with beliefs
arising from education, Hume states that, with beliefs pro-
duced by education, Hume states that, with beliefs arising
from education, "we must not be contented with saying, that
the vividness of the idea produces belief. We must maintain
that they are individually the same” (p. 116).
Elsewhere, Hume implies that belief produces the live-
liness of the idea:
The effect, then, of belief is to raise
us a simple idea to an equality with our
impressions, and bestow on it a like in-
fluence on the passions. This effect is
can only have by making a idea approach
an impression in force and vivacity....
Belief, therefore, since it causes an
idea to imitate the effects of the im-
pression, must make it resemble them in
these qualities. ... (p. 119-20).
On the basis of the text alone it is impossible to de-
cide which, if any, of these three views represent Hume's
original view. But, by referring to Hume's appendix ac-
15
count, it is possible to determine his final and considered
opinion on how his earlier comments are to be Interpreted.
I shall now turn to the appendix account.
Recall that Hume originally argued that the only dif-
ference between ideas and impressions is their different de-
grees of force and vivacity. This led him to claim that the
only difference there could be between a mere conception and
a belief is a difference in the force and vivacity of the
Ideas involved in the conception. In the appendix, Hume ac-
knowledges a fundamental error in his original argument, an
error which, he says, "more mature reflection has discover'd
to me in my reasoning" (p. 636). His description is as fol-
lows
:
The error ... may be found in Book I,
page 96 where I say, that two ideas of
the same object can only be different by
their different degrees of force and vi-
vacity. I believe there are other dif-
ferences among ideas, which cannot pro-
perly be comprehended under these terms.
Had I said, that two ideas of the same
object can only be different by their
different feeling
,
I shou'd have been
nearer to the truth. (p. 636)
In abandoning the view that the only difference between
an idea and its corresponding impression is the latter's de-
gree of force and vivacity, Hume is repudiating his initial
argument leading to his definition of belief as a lively
idea related to a present impression. He is, then, free to
offer a different account of the nature of belief and this
16
IS exactly what he does in the appendix. According to his
appendix account, belief consists in a particular sort of
feeling. Hume does not mean that belief is a distinct im-
pression joined to an idea. He describes this erroneous
view as follows:
Belief, beside the simple con-
ception, consists in some impression orfeeling, distinguishable from the con-
ception. It does not modify the concep-
tion and render it more present and in-
tense: It is only annex'd to it after
the same manner that will and desire are
annex'd to particular conceptions ofgood and pleasure (p. 625)
Hume offers four reasons for rejecting this view.
First, "it is directly contrary to experience, and our imme-
diate consciousness" (p. 625). Reasoning is "an operation of
our thoughts or ideas" and "nothing ever enters into our
conclusions but ideas..." (p, 625). When I hear a friend's
voice in the hall, l conclude that he is in the hall. This
conclusion contains only ideas. These ideas are "different
to the feeling; but there is no distinct or separate impres-
sion attending them"(p. 625).
This case can be contrasted with cases where there is a
distinct impression or feeling attending an idea. Suppose I
am in doubt about some particular matter of fact. Along
with the conception, I have a feeling of uneasiness. I am
then presented with an argument that resolves the doubt. I
17
arrive at a belief and feel satisfaction. The uneasiness
and satisfaction are particular feelings distinct from and
added to the conception.
Hume's other reasons for rejecting the view that belief
involves a separate impression are: (1) Belief is fully
explicable without supposing any such distinct impression;
(2) The causes of belief can be explained without reference
to any separate impression; and (3) The effects of belief
can be explained without reference to any separate impres-
sion. Hume asks, "Why then look any farther, or multiply
suppositions without necessity?" (p. 626).
Belief is, then, an idea with a particular kind of phe-
nomenological feel. In claiming that belief is a "manner of
conception", Hume does not mean to refer to how the idea is
produced but to the way it is experienced. "Belief consists
not in the nature and order of our ideas, but in the manner
of their conception, and in their feeling to the mind"(p.
629) . "An idea assented to fee 1 s different from a ficti-
cious idea" (p. 629).
While belief is not a distinct impression, it does in-
volve a feeling, and feelings can be described but not de-
fined. Accordingly, Hume does not attempt to offer a de-
finition of belief in the appendix. Instead he attempts to
characterize belief in the same manner as he characterized
simple impressions: he offers a description of the feeling
and gives its causes and effects. The feeling of belief may
18
be described as "a superior force
, or vivacity
, or solidity
,
or f irmness
, or steadiness" (p. 627). Hume acltnowledges that
such descriptions are bound to be imperfect. "'Tis impossi-
ble to explain perfectly this feeling or manner of concep-
tion. We may malce use of words, that express something near
It. But its true and proper name is belief ..." (p. 629)
. [7]
The cause of belief is generally custom, although in
cases where there is an "extraordinary ferment of the blood
and spirits" such as madness, "a present impression and cus-
tomary transition are ... no longer necessary ..." (p. 123).
In the conclusions to causal inferences, this custom con-
sists in our experience of constantly conjoined objects; in
the case of education, it consists in the repetition of a
single conception. The effect of belief is its influence on
our thoughts and actions. it "renders realities more pre-
sent to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the
thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions
and imaginat ion" (p. 629). Likewise, "it gives [ideas] more
force and influence; makes them appear of greater im-
portance; infixes them in the mind, and renders them the
governing principles of all our actions" (p. 629).
Thus, in Hume's final view, belief is not equivalent to
the force and vivacity (or liveliness) of an idea nor is it
the cause or effect of a lively idea. Therefore, Hume can
consistently maintain that an idea can be forceful and vivid
19
without being believed. There is, then, no problem with his
view that "poetical enthusiasm" can make an idea lively
without producing belief. "How great soever the pitch may
be, to which the vivacity rises, 'tis evident, that in poet-
ry It never has the same feeling with that which arises in
the mind, when we reason, tho' even upon the lowest species
of probability" (p. 630). Because belief does not consist in
the force and vivacity of an idea, Hume can also consistent-
ly maintain that a believed idea can be less forceful and
vivid than an idea that is not believed.
These points are particularly important in understand-
ing the role of general rules in Hume's epistemology. Ac-
cording to Hume, "a reflexion on general rules keeps us from
augmenting our beliefs upon every increase of the force and
vivacity of our ideas" (p. 632). in a later chapter, I will
return to this important point to show the importance of
general rules in regulating our beliefs.
Imagination
Hume's view of the nature of the imagination is basi-
cally Cartesian or, more specifically, Malebranchian. [8]
While Malebranche
' s treatment of the imagination is both
psychological and physiological, Hume concentrates on the
psychological aspects and, for the most part, "neglects the
advantages" of presenting a physiological account. [9] Al-
though Hume follows Malebranche in his account of the nature
20
of the imagination, he develops a completely original view
of the role of the imagination in human thought and action.
To understand Hume's departure from Malebranche, it is first
important to understand their agreement with respect to the
nature of the imagination.
According to both Descartes and Malebranche, it is the
mind or soul that thinks and perceives. The ideas involved
in thinking and perceiving come from two sources: from the
mind Itself and from the senses. The first sort are the
ideas of the pure understanding or pure intellect. As I
mentioned earlier, Descartes believed these ideas are in-
nate, while Malebranche, following Augustine, believed that
such ideas are ideal archetypes in the mind of God. They
are contained in God, not in the human mind, but the pure
intellect directly apprehends them in God. The second sort
of ideas are obtained when the mind directs its attention to
the body and perceives via the imagination. According to
Malebranche, the imagination is intimately related to the
senses. "There is such a close relationship between the
senses and imagination that they should not be separated.....
The differences between these two faculties is but on e of
degree. "[10] The imagination is the faculty by which the
mind reproduces what has been previously experienced by the
senses. Memories are thereby included under ideas of the
imagination.
21
Like Descartes, Malebranche supposed that the processes
of the imagination depended on the activity of animal
spirits in the brain. "The imagination consists only in the
soul's power of forming images of objects producing changes
in the fibers of the brain.
.."(n 1.1,88). Malebranche im-
plies, but does not specifically state, that memories are
distinguished from other ideas of the imagination by the
fact that they reproduce ideas in the order of the original
sensations. Our brain fibers, having once received certain
impressions through the flow of animal spirits and by the
actions of objects, retain some facility for receiving these
same dispositions for some time Memory consists only in
this facility"(ll 1.5,106).
Sensation consists in the understanding's perception of
something "upon occasion of the appropriate natural events
taking place in the organs of the body...(l 1,3). When the
sense organs are stimulated by an object, the "agitation" of
the fibers in the sense organs are "communicated" to the
brain via animal spirits— "the most refined and agitated
parts of the blood" (II 1.2,91). The passage of animal
spirits leaves "traces" in the brain. Both the force with
which objects strike the senses, and the frequency with
which the same kind of object is presented to the senses
determine the depth of the traces and, thus, the strength of
the consciousness of sensation. Imagining and remembering
are "a kind of weak and languid sensation the mind receives
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or arous6d in
only because of certain traces being produced
the brain by the flow of spirits" {Conclusion, 261).
either according to the will or in so^e other manner,
spirits flow into the brain traces made by previous
Eions of the senses, those impressions are "revived"
imagine or remember.
The similarity between Malebranche and Hume is
summarized by Charles McCracken:
When
,
animal
impres-
and we
nicely
Both sensation and imagination occur,
Descartes and Malebranche supposed, be-
cause a rush of animal spirits to thebrain imprints traces there that occa-
sion an 'image' in consciousness; ifthese spirits flow forcefully, as hap-
pens when our sense organs are stimulat-
ed, a deep trace is made on the brain,
and the images produced are fortes et
vives ; such images we call sensation.
If, however, the spirits flow weakly, as
is usual when the cause of the flow is
internal to the body, they produce a su-
perficial trace on the brain, which oc-
casions in consciousness that espece de
sensation faibles et languissates thaT
we term imagination. While Hume does
not engage in this sort of speculative
physiology, he and Malebranche are in
complete accord here about the differ-
ence between sensation and imagination.
Indeed, Hume's terminology follows Male-
branche: where one speaks of sensations
as ' fortes et vives '
,
the other speaks
of their 'force and liveliness'; and
where one describes ideas of the imagi-
nation as ' faibles et languissantes '
,
the other says they are 'faint and
languid '
. [11]
Later I will show that Hume does at least once quite
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explicitly "engage in this sort of speculative physiology"
and that there is good reason to suppose that he accepted
Malebranche's physiological model. For now it is sufficient
to note an important point neglected by McCracken. This
point concerns the different focus in the methods of distin-
guishing sensing from imagining in the discussions of Des-
cartes, Malebranche and Hume. Descartes's manner of distin-
guishing sensing from imagining is objective: it is focused
on their physical causes or manner of production:
When external objects act on my senses,
they print on them an idea, or rather afigure, of themselves; and when the mind
attends to these images imprinted on the[pineal] gland in this way, it is said
to perceive. When on the other hand theimages on the gland are not imprinted by
external objects but by the mind itself,
which fashions and shapes them in thebrain in the absence of external ob-jects, then we have imagination. The
difference between perception and imagi-
nation is thus really just this, that in
perception the images are imprinted by
external objects which are actually pre-
sent, whilst in imagination the images
are imprinted by the mind without any
external objects, and with the windows
shut, as it were. [12]
Malebranche presents the difference between sensing and
imagining in terms of both the objective difference and the
subjective difference— their feeling to inner consciousness.
The difference to consciousness is the different degrees of
force and liveliness. The objective difference lies in
their manner of production. Sensation arises from the
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action of external objects on the senses, imaginings arise
when the will or some other internal event causes animal
spirits to flow into the traces left by previous sensations.
Hume is interested in the examination of the un-
derstanding and his primary concern is with the contents of
consciousness. His presentation of the difference between
sensing and imagining is directed toward the subjective dif-
ference or difference to consciousness. The objective dif-
ference is a subject that he claims "belongs more to anato-
mists and natural phi losophers
. .
.
” (p. 8).
Another aspect of Malebranche
' s view adopted by Hume
deals with the connection between ideas of the imaqination.
According to Malebranche, the connections between ideas of
the imagination depend on the connections between brain
traces. There are three primary types of connections be-
tween traces: (1) natural connections, (2) connections based
on identity in time, and (3) connections based on resem-
blance. Natural connections are described by Malebranche as
follows
:
There are traces in our brains that
are naturally tied to one another, and
even certain emotions of the spirits,
because that is necessary to preserva-
tion of life.... For example, the trace
of a great elevation one sees below one-
self, and from which one is in danger of
falling ... is naturally tied to the one
that represents death to us, and to an
emotion of the spirit that disposes us
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to flight (I 1.5,106)
Hume, in a passage reminiscent of Malebranche, describes
this connection as "deriv'd solely from custom and experi-
ence" {p. 148). [13] But, as I will show in my discussion of
custom, Hume's view of what constitutes a natural connection
IS both more extensive and more complex than that of Male-
branche
.
The second type of connection depends on the identity
of time when traces are made. ”it is enough that many
traces were produced at the same time for them all to rise
together again" (II 1.5,106). From his examples it is clear
that by "Identity in time" Malebranche meant to include
traces produced in succession. The original traces produced
by experiencing two objects at the same time or one immedi-
ately following another will be only weakly connected, and
such connections will be easily broken. But when objects
are continually conjoined in experience, the animal spirits
will cut a deep path between the traces occasioned by the
two objects, forming a strong connection. Upon experiencing
one of these objects, the animal spirits that flow into its
traces will continue on into the connected trace producing
the idea of the object that has been frequently conjoined
with it. The result is that men frequently judge that there
is some real connection between objects that are often
joined in their experience.
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Men never fail to judge that a thing isthe cause of a given effect when the twoare conjoined, given that the true cause
of the effect is unknown to them. ThisIS why everyone conclude that a movingball which strikes another is the trueand principal cause of the motion it
communicates to the other, and that the
soul s will is the true and principal
cause of movement in the arms, and other
such prejudices
—because it always hap-pens that a ball moves when struck by
another, that our arms move almost every
time we want them to and that we do not
sensibly perceive what else could be the
cause of these movement s .( I l l 2.3,224)
The third sort of connection between ideas depends on
resemblance. Resembling objects produce resembling traces,
and these, in turn, produce resembling ideas. This can lead
both to errors in sensation and errors in judgment
. [14] it
can lead to error in sensation because we mistakenly take
one object to be another resembling object. Suppose, for
instance, that we have experienced two resembling objects
and thus have two similar brain traces. When we are later
presented with" one of these objects, animal spirits may flow
into the traces occasioned by the other resembling object.
The result is that, in a sense, we actually experience the
non-present object resembling the present object. [15] This
generally occurs when one of the objects is more common or
familiar than the other. Familiar objects have made deeper
traces from the frequent flow of animal spirits. When a
less familiar object is presented and this object bears some
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resemblance to the familiar-t nuliar object, the animal spirits flow
into the deeper traces left by the familiar object. •when
the spirits have passed through traces many times, they en-
ter there more easily than other places nearby, through
which they have never passed, or have not passed as of-
ten.
.
(II 212, 134)
.
Errors of judgment arise from mistaking one idea for
another resembling idea. This mistake has the same source
as that found in sensation.
-The animal spirits that were
directed by the action of external objects, or even by or-
ders of the soul [i.e. by the will], to produce certain
traces in the brain often produce others that truly resemble
them in some things, but that are not quite the traces of
these same objects, nor those the soul desired to be repre-
sented ..."( n 212,134-35)
.
Hume's principles of association among ideas are simi-
lar to Malebranche's connections of ideas, yet they differ
in some important respects. The principles of association
are resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect. Accord-
ing to Hume, these are "natural" connections in the sense
that they are the universal principles "by which one idea
naturally introduces another" (p. 10). We can, of course,
combine and relate ideas in any way we choose. Such combin-
ing and relating would then be attributable to the will.
But the association of ideas by resemblance, contiguity and
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cause and effect is an activity of the imagination and does
not depend on the will. with respect to resemblance. Home
IS in complete agreement with Malebranche. But in place of
Malebranche's identity in time, Hume substitutes the princi-
ples Of contiguity in space and time and cause and effect.
Both these principles have features in common with Male-
branche's principle of identity. According to Hume, the im-
agination associates ideas of objects that we have experi-
enced to be contiguous in time or space. According to Male-
branche, identity accounts for the following situation:
If ... a man finds himself in some pub-lic ceremony, if he notes all the cir-
cumstances and all the principal persons
assisting at it, the time, place, day,
and all the other particulars, it will
suffice for him to remember the place,
or even some less noteworthy cir-
cumstance of the ceremony, to have allthe others recur to him.fli 1 / 5 , 105 )
For Hume, this would be explained by the associative rela-
tion of contiguity in space and time.
On Malebranche 's account it is the (near) identity in
time that objects are expe r i e nc ed
--,t h e i r constant
conjunction that leads us to connect their ideas so closely
that we suppose a causal connection. Unlike Malebranche,
Hume believes that there are causal connections between ob-
jects, yet he agrees with Malebranche that the strong con-
nection between ideas in the imagination produced by con-
stant conjunctions leads us to mistakenly suppose that we
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know of some necessary connection between objects.
So far I have dealt primarily with similarities between
Hume's and Malebranche
' s accounts of the imagination. There
are two differences that bear eKamlnation. The first dif-
ference is superficial, but can be misleading. The second
difference is both fundamental and crucial. it is fundamen-
tal in that it distinguishes Malebranche the Cartesian ra-
tionalist from Hume the empiricist. It is crucial in under-
standing why general rules are so important for Hume's epis-
temology. I will begin by examining the superficial, but
possibly misleading, difference.
When comparing Hume's and Malebranche
' s accounts of the
imagination, one cannot help but notice one pervasive dif-
ference. Hume's account lacks the constant appeal to
physiology found in Malebranche. McCracken explains this by
claiming that "Hume had little taste for such purported
physiological explanations of association and sometimes de-
rided that 'imaginary dissection of the brain '".[16] Mc-
Cracken's claim is based on a careless reading of the pas-
sage in question. Hume is pointing out that, in his initial
presentation of the principles of association, he did not
take advantage of the physiological explanation. But his
recognition that some such account underlies the facts of
association is made clear by the passage following the one
quoted by McCracken. Hume continues: "But tho' I have ne-
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glected any advantage, which I „ight have drawn fro. this
topic in explaining the relations of ideas, I a. afraid i
must here have recourse to it, m order to account for the
mistakes that arise from these relat ions" (p. 60). He then
proceeds to present a physiological explanation of the er-
rors arising from resemblance which is clearly similar to
Malebranche
' s account.
As the mind is endow'd with a power ofexciting any idea it pleases; wheneverIt dispatches the spirits into that re-
brain, in which the idea ispiac d; these spirits always excite theIdea, when they run into the propertraces, and rummage that cell, which be-longs to the idea. But as their motion
IS seldom direct, and naturally turns alittle to the one side or the other; forthis reason the animal spirits, fallinginto the contiguous traces, present
other related ideas in lieu of that
which the mind desir'd at first to sur-
vey. (p. 60-61)
Whether or not Hume had a distaste for physiological
explanations, I cannot pretend to determine. But there are
two more obvious reasons for his general reluctance to make
such appeals. First, his main concern is with the phenomena
of consciousness themselves, not with the underlying physio-
logical causes. Hume is interested in examining certain
facts of our experience to determine the "extent and force"
of the understanding. The physiology underlying such facts
is something that, like the examination of our sensations,
belongs more to anatomists and natural phi losophers . . . " (p.
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8). second, Hume recognized the danger of placing too much
emphasis on physiology. The discovery of a mistake in the
physiological account could lead readers to suppose that the
facts of consciousness being explained are also unwarranted.
But it is evident that he is concerned about the possibility
of such a mistake on the part of his readers in the dis-
claimer that preceeds the physiological explanation cited
above
.
I shall only premise, that we must dis-tinguish exactly betwixt the phenomenonItself, and the causes, which l shall
assign for it; and must not imagine from
any uncertainty in the latter, that theformer is also uncertain. The phenomena
may be real, tho' my explication be chi-
merical. The falsehood of one is no
consequence of that of the other; tho'
at the same time we may observe, that
'tis very natural for us to draw such a
consequence (p. 60) .
The second difference between Hume and Malebranche is
best approached through the subject of error. According to
Malebranche, "error is the cause of men's misery; it is the
sinister principle that has produced the evil in the world
... and we may hope for sound and genuine happiness only by
seriously laboring to avoid it" (I 1,1). Accordingly, one of
the main tasJcs Malebranche sets himself is to "examine the
causes and nature of our errors... "(I 1,1). The most "or-
derly and illuminating" method of examining error is one
that considers them in "their birth and origin" (I 1.1). Be-
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cause the senses and imagination depend on physiological
processes of the body, the examination of the birth and ori-
gin of their errors requires an examination of this physiol-
ogy. The errors of the imagination are first traced to
certain general principles: the connecting of ideas of the
imagination according to resemblance and identity in time.
These principles of connections among ideas are then ex-
plained according to their physiological origins.
Like Malebranche, Hume recognizes that the principles
of association inherent in the imagination are apt to lead
to errors. Resemblance is the major culprit, but contiguity
and cause and effect are also sources of error. ”Tho' resem-
blance be the relation which most readily produces a mistake
in ideas, yet the others of causation and contiguity may
also concur in the same inf luence" (p. 61). But, while Hume
agrees that these principles and the mistakes that arise
from them are caused by certain physiological processes, he
does not believe that knowledge of these processes is as
important as knowing that such mistakes do occur.
In addition to the particular processes involved in er-
rors, Malebranche continually stresses a more general reason
for error. We are constantly misled by sensation and the
ideas of the imagination which arise from sensation because
we take them to be a source of knowledge about the real
natures of objects. Malebranche, in the Cartesian tradi-
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can
tion, emphatically denies that sense
ever be the source of such knowledge.
and imagination
The sense and imagi-
nation depend entirely on the body and are provided by God
only for the preservation of the body. They are not meant
to provide us with knowledge of objects, but only with
limited truths about the relation of objects to our bodies.
Malebranche's rule for avoiding error in the senses applies
equally well to the imagination.
s^^ses as towhat things are in themselves, but only
as to the relation they have to the bodybecause, in fact, the senses were givento us, not to know the truth of thingsin themselves, but only for the preser-
vation of our body. (I 5, 24)
In he conclusion of
Malebranche notes:
the book on sense and imagination
All the thoughts the soul has
through the body, or through dependence
upon the body, are all for the sake of
the body ... they are all false or ob-
scure ... they serve only to unite us to
sensible goods and to everything that
can procure them for us; ... this unioninvolves us in infinite errors and very
great miseries (ii 3.6 195)
The source of our knowledge of the real natures of objects
IS the pure understanding, and it is by the ideas of the
pure understanding that we correct the errors of the senses
and imagination.
Our natural judgments
—
judgments of the senses and
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in^aginat ion-are adequate for their purpose. They serve to
preserve the body. But even in this capacity they are lia-
ble to error and require regulation by the pure understand-
ing. in judgments about the nature of objects the senses
and imagination can give us no truth whatsoever; such judg-
ments are "all false and obscure".
According to Hume there is no faculty of pure under-
standing. The following important passage is clearly
directed against any view that assumes the existence of such
a faculty:
I shall here take occasion topropose a second observation concerning
our demonstrative reasonings, which is
suggested by the same subject of mathe-
matics. 'Tis usual with mathematicians,
to pretend, that those ideas, which aretheir object, are of so refin'd and
spiritual a nature, that they fall not
under the conception of the fancey, but
must be comprehended by a pure andintellectual view, of which the superior
faculties of the soul are alone capable.
The same notion runs thro' most parts of
philosophy, and is principally made use
of to explain our abstract ideas, and to
show how we can form an idea of a
triangle, for instance, whichv shall
neither be an isosceles nor scalenum,
nor be confin'd to any particular length
and proportion of sides. 'Tis easy to
see, why philosophers are so fond of
this notion of some spiritual and
refin'd perceptions; since by that means
they cover many of their absurdities,
and may refuse to submit to the
decisions of clear ideas, by appealing
to such as are obscure and uncertain.
But to destroy this artifice, we need
but reflect on that principle so oft
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are
insisted on, that all our ideas
impressions
, (p. 72)
eliminating the faculty of pure understanding, Hume
IS faced With the task of accounting for certain features of
thought traditionally attributed to that faculty. As for
the ideas attributed to the pure understanding, Hume either
denies we have them or argues that they are really products
of the imagination that are founded on experience. But my
primary concern is with another feature that Hume needs to
account for the regulation of our judgments. He could not
follow Malebranche in an appeal to the pure understanding to
determine what kinds of judgments provide us with truth or
to account for the means by which we correct our natural
judgments. What Hume needs is an empirical method of regu-
lating and correcting natural judgments. Such a method must
itself be explicable within the framework of natural judg-
ments. General rules provide just such a method.
Custom
Descartes, Malebranche and Locke all acknowledge the
influence of custom on human thought and action. All agree
that customs are primarily the result of past repetition.
But, while they agree that customs are primarily the result
of repetition, they acknowledge exceptions. Descartes, for
instance, remarks:
[A] custom can be acquired by a solitary
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Trui°'’whpn‘^ long usage,inus en we unexpectedly mept wifv,
so.eth.ng very foul food that „e are
th s"lvrnt" ‘hati e e gives us may so change the
longed Ve°p" hrain, that we can nonger see any such food without hor-
Malebranche and Locke cite similar examples. [18] As
they see it, the distinguishing feature of customs is not
that they result from past repetition but that they are ar-
bitrary as opposed to natural, a distinction I shall discuss
in detail below. Hume, on the other hand, takes past repe-
tition as the distinguishing characteristic of custom. "We
call everything custom which proceeds from past repetition
Without any new reasoning or conclusion" (p. 102).
Following Descartes' mechanical account, Malebranche
supposed that customs or habits are formed when "pathways”
in the body become sufficiently open or worn to allow easy
passage of animal spirits. "Little by little the animal
spirits open and smooth these paths by their continual flow,
so that in time they find no more resistance" ( ll 1.5,108).
Locke apparently accepted the same explanation:
Custom settles habits of thinking in the
understanding, as well as of determining
in the will, and motions in the body:
all which seems to be but trains of mo-
tioins i the animal spirits, which, once
set a going, continue in the same steps
they have been used to; which, by often
treading, are worn into a smooth path
and the motion in it becomes easy, and
as it were natural. (II 33 . 6 , 529
)
[ 19
]
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There is no reason to suppose that Hume differed from
his predecessors with respect to the mechanics involved in
custom. This account follows naturally from the Male-
branchian account of the imagination, an account that Hume
clearly accepted. Furthermore, in discussing the effects of
custom in Book II, Hume makes frequent reference to physio-
logical processes. He refers to the "difficulty of spirits
moving in their new direction", and he explains that "this
difficulty excites the spirits" and that surprise "puts the
spirits into agitat ion" (p. 423 ).
All agree that the influence of custom can be found in
thought, passions, and movement. Locke and Malebranche take
the skill of a musician as the paradigm of customary move-
ment
.
[
20] Custom is also a source of connect ion between
ideas and passions. in an example later repeated by Male-
branch e, Descartes claims:
When a dog sees a
rally disposed t
when he hears a
partridge he
o run toward
gun fired, th
is natu-
it
,
and
is sound
naturally incites him to flight. But
nevertheless setters are usually so
trained that the sight of a partridge
causes them to stop, and the wound which
they afterwards hear when a shot is
fired over them, causes them to run
toward it
. [21]
Descartes notes that such conditioning is also possible
in men "and that even those who have the feeblest souls can
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acquire a very absolute doniinion over all their passions if
fficient industry is applied in training and guiding
• [22] Left to accidental circumstances, the con-
nections established by such conditioning are apt to produce
various pathological aversions, fears, and phobias. But
this capacity for linking ideas and passions, when properly
directed, can be used to man's benefit.
Finally, custom can be the source of connections be-
tween ideas. I have already discussed Hume's and Male-
branche's views on the connection between ideas of the imag-
ation. Here I will concentrate on the important differ-
ence between Hume and his predecessors over the distinction
between "natural" and "customary" connections of ideas. [23]
Locke draws the distinctions as follows:
Some of our ideas have a natural corre-
spondence and connection one with anoth-
er: it is the office and excellency of
our reason to trace these, and hold them
together in their peculiar beings. Be-
sides this there is another connection
of ideas wholly owing to chance and cus -
t^m. Ideas that in themselves are not
of kin, come to be so united in some
men's minds, that it is very Hard to
separate them, they always keep in com-
pany, and the one no sooner at any time
comes into the understanding, but its
associate appears with it; and if they
are more than two which are thus united,
the whole gang, always inseparable, show
themselves together. {II 33 . 6 , 529) [24]
According to Locke, judgment consists in the joining and
separating of ideas. A natural consequence of this view is
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Ideas are joined in an arbitrary manner, the re-
sulting judgment is likewise arbitrary. Habits or customs
Of thought consist of just such arbitrary judgments.
While Locke distinguishes between natural and customary
connections between ideas, Malebranche and Descartes make a
further distinction. There are connections between the non-
sensuous ideas of the pure understanding. These ideas and
the relations between them provide us with our real knowl-
edge, including our genuine knowledge of the physical world.
There are also natural connections between the ideas of the
imagination. These connections are essential for the pres-
ervation of our bodies. They are natural in the sense that
they depend on inborn mechanical dispositions of our bodies.
According to Malebranche:
There are traces in our brains that
are naturally tied to one another, and
even to certain emotions of the spirits,because that is necessary to preserva-
tion of life; and their connection can-
not be broken, or at least not easily
broken, because it is good that it be
always the same it consists in a
disposition of the brain fibers that we
have from birth. (II 1.5,106)
Finally, there are customary connections. These con-
nections are also between ideas of the imagination and de-
pend on body mechanisms. But they are either accidental,
such as the connections established by the identity of times
when objects are experienced, or they are artificial, such
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as the connections established by education.
Unlike Locke, Malebranche does not believe that judg-
ment consists in the joining and separating of ideas. Male-
branche ' s view of judgment is one that is later adopted, in
part, by Hume.
There is no difference on the partof the understanding between a simpleperception, a judgment, and an in-
erence, other than that the understand-ing by a simple perception perceives asimple thing without any relation to
anything else whatsoever, that in judg-
ments It perceives the relations betweentwo or more things, and that in infer-
ences It perceives the relations among
the relations of things. Consequently,
operations of the understanding
are nothing but pure perceptions. (t
1.2,7) [25] ^ ^
'
This is judgment on the part of the understanding ; it
"is only the perception of the relation found between two or
more things" (l 1.2,7). yet the will also plays a crucial
role in judgment. According to Malebranche, it is the will
that assents or withholds assent from the perception of the
understanding. in this he and Hume part company. As I not-
ed in the section on judgment, Hume held that the assent
involved in judgment is be lief and does not depend on the
will.
What is significant about Malebranche
' s theory of judg-
ment is that the particular manner of joining ideas does not
determine whether or not a judgment is arbitrary. What de-
41
rep-
termines the latter is the truth of the perception-its
resentation of a relation that actually holds between ideas
or things. Natural judgments do provide us with a measure
of truth-the relation of objects to our bodies. They do
not provide us with truth about the objects themselves.
customary judgments, on the other hand, do not provide us
with truth about the relation of objects to our bodies or
about objects themselves. Such judgments are, therefore,
arbitrary.
Hume agrees with Malebranche that natural connections
are based on inborn dispositions necessary for preservation,
but he does not separate natural connections from customary
ones. The connecting of ideas by custom is both natural and
necessary for preservation. According to Hume, the imagina-
tion has natural dispositions or "propensities" to join
ideas in certain ways. One such natural propensity is to
join ideas by custom or repetition. But the fact that the
joining of ideas by custom is both natural and necessary to
human nature does not preclude the possibility that some
particular connection arising from custom will not be neces-
sary or may actually be destructive. The same principle ac-
counts for both of the following judgments;
One who concludes somebody to be near
him, when he hears an articulate voice
in the dark, reasons justly and natural-
ly; tho'that conclusion be deriv'd from
nothing but custom, which infixes and
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inlivens the idea of a human creature
?he"present°Ln^" conjunction wUhtn esent impression. But one. who
Snston^^of""""^ with'the ap!
Lrhen^ K ^ spectres in the dark, may,per aps, be said to reason, and to rea-son naturally too; But then itin the same sense, that a maladyto be natural; as arising from
causes, tho' it be contrary to
must be
is said
natural
health
,
uaf "’^st natural sitn tion of man. (p. 225 - 26 )
Here Hume is clearly differentiating between a just
judgment and one that is not just. Yet both depend on the
same principle of custom. Thus, the "justness" of a judg-
ment is not determined by the principle that gives rise to
it. To say that a judgment is derived from custom is not to
say that it is arbitrary. Like Malebranche, Hume distin-
guishes between arbitrary judgments by their ability to pro-
vide truth. Yet Hume believes that natural judgments, judg-
ments based on custom, can provide truth. But they can just
as naturally lead to error. If wrong judgment is to be
avoided, natural judgments must be regulated. This regula-
tion is achieved by employing general rules. The next chap-
ter is devoted to the examination of the formation of these
rules and a description of how they serve to regulate and
correct natural judgments.
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chapter II
the formation and structure op general rules
Hume's first discussion of the operation of general
rules IS found in Book 1, part 3, section 8 of the Treatise
.
The subject Of the section is probabilities determined in
Philosophically unjustified wavs. Hume cites four cases,
calling them
"unphllosophlcal probabilities".
It IS important to remember what Hume means by "proba-
bility
. His discussion of probability follows his discus-
sion of belief and is meant as a continuation of the same
subject. Having discussed the nature of belief and how we
come to form beliefs, Hume turns to the topic of how we come
to form various degrees of belief. Hume uses the term
probable' to describe those judgments which are made with
less than complete certainty. His interest is in how and
why we form different degrees of belief or assurance in our
various judgments.
Hume is careful to inform the reader of his meaning.
At the beginning of his discussion of probability in section
11, Hume notes that some philosophers (including himself at
other points) have divided all our reasoning into Icnowledge
and probability, the former based on the relation of ideas,
the latter including any other forms of reasoning. This, of
course, entails classifying all causal judgments as proba-
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ble.
mon
But Hume states his
signification of words
intention of
by allowing
preserving
that "many
the "com-
srgument s
from causality exceed probabi 1 i ty . . . " (p
.
least for the present discussion, he will
into three kinds, depending on the decree
tached to them;
124)
. Thus
, at
divide reasonings
of assurance at-
y knowledge, l mean the assurance aris-ing from the comparison of ideas. Byproofs, those arguments, which are d°-riv d from the relation of cause and ef-fect, and which are entirely free ^^romdoubt and uncertainty. By probability,that evidence, which is still attended
with uncertainty. fp. 124)
.
According to Hume, there are two philosophically sanc-
tioned methods of proportioning belief: probability of
chances and probability of causes. in the case of chances,
such as a roll of a die, belief is proportioned according to
the "superior number of chances" (p. 127). if the die has
four sides marked with the same number and two sides marked
with a different number, we conclude that it is more proba-
ble that the number marked on four sides will turn up on any
given roll. in the case of causes, belief is proportioned
according to the frequency with which an effect has been
observed to follow from a given cause. in both cases Hume
shows how the degrees of belief are explicable according to
his theory of belief. His explanation is not important for
present purposes. What is important is Hume's claim that
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these two methods constitute the
"philosophical" forms of
probabUlty. Philosophers accept these as legitimate ways
proportion belief; they are "reasonable foundation of be-
lief and opinion" (p. 143 ).
in the previous section on causality and belief, Hume's
primary concern has not been to present a normative philo-
p ical system. While he has made distinctions between
good and bad judgments, he has not advanced a thesis about
how we oug^ to make causal judgments or about how we ought
to proportion our beliefs. His primary concern so far has
been how we, Ui f act
, make causal judgments and form be-
liefs. As I showed in Chapter I, Hume adopts and develops
the psychophysiological view of natural judgments held by
Malebranche. if his account is not meant to be a philo-
sophical analysis of how we make rationally justified judg-
ments, but, rather, a psychophysiological account of how hu-
man beings in fact make judgments, then his account must be
capable of explaining all of our judgments, not simply those
judgments we consider philosophically respectable. His dis-
cussion of unphilosophical probabilities is an attempt to
show that certain forms of judgment that we take to be ille-
gitimate or unjustified are based on the same principles as
legitimate probabilities, that is, the same natural
psychophysiological mechanisms.
Hume does not conclude that we have no grounds for mak-
ing a distinction between justified and unjustified judg-
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-nts. The distinction is well founded. But his account
of the origin and nature of our judgments and beliefs is
correct, then the method for distinguishing between justi-
fied and unjustified judgments must be different from what
Philosophers have commonly supposed, of course, Hume is not
introducing a new point here. There are two general themes
in Book I of the Treatise
. The first is Hume's account of
the nature of the understanding. The second is Hume's in-
sistence that, given a correct account of the nature of the
understanding, the traditional, ratlonallstically conceived
philosophical systems leave the majority of our judgments
either inexplicable or completely unjustified. His best
known example is causal judgment.
As I explained in my first chapter, Hume denied that
there is any faculty of pure understanding as understood by
Descartes and Malebranche. what is of particular interest
and importance in his account of unphi losophical probabili-
ties IS the appearance of a non-rat ionalistic method for
correcting and justifying certain forms of judgment. This
method involves the use of general rules. While Hume is
only interested in a particular kind of error in judgment in
this section and is not specifically addressing the question
of justification in general, l believe that his account of
general rules provides the rudiments of an empirically based
system of judgment justification. This rudimentary account
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- later expanded to cover
.oral and political iudg.ents.
There are r.portant U.its to the justification provided by
general rules, and these li.rts will be addressed in Chapter
III- In this chapter my main concern is to work out the
account of general rules presented by Hume in the discussion
of unphilosophical probabilities.
According to Hume, there are four types of un-
philosophical probability. Each is based on a certain
principle of judgment that, while unjustified, is fully
explicable on Hume's account of belief. The four principles
are as follows:
1. An argument founded on any remember-
ed matter of fact "is more convincing,
according as the fact is recent or re-
mote” (p. 143).
2. A recent experiment affects us morethan one long past.
1 :
longer the required inference,
the less it affects our judgment.
4. Rashly formed general rules produce
prejudice which influences our judgment.
Belief, recall, can be generally characterized as a
lively idea related to or associated with a present impres-
sion" (p. 96). Probabilities are weaker or lesser degrees of
belief. Given the mechanics involved in the production of
the majority of our beliefs, it follows that the fainter the
original impression the less vivacity there is to transfer
to an associated idea. The result is weaker belief. Un-
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philosophical probabilities of the first sort are explained
by the fact that more remote memories are generally less
lively than more recent ones and thus have a lesser degree
of vivacity to transfer to the associated idea. The feeling
of belief tends to weaken over time. As it weakens it
"weighs" less in our thoughts and has less influence on our
behavior. This might explain some people's seeming inabili-
ty to learn from their mistakes. In order to learn from
mistakes, one must be able to assign equal weight both to
certain remembered facts and to present facts. And this Is
what a judicious reasoner will do. But not everyone is a
judicious reasoner and, as some regretted action becomes
more remote, the memory of it loses the vivacity needed to
enliven an idea to the degree needed to influence our pre-
sent behavior.
The second principle is similar to the first. While
the first principle depends upon the change in authority of
a remembered fact, the second principle depends on the
change in authority of a remembered argument. Hume's own
example aptly illustrates the point:
A drunkard, who has seen his companion
die of a debauch, is struck with this
instance for some time, and dreads a
like accident for himself: But as the
memory of it decays away by degrees, his
former security returns, and the danger
seems less certain and real.(p. 144).
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Again this fact Is explained by the mechanics of belief, "a
lively impression produces more assurance than a faint one,
because it has more original force to communicate to the
related idea, which thereby acquires a greater force and vi-
vacity»(p. 144).
The third principle—the longer the chain of inference,
the less we are affected-explains how "proofs" (judgments
free from uncertainty) degenerate into "probabi 1 it ies"
(judgments "attended with uncertainty"). if our degree of
assurance is generated by the degree of vivacity transferred
from the original impression to the associated idea, then,
Hume believes, tis evident this vivacity must decay in
proportion to the distance, and must lose somewhat in each
transition" (p. 144) . it might be noted that this is only
"evident" assuming a physiology of animal spirits.
The final form of unphilosophical probability is rashly
formed general rules. The way these general rules are
formed is particularly important. While following rashly
formed rules leads to prejudice and thus to errors in judg-
ment, following judiciously formed general rules is, accord-
ing to Hume, the only way to correct prejudice and all other
unphilosophical probabilities. To understand the dis-
tinction between rashly formed and judiciously formed gener-
al rules and the important corrective capacity of the lat-
it will be necessary to examine Hume's account in some
detail
.
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Hume supplies the following account
sing from rashly formed general rules:
of prejudice aris-
^^ishman cannot have wit^AnFrenchman cannot have solidity; for
reason, tho' the conversation of
e former in any instance be visiblyvery agreeable, and of the latter very
;]udicious, we have entertain'd such aprejudice against them, that they mustbe dunces or fops in spite of sense andreason. (p. 146-47)
[
1 ]
What must be accounted for within Hume's general ac-
count of belief formation is "why men form general rules,
and allow them to influence their judgment, even contrary to
present observation and exper ience
. .
.
" (p. 147). Hume's an-
swer IS that "it proceeds from those very same principles,
on which all judgments concerning cause and effect depend.
Our judgments concerning cause and effect are deriv'd from
habit and experience. .." (p. 147) General rules arise from
natural processes of the imagination. Lilce the other three
unphilosophical probabilities, rashly formed general rules
are derived from the same principles (based on the same pro-
cesses) as all our causal judgments (including "proofs"),
viz., custom and experience.
An obvious question arises here. The rash formation of
general rules is an illegitimate method of belief formation.
Yet Hume claims it is based on the very same principles as
the legitimate philosophical probabilities. What, then.
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distinguishes the two, allowing us to view one as justified,
the other as unjustified? The answer lies in the formation
of the rules.
Hu.e-s account of the fundamental method for forming
causal judgments involves the customary transition of the
gination based on a past constant conjunction. Thus, it
IS puzzling why he believes that prejudices of the sort he
describes can be explained by the same principles as all
causal judgment. Prejudice is one of the more notorious ex-
amples of beliefs based on very little experience. But, in
fact, Hume believes there is another, less fundamental, but
equally important method of forming causal judgments. Hume
calls this an "oblique" or "artificial" method.
Hume first explains the oblique manner of causal infer-
ence in section 8. The most fundamental way of producing
the customary transition from cause to effect is by experi-
ence of past constant conjunction. But, having had experi-
ence of causal reasoning in general and recognizing certain
principles governing such reasoning, we, in a sense, acquire
another, higher-order custom of causally relating objects of
which we have had little or no past experience. Inasmuch as
this is an important point, I quote Hume at length:
Even in common life, we may attain
knowledge of a particular cause merely
by one experiment, provided it be made
with judgment, and after careful removal
of all foreign and superfluous circum-
stances. Now as after one experiment of
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either'^of' th^
"’'''d. upon the appearance
draw an inf ® ' =anerence concerning the
hablt"c?n correlative; and as a
one
acquir'd merely by
Kofi It may be thought that
the effecr°e " estee.’d
cSltv^wfn custom. But this diffi-vanish, if we consider, that
onw suppos'd to have had
effect ^ particular, yet we have had many millions toconvince us of this principle; tha? like
9^ 2^ PLac'd in ]^e circu^i^i^nMI^
always produce like ettects ; and asthis principle has establish'd itself by
a sufficient custom, it bestows an
firmness on any opinion towhich It can be apply 'd. The connexion
of Ideas is not habitual after one
experiment; but this connexion is com-prehended under another principle which
IS habitual (p. 104-105).
Here Hume is discussing how we can attain knowledge of
causes without experiencing past constant conjunction of the
objects in question. if we are to avoid error, it is impor-
tant that such judgments be made only after the "removal of
all foreign and superfluous circumstances". But the point
of interest at present is not how we make correct causal
judgments after merely one experiment, but, rather, how we
form prejudices after one experiment. The answer is that
after experiencing one (or a few) cases of conjunction,
which does not itself establish a custom, we rely on a
higher-order custom established by our long experience of
causal reasoning. in other words, we learn to guide our
judgment by causal principles.
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in the discussion of the probability of causes, Hu.e
makes the same point. Initially our causal beliefs arise
from experienced constant conjunctions. But, while this way
Of forming beliefs is "first in order
... no one, who has
the age of maturity, can any longer be acquainted
with it"(p. 131). But the time we have become mature (ex-
perienced) reasoners we have come to recognize certain gen-
eral principles involved in making causal inferences and
have acquired the higher order custom of connecting objects
according to this custom.
The mind, having form'd another observa-tion concerning the connexion of causesand effects, gives new force to its rea-soning from that observation; and by
means of it can build an argument on one
single experiment, when duly prepar'd
and examin'd. what we have found onceto follow from any object, we conclude
will for ever follow from it; and ifthis maxim be not always built upon as
certain, 'tis not for want of a suffi-
cient number of experiments, but because
we frequently meet with instances to the
contrary (p. 131)
.
The causes of prejudice Hume describes are not ex-
plained merely by the fact that they result from causal in-
ference made in this "oblique" manner. As Hume points out,
this is the most common method of making causal inferences
among experienced reasoners. But his descriptions of this
process have been of its legitimate employment. Thus, in
both passages cited, he is careful to point out that care
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be taken to insure that such inferences be "niade withjudgment, and after careful re„,oval of all foreign and su-
perfluous circumstances", p. 104). Prejudices result from
the improper or "rash" employment of general rules, ignoring
these important conditions.
The rash formation of general rules is not simply a
case of hasty generalisation, as in, "A is B, therefore all
A are B". The problem lies in the failure to attend to the
complexity of the causal circumstances. Simply adding more
instances of A's that are B's may not result in a better
judgment. And, as Hume has noted, when we do attend to the
complexity of these circumstances, one instance may provide
an adequate basis for generalization.
Experienced reasoners are accustomed to forming causal
judgments in an oblique manner. After a certain amount of
experience in the world we assume that, at least in general,
things have causes. (According to Hume, it is only those
who think philosophically or scientifically who assume that
everything has a cause, cf. p. 132). Suppose we meet some-
one who IS quite witless. The imagination causally associ-
ates certain other features of the man with his witlessness.
This is not a reflective process; the imagination naturally
associates these features. But the association is to some
extent rule-governed. The association is not made simply by
the experience of repeated past conjunction, but, instead,
by the unreflective employment of causal principles. The
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problem lies in a failure to distinguish complexities in the
causal circumstances. The feature we note about the man is
is Irish. But he may also be uneducated, m, se-
nile, etc. we are not careful to note and separate the es-
sential from the superfluous circumstances.
Our ability to make such distinctions depends on our
general experience of causal reasoning and on our judicious-
ness as reasoners. These in turn depend on our ability to
employ £roperly formed general rules. But, before discuss-
ing the nature of properly formed rules, let me return for a
moment to rashly formed rules.
Hume believes that careful attention must be given to
the complexity of the causal circumstances to avoid errors
in judgment, which result from a natural propensity of the
imagination.
When the superfluous circumstances sur-
rounding the cause are numerous, and re-
markable, and frequently conjoined with
the essential, they have such an influ-
ence on the imagination, that even in
the absense of the latter they carry us
on to the conception of the usual ef-
fect (p. 148) .
Having causally associated a certain complex 'object', for
example, (A[1]&A[2]), with a certain effect, B, we are led
to judge B upon the experience of either A[l] or A[2], even
though A[2] is in fact superfluous. This propensity of the
imagination is, in turn, an instance of a more general pro-
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pensity: •When an object appears that resembles any cause in
y considerable circumstances, the Imagination naturally
carries us to a lively conception of the usual effeet
. . .
•
,p.
150). Having established a transition between X, where
X=(A[1ISA[21), and Y, upon experiencing A[2), which resem-
bles X, we judge Y.
Hume has not yet specified what basic causal principles
guide our 'higher order' iudampni-c=j agments. Yet simply examining
the judgments we do in fact malce and drawing up a list of
rules Implicit in such judgments would not seem to provide
us with a normative guide for maJtlng causal judgments.
Hume's discussion of the unphi losophical probabilities shows
that he believed that many judgments we ma)te, while fully
explicable according to the general principles of our under-
Standing, are illegitimate.
222222222
Throughout his discussion of the unphi losophical proba-
bilities, Hume is clearly assuming some standards by which
we judge such probabilities illegitimate. Equally clearly,
such standards cannot be the kind invoked by Descartes and
Malebranche. The standards must be derivable from and ex-
plicable within Hume's system, and, according to Hume's
system, all of our causal judgments depend on the customary
transition of the imagination. There is an obvious problem
of how to distinguish (or why we should distinguish) between
legitimate and illegitimate judgments. Hume states the
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problem as follows:
arp
to my system, all reasoningse nothing but the effects of custom-and custom has no Influence, but by In-
a strong.
i^^gin^tion, a^d giving Ssong conception of any obiect ti-
iud^en'V^'^'^a'^®' ^°ncluLd,'tha; ourj gment and imagination can never be
on^the^V^^"^ custom cannot operate
ner as \n a man-/ to render it opposite to theformer. (p. 149)
If, within Hume’s system, all judgments are based on natural
propensities of the imagination, how can he maintain that
our
-judgment” corrects the propensities of the imagination?
Hume believes that we correct judgments made according
to the unphilosophical probabilities by appeal to what he
calls "general rules by which to judge of cause and effect",
which are discovered by reflecting on past judgments. They
are rules, "by which we ought to regulate our judgments con-
cerning causes and effects"(p. 145
, emp. mine).
To solve the problem Hume appeals to a "second influ-
ence" of general rules. Hume refers the reader ahead to
section 15 where he cites eight rules for guiding causal
judgments. Commenting on these rules Hume says:
Here is all the LOGIC I think pro-
per to employ in my reasoning; and per-
haps even this was not very necessary,
but might have been supplied by the nat-
ural principles of our understanding.
Our scholastic headpieces and logicians
shew no such superiority above the mere
vulgar in their reason and ability, as
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to give US any inclination to imitatethem in deliverina » i -Lmxiar^-Lveri g a long system ofrules and precepts to direct our iudq-
th?o'
philosophy. All the rules ofis nature are easy in their inventionbut extremely difficult in their appli-cation (p. 175) [ 2 ]
Thus, we correct judgments made according to rashly
formed general rules (and other unphi losophical probabili-
ties) by employing these general rules by which to judge of
causes and effects. But Hume does not claim merely that we
do in fact correct our judgments according to these rules.
What, then, distinguishes the general rules by which we
oug^ to regulate our judgment from general rules rashly
formed to ourselves? According to Hume the rules that we
ought to use in regulating our judgments are "form'd on the
nature of the understanding and our experience of its opera-
tions in the judgments we form concerning objects. By them
we learn to distinguish accidental circumstances from ef-
ficacious causes" (p. 149). How are such rules "form'd on
the nature of the understanding"? Hume's account of the
"opposition" of general rules is helpful here:
When an object appears, that resembles
any cause in any considerable cir-
cumstances, the imagination naturally
carries us to a lively conception of its
usual effect, tho' the object be differ-
ent in the most material and most ef-
ficacious circumstances from that cause.
Here is the first influence of general
rules. But when we taJce a review of
this act of mind, and compare it with
the more general and authentic op-
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of we find
strucfiv. nature, and de-
rsnoo
reasoning; which is the
second^ inf'll
rejecting it. This is theinfluence of general rulec:implies the condemnation of the former
Irltlnr Tr^ T' — the°o:he;
^nH i, ' to the dispositiona d character of the person. Thevulgar are commonly guided by the firstand wise men by the second. (p. 149) .
'
Again, suppose we meet a man who is witless. Reasoning
in an "oblique" manner we causally associate a certain fea-
ture of this man (his Irishness) with witlessness. Upon
meeting another man, we note this same feature, establishing
a resemblance between him and the first man. We then expect
the same "effect" and conclude that he too will be witless,
although he is "different in the most material and most ef-
ficacious circumstances" from the first man. This is the
first influence of general rules. If we examine this judg-
ment, we note that it involves making a causal judgment
without distinguishing the type of resemblance involved. We
thereby expect the same effect. To analyze this mistake in
judgment assumes we have some standards for determining cor-
rect causal judgments. These standards are implicit in the
"more general and authentic operation of the understanding".
Thus, by comparing the judgment formed according to rashly
formed general rules to our "authentic" judgments, we recog-
nize the former as "irregular ... and destructive of all the
most establish'd principles of reasoning ..." (p. 150 ).
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According to Hume, the standards Implicit in our "gen-
eral and authentic" judgments are the eight rules for judg-
ing causes and effects. These rules are formed by reflec-
tion on our experience of past judgments. Some of our past
judgments have been true, others false. After a certain
amount of experience „e are able to discern the principles
governing true judgments. Thus, the rules for judging
causes and effects are taken as standards of causal judgment
because they are the rules implicit in our past true judg-
merits
. [3]
A natural question to raise at this point is how we
distinguish between true and false judgments. while Hume
clearly held a correspondence theory of truth (cf
. p. 448)
,
he took the general ability to make our experience coherent
as indication of the truth of judgments. But Hume’s view on
this issue can only be understood within the context of his
particular brand of skepticism and l want to postpone the
discussion of that topic until the next chapter. What is
important for the present discussion is Hume's belief that
by reflecting on past judgments we are able to discern cer-
tain principles involved in our successful judgments. The
degree to which we will be able to discern these principles
will depend on our experience and education. Consider
Hume's comments from section 7:
A peasant can give no better reason for
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to sav than
right- Rn?^
commonly It does not go
that Vhe artizan easily perceives,
noifi ® force in the sprinq or
Sr the''"'whe^®l Influence
effect ferhi®' '^"t.al
dust wh'^ I? reason of a grain of, hich puts a stop to the wholemovement. From the observation of se^!
fo?m instances, philosophers
tS^^t =1^’'""’' connection be-wix all causes and effects is equally
tainty m some instances proceeds fromhe secret opposition of contrarycauses, (p. 132) . r
Those of the most limited experience and education are
least able to discern the general principles involved in
successful judgments. Thus the "vulgar", following the nat-
ural propensities of the imagination, "are commonly guided
by the first [influence of general rules] "(p. 150). The
philosopher is supposed to have, not only far more extensive
and diverse experience than the peasant, but also, through
education, to have access to the 'experience* of a wide
range of other people both past and present. in recognizing
the principles involved in successful judgments, he is able
to establish general rules for guiding causal judgments.
Thus, the "wise" are guided by the second influence of gene-
ral rules.
One must taJce care in distinguishing between "wise" and
"vulgar" reasoners. The difference is not between those who
maJce judgments according to natural propensities and those
who do not. According to Hume, alj. judgments are made ac-
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cording to natural propensities. This applies to the judg-
ments Of the ••wise" reasoner in two respects. First, the
general rules used by such reasoners are based on natural
propensities discovered by reflection on 4. •Y ri past judgments.
Thus, these rules are simply standards developed from the
natural principles implicit in our successful judgments.
They are not standards based on rational insight into the
"essence" of objects, or on innate ideas or any other ratio-
nalistic criteria.
Second, if we examine the reasoning involved in deriv-
ing these general rules, we will discover a familiar pat-
tern. To determine which of the principles employed in our
past judgments ought to regulate our judgments, "our reason
must be considered as a kind of cause, of which truth is the
natural effect ..." (p. 180)
. He take past judgments as ob-
jects in our experience and note that some of the objects
are constantly conjoined with truth. While this is a some-
what awkward way of speaking, Hume's point is clear. Gene-
ral rules are formed by examining past judgments. We are
able to sort these objects into types according to their
success or failure. This, in turn, allows us to discover
principles involved in the successful judgments. We then
judge that all judgments of this type will be successful.
The inference involved in making this judgment is as fol-
lows :
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Judgments of type
stantly conjoined
experience
.
(A >B) have been
with success in
con-
past
Judgments of type
successful
(A >B) will always be
According to Hutne
, such inferences are "not founded on
reasoning or on any process of the understanding"
. [4] They
are based on the customary transition of the
natural propensity. Hume concludes:
imaginat ion—
a
amy here have
Mean while the sceptics
the pleasure of observing a new and sig-
nal contradiction in our reason, and ofseeing all philosophy ready to be sub-
verted by a principle of human nature,
and again sav'd by a new direction ofthe very same principle. The following
of general rules is a very unphi losophi-
cal species of probability; and yet 'tis
only by following them that we can cor-
rect this, and all other unphi losophical
probabilities. (p. 150)
There is one further aspect of Hume's basic account of
general rules that deserves emphasis. This involves the
difference between imagination and judgment. The general
rules for judging causes and effects were introduced to
explain how there can be a conflict between imagination and
judgment when, according to Hume's system, all judgments are
derived from the imagination. it is important to keep in
mind a certain ambiguity in the use of the word 'imagina-
tion'. To say that a judgment is based on the imagination
need not imply that it is illegitimate. As was shown in
68
Chapter i, 'imagination' is a t
the faculty by which we form and
echnical term
unite ideas.
referring to
But we also
^^^^iri^uish between qodh u jg od and bad reasoning and mark this
distinction by attributing bad reasoning to "mere imagina-
tion and good reasoning to “judgment". Here we use ’imagi-
nation to refer to the more frivolous workings of the
imagination. m section 11 Hume acknowledges this ambigu-
i ty
:
In general we may observe, that as
?oundl"/^" P^°bable reasonings !sf ed on the vivacity of ideas, itresembles many of those whimsies andprejudices, which are rejected under the
opprobrious character of being offspring
of the imagination. By this expression
It appears that the work, imagination,IS commonly us'd in two different
senses; and tho'nothing be more con-trary to true philosophy, than this in-
accuracy, yet in the following reasoning
I have often been oblig’d to fall intoIt. When I oppose imagination to the
memory, l mean the faculty, by which we
orm our fainter ideas. When I oppose
It to reason, l mean the same faculty,
excluding only our demonstrative and
probable reasonings. (p. 117-l8n)
To oppose judgment to imagination is not to suppose
that there is a faculty of judgment entirely distinct from
the faculty of imagination, that is, the faculty by which we
form our fainter ideas. in this sense, "the memory, senses,
and understanding [judgment] are ... all of them founded on
the imaginat ion.
.
.
" (p. 265). The distinction between judg-
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-nt and Innaginatlon is between those judgments based on the
•""ore extensrve and constant- operations of the understand-
ing and those judgments based on the
-.ore capricious and
uncertain- operations of the understanding
,p. 149 ,. But
the fact that the difference is a matter of degree does not
""ean that each should have equal authority ,or no authority)
in guiding our judgments.
Hume defends the distinction in justifying his
criticism of the ancient philosophers. These philosophers,
Hume claims,
-were guided by every trivial propensity of the
imagination... (p. 224). But, if all of our reasoning is in
fact guided by the Imagination, then this would not seem a
particularly telling criticism. Hume justifies the crltl-
cism as follows:
It may be objected, that the imagi-
nation, according to my own confession,being the ultimate judge of all systems
of philosophy, l am unjust in blaming
the ancient philosophers for making use
of that faculty, and allowing themselves
to be entirely guided by it in their
reasonings. in order to justify myself,
I must distinguish in the imaginationbetwixt the principles which are perma-
nent, irresistable
, and universal; such
as the customary transition from causes
to effect, and from effects to causes;
And the principles, which are change-
able, weak and irregular The former
are the foundation of all our thought
and actions, so that upon their removal
human nature must immediately perish and
go to ruin. The latter are neither
unavoidable to mankind, nor necessary,
or so much as useful in the conduct of
life (p. 225)
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Hume is not eliminating the distinction between judg-
-nt and Imagination.
„hat he is doing is, in effect,
redefining the distinction. One of Hume's major tasks was
the debunking of the traditional views of the nature of
judgment. But to deny that such views are correct is not to
deny that there is such a thing as judgment, which can be
distinguished from 'mere' imagination. Throughout his works
Hume constantly distinguishes between conclusions which can
be justly" drawn and those that cannot; between "wise" and
"judicious" reasoning and "foolish" and "vulgar" reasoning.
There are, then, standards for distinguishing between good
reasoning or "judgment" and bad reasoning or "imagination"
and to adhere to these standards is to make rational
judgments. Likewise, there are standards for moral judg-
ments and to adhere to such standards is to judge morally.
The standards are embodied in general rules; thus, to guide
our judgments according to general rules is to make rational
judgments
.
Clearly a lot more needs to be said about the normative
authority of general rules. i have indicated that this
authority is related to our experience of what sorts of
judgments are likely to lead to truth. This raises ques-
tions of justification and the relationship between Hume's
theory of general rules and his skepticism. The next chap-
ter is devoted to these issues. But before turning to that
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topic, I want briefly to discuss Tho.as Hearn's account of
general rules. This is the only thorough discussion
of the subject known to me Thonnh t uug I have profited from
reading his discussion, i think- i k = ou 1 nink It has certain shortcomings
which deserve to be pointed out.
The central features of Hearn's account are as follows:
There are two different types of general rules. The first
type "describes a propensity of the imagination to extend
the scope of judgments formed in one set of circumstances to
other resembling but non-identical circumstances"
. [5 ] The
second type "function to correct certain natural
propensities which result in erroneous belief or action if
permitted to operate unchecked.
" [6] According to Hearn,
these two types of general rule are very different. Those
of the first type involve the propensity of the imagination
to generalize and are the source of illegitimate judgments.
Those of the second type are not the result of mere
propensities of the imagination; they are "rules of the
understanding" and are "corrective, reflective and direc-
tive". [7] They are corrective in serving to correct natural
propensities; they are reflective in being "consciously
formulated and adopted. "[8] They are directive in having
normative authority: "we 'ought' to follow them and failure
to do so is a potential source of error. "[9]
The formation of the first type of general rule is
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•explicable in ter.s of the fa.iliar Hu.ean principles of
resemblance... UO, The second type of general rules rs
formulated by reflecting on the nature of our mental activ-
ities and operations... [11] According to Hearn,
..the outcome
of this reflection is the formation of rules by use of which
• •• coJ^iT©ction occiitq” rioi tturs
.[12] Hearn's description of the
formation of the "first sori-" „j-irs t of general rules is as
follows
:
Let us suppose that C is known to be
necessary for the produc-tion of E. However, when c produces E,It IS conjoined with D which is entirelyincidental to the production of E. Theeffect of the conjunction of D with Chowever, is that the imagination extendsthe principle "C causes E" to the resem-bling circumstances "C and D causeThe imagination even can be led topect the production of e when Dpresent and C absent. This effectthe imagination is what Hume calls
E".
ex-
is
on
thefirst influence of general rules".
[
13 ]
Hearn has surprisingly little to say about the formation of
the "second sort" of general rule. He tells us that they
are formed by reflecting on the nature of our mental
activities, but he does not attempt to show the structure of
this second type of rule as he does with the first type. i
believe the failure to do so leads him to overlook an
important point which I will discuss below.
What I have been saying here amounts to a very sketchy
account of Hearn's view, but it is adequate for purposes of
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comparing Hearn's account of the formation of general rules
with my own.
The similarities between our accounts are easily
stated. „e agree that general rules are both the source of
Illegitimate judgments. we also agree that, in their
correctrve capacity, general rules are normative. Finally,
we agree that normative general rules are derived from
reflection on our "mental activities and operations". on
the other hand, our differences stem primarily from one
fundamental disagreement. while Hearn claims there are two
very different types of general rules, I claim there is only
one type of general rule. Hearn's reason for insisting that
there are two different types of rule is that in one case
rules are the result of mere propensities of the
imagination, resulting in illegitimate judgments, while in
the other case the rules are the product of the
understanding, resulting in legitimate judgments. But this
is very misleading. What Hearn calls the "generalizing
propensity of the imagination" is simply the imagination's
propensity to join ideas by resemblance and custom.
According to Hume, these are fundamental natural principles
of human thought. Hume was attempting to explain aM
judgments by means of the same fundamental principles, while
at the same time preserving the distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate judgments. Clearly the
distinction between legitimate and Illegitimate judgments
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result from
cannot depend on whether or not they
propensities of the imagination.
As I showed above, the two "operations" of general
rules described by Hume are identical in form, m the first
case a person has experienced objects of type A constantly
conjoined with objects of type B. He is then presented with
an object a, which resembles objects of type A. By a
customary transition, he forms the idea of an object of type
this idea is enlivened by the Impression of a. He
thus judges— or believes—B. m the second case the
operations involved are exactly the same. A person has
experienced objects of type A (in this case judgments) con-
stantly conjoined with objects of type B (truth). He is
then presented with an object a (a particular judgment)
which r6sembles obiects nf auuj r or type A. By a customary
transition he forms the idea of B and this idea is enlivened
by a. TO call these two very different types of rules, one
based on propensities of the imagination, the other on the
understanding, is certainly misleading.
Surprisingly, after distinguishing general rules into
two types, Hearn acknowledges that "there is no sense in
which these ["reflective"] rules could be other than empiri-
cal and, hence, products of probable reason or custom". [14]
But, as I noted above, Hearn has little to say about this
point and makes no attempt to explain how these rules are
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the product Of custom. if he had worked this out he mighthave recognized that, while we attribute preiudice to the
imagination and general rules to the judgment, the only
distinction is between the more "capricious and uncertain"
and the more "extensive and constant" operations of the
imagination.
Hume has good reason to insist that the two examples of
the operation of general rules involve only the "redirect-
ing" of the "very same principle". it is important to keep
in mind the task that Hume is trying to accomplish. He is
developing a theory of natural judgments. Part of his
project is to uncover the fundamental principles operative
in all our judgments. The section on unphilosophical proba-
bilities is meant to support his claim that all judgments
based on the same principles. The unphilosophical
probabilities, although not "sanctioned" by philosophers,
are in fact "deriv'd from the same principles" as all other
probabilities.
Hume IS particularly careful to resolve an apparent
contradiction in his system. He has claimed that custom is
the foundation of all of our judgments and that custom is a
propensity of the imagination. Yet he admits that unphilo-
sophical probabilities are an illegitimate method of forming
judgments. Doesn't this presuppose that we have a faculty
of judgment different from and opposed to the mere propensi-
ties of the imagination? Hume's reply is that we do not
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need to suppose any separate faculty, although rt Is natural
for us to do so. The criterion for determining the legiti-
-cy Of a judgment is whether or not that type of judgment
IS Ukely to be true. „e determine this by comparing it to
past judgments. when it resembles the type of judgments
that have been successful in our past experience, we accept
tt as legitimate, when it is "irregular” we reject it as
illegitimate. To correct judgments based on propensities of
the imagination we use judgments based on the same propensl-
Thus Hume offers a unified theory of natural judg-
ments, which allows for the correction of judgments without
appeal to any "pure and intellectual view, of which the
superior faculties of the soul are alone capable" (p. 72 ).
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[11 The example appears to be from Malebranche:
Pattr/u?ar h?m^,/r7s"7ef^n\a
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iudae an Z Frenchman to
i;^no u Englishmen, or all Ital-ans, have the same character ^
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Royal ^Logi^c
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clairto philosophersC aim to offer us a light capable ofdissipating the darkness of tL mind!Logic IS said to correct all errors of
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is impossible. Such
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trustworthy as to
the truth
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complete certainty^
-Lii'PossiDie
praises the philosophers bestow ontheir own precepts. But if we considerthe use philosophers have made of their
own rules either in logic or in the otherbranches of philosophy, we shall have goodreason to suspect the truth of suchpremises” (p. 11-12).
[3] Hume'
viewed
Roya 1 Logic
- theory of general rules can plausibly be
out of a suggestion made in the Port
"Sometimes men are
their judgments, but not
must reason now poorly.
mistaken i n
always; so man
now well. and
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chapter III
REASON AND SKEPTICISM
in Chapter ii, i examined the structure and formation
Of general rules. i showed how general rules were meant to
provide a purely naturalistic method of regulating and
correcting judgments and that Hume believed general rules
have normative authority because they embody the standards
Of rational judgment. m this chapter I want to examine
Hume's views on the normative authority of general rules in
more detail. i also want to discuss the related topic of
the connection between Hume's theory of general rules and
his skepticism.
Normative Authority of General Rules
According to Hume, by examining the "operations of our
understanding, and ... our experience of its operation in
the judgments we form concerning objects,” we learn to
separate the "more extensive and constant" operations from
the "more capricious and uncertain" operat ions (p . 149 ).
General rules are formed according to the extensive and
constant operations and serve to correct judgments made
according to the capricious and uncertain operations. Thus,
the steady application of general rules will ensure that all
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our judgments „U1 confer, to the extensive ana constant
principles
.
Hume clearly believed that it Is preferable or more
rational to conform our judgments to the more extensive and
constant operations of the understanding.
„e attribute
these operations to the judgment, while attributing the
capricious operations to the imagination. if „e concede
this point, then it is clear why we ought to follow general
rules. What is not clear is why we should make such a
concession. what grounds are there for maintaining that it
is more rational to conform our judgments to the more
extensive operations of the understanding? We are able to
distinguish between the different operations by observing
that certain types of judgments have often been false, while
other types have often been true. But Hume's discussion of
causal inference has shown that there is no justification
for the Inference from past regularities to future regulari-
ties. Thus, the fact that, in the past, judgments made
according to the extensive and constant principles have been
more often true cannot provide any grounds for Inferring
that such judgments will continue to be true in the future.
If we cannot show that judgments based on the extensive
and constant principles of the imagination will be more
likely to turn out true, then what grounds are there for
considering such judgments more rational than those based on
the capricious and uncertain principles? A number of recent
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commentators have noted that Hume persistently advocates the
adoption of what we would call
-scientific
.nethod” and
ticizes all manner of "superstitious" reasoning
.
[l] some
Of the. have ctted the following passage as Hu.e’s atte.pt
to justify the distinction:
It may here be objected, that theimagination, according to my own confes-sion, being the ultimate judge of allsystems of philosonhv t
V.1
-L pny
, I am umustin blaming the ancient philosophers^ formaking use of that faculty, and allowingthemselves to be entirely guided by itin their reasonings. m order to justi-
y myself, i must distinguish in theimagination betwixt the principles whichare permanent, irresistable
, and univer-
sal, such as the customary transitionfrom causes to effects, and from effects
principles which are
angeable, weak, and irregular, such ashose I have just now taken notice of.The former are the foundation of all ourthoughts and actions, so that upon their
removal human nature must immediatelyperish and go to ruin. The latter are
neither unavoidable to mankind, nor nec-
essary, or so much as useful in the
conduct of life; but on the contrary are
observ'd only to take place in weak
minds, and being opposite to the otherprinciples of custom and reasoning, may
easily be subverted by a due contrast
and opposition. (p. 225 )
The traditional method of justifying a judgment is to
show that it is formed in accordance with a justified
method. A method is justified by showing that it is more
likely to result in true judgments. But, given Hume's views
on causal inference, he cannot maintain that judgments based
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established principles are more likely to be true.
Therefore, he cannot appeal to the traditional gronnds to
support his claim that It Is more rational to guide our
judgments according to established principles such as cus-
tom. The question, then. Is whether Hume can provide any
Other grounds for this claim.
It is certainly questionable whether the fact that some
principles are "permanent, Irreslstable, and universal".
Others "weak and irregular” ran in ^ i jtj-i-i-eguiar c , m itself, provide any
reason for considering the former rational and the latter
irrational. Passmore, for Instance, clearly maintains that
this approach is inadequate:
"Unphilosophical probability" depends on
a trick of the mind; but so does philo-
sophical probability. why, then, doesthe philosopher regard them so differ-
ently?
.... In neither case, on Hume's
view, is there any objective implica-tion; in both cases we are led to a
certain conclusion as a result of a
merely psychological operation....
Is there, then, no difference be-
tween these two cases? One difference,
Hume again suggests, is that to rely
upon unphilosophical probability wouldbe to commit ourselves to an 'irregular'kind of reasoning, which is 'capricious
and uncertain' in contrast with the 'ex-tensive and constant' principles of
philosophical reasoning (T, 149) . But
why should we prefer regularity to ir-
regularity? To this the only answer can
be, Hume replies, that the 'disposition
and character of the person' (T, 150)
will determine his preference. [2]
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Passmore goes on to point out that this resort to
individual psychological preference is worthless in the
attempt to justify the distinction between rational and
irrational judgments. "The logical problem - how can em-
pineal reasoning be justified — vanishes as nn;,nii tsiies u a swer-
able". [3]
I think Passmore is too hasty here. while it is true
that this sort Of appeal to individual psychology could not
support the distinction between rational and irrational
judgment, it is not necessarily true, as his discussion in
the section seems to suggest, that no appeal to psychology
could provide grounds for the distinction. Hume does not
claim that the reason (ground) for the distinction is the
disposition of the individual. He claims that people are
inclined toward one form or the other according to their
disposition. This is a different claim altogether. One can
admit that whether people choose their winter coats on the
basis of warmth or style is often determined by their
disposition without concluding that the only grounds for
prefering one 'principle' to the other is individual dis-
position. The same is true of the principles of reasoning.
Hume could argue in the following manner: It is a
psychological fact about human beings that they prefer
orderly and coherent judgments to disorderly and incoherent
judgments. Following the regular and established principles
results in orderly and coherent judgments, following weak
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irregular principles results in disorderly and incoher-
ent judgments. People who reason according to weak and
gular principles are irrational because they are thwart-
ing their own aims. They are like people who prefer warmth
to style yet, on a sudden impulse, end up buying a flimsy
Stylish coat.
Numerous passages in the •n Treatise indicate that Hume
believed that "love of ord^.i-” • ut der is inherent in human nature.
To note just a few such passages;
Objects have a certain coherence even asthey appear to our senses; but thiscoherence is much greater and more uni-form, if we suppose the objects to have
a continu d existence; and as the mind
^ observing anniformity among objects, it naturally
continues, till it renders the unifor-
mity as compleat as possible. (p. 198)
The mind has
to join relations,
ones, and finds a
uniformity in such
a natural propensity
especially resembling
kind of fitness and
an union. (p. 509)
The same love of order and uniformity,
which arranges the books in the library,
and the chairs in the parlour, contri-butes to the formation of society (n
504)
Although this line of reasoning would provide grounds
for maintaining that it is more rational to follow estab-
lished principles than it is to follow irregular principles,
it appears to conflict with certain other of Hume's claims.
If the established principles produce orderly judgments and
85
psychological
he irregular judgments do not, and It is a
fact that human beings prefer order, then how can Hume
explain the fact that many (if not most) of manlcind reason
according to the irregular principles? Hume notes that
"superstition arises naturally and easily from the popular
opinions of mankind and that for this reason it is
more likely to rule the popular Imagination, (p. 271 ) He
also Claims that the "wise” are generally guided by the
established principles, the vulgar by the irregular princi-
ples. By the vulgar Hume meant the Ignorant and uneducated
— in other words, the majority of mankind. The implication
is that the majority of mankind guide their judgments
according to weak and irregular principles. This is diffi-
cult to reconcile with the claim that human beings prefer
orderly judgments. The evidence appears to indicate just
the opposite.
I think that Hume can answer this sort of criticism by
distinguishing between different levels of judgment of be-
lief. Custom is the permanent, irresistable and universal
principle underlying all of he most fundamental beliefs of
common life. Hume is not referring to our most cherished
religious or ideological convictions. He is referring to
much more basic beliefs— the types of belief that underlie
even our most trivial thoughts and actions. When we get up
to answer the door we reveal the belief that the knock was
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produced by someone, that our bodies will .ove as we desire,
that the floor will support us, that the door Is where we
remember it being, and countless other basic beliefs. These
sorts Of belief are the product of custom and are common to
all mankind. Without them our experience would be discon-
nected and incoherent. Hume makes this point gulte clearly
in the first Enquiry :
*’* great guide ofhuman life. it is that principle alone
us^^^
experience useful to, and makes us expect, for the future,
train of events with those
ou^ With-the influence of custom, we would beentirely ignorant of every matter oftact, beyond what is immediately presentto the memory and senses. We should
never know how to adjust means to ends,
or to employ our natural powers in theproduction of any effect. There wouldbe an end at once of all action, as well
as the chief part of speculation. [4]
Thus, at this basic level of belief, everyone forms
judgments according to the established principle of custom.
But, at a somewhat more complex level, other natural propen-
sities that are "neither unavoidable
..., nor necessary, or
so much as useful in the conduct of life” begin to influence
judgments. Hume has three different, yet related, criti-
cisms of the irregular principles discernable in the opera-
tion of these propensities:
1. Judgments made according to irregu-
lar principles are "often contrary to
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each other" and lead us to
and obscurities". (p. 267)
"absurdities
2
. Judgments made
lar principles are
the most establish'
soning".(p. 150)
according to
"disruptive
d principles
irregu-
of all
of rea-
principles "being op-
Ld °iher principles of custom
bv 3 dne subvertedu contrast and opposition”, (p.
According to Hume, we cannot know that beliefs formed
according to custom are more likely to be true. Neither can
we know that they are more likely to be false. But we do
know that principles that lead to judgments that are "often
contrary to each other", and lead to "absurdities and
obscurities" cannot lead to truth. Hume often refers to the
absurdities and contradictions that result from the "trivial
propensities of the fancy". The unphilosophlcal probabili-
ties provide a good example. Because of certain natural
propensities, "an experiment, that is fresh in the memory
affects us more than one that is in some measure oblit-
erated. .." (p. 143 ). When the evidence that smoking is dan-
gerous to my health is fresh in my memory, I judge that
smoking is unsafe. When the same evidence is more remote, I
judge that smoking is safe. Guiding my judgment by such a
principle leads me to form contrary judgments from exactly
the same evidence.
Not only do we know that principles that result in
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contrary judgments cannot lead to troth, „e also kno« that
employing mutually inconsistent principles cannot lead to
truth. According to Hu.e, „e all accept and cannot help
but accept the basic beliefs of co™on life. At this level
we all employ the egular and established principles. Those
Who ^ form beliefs according to weak and irregular
principles are following principles that conflict with es-
tablished principles. The drunkard who lets time weaken his
belief that he, like his friend, is in danger of dying of a
debauch, employs mutually incompatible principles. When he
expects his liquor to pour when he tips his bottle, to feel
a warm glow when he drinks and the ground to support him
where he lies, he is reasoning according to the established
principle of custom. When he allows his belief in his
danger to weaken over time he is “reasoning" according to an
irregular principle that is “opposite" to custom and “des-
tructive of all the most established principles of reason-
ing". Given that we cannot give up the established princi-
ples, the only consistent course is to give up the weak and
irregular principles.
According to Hume, at the level of basic beliefs we are
unable to suspend judgment. "Nature, by an absolute and
uncontroulable necessity has determin'd us to judge as well
as to breath and feel..."(p. 183). Neither can we avoid
forming beliefs according to custom.
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forbear viewinq
liaht ^ stronger and fulleri gn , upon account of thf^ir
connexion with the Drf^Qont- •p esent impression.
inras lo^n'’a ourselves frL think-g as o g as we are awake, or seeing
eyes towards them in broad sunshine. (p.
Given the facts
,1, that judgments formed according to
irregular principles will inevitably conflict with judgments
.ade according to established principles then we can avoid
"seeing surrounding bodies, when we turn our eyes towards
them in broad sunshine”, it follows that judgments formed
according to irregular principles will often be unstable.
"Being opposite to the other principles of custom and
reasoning, [they] may easily be subverted by a due contrast
and opposit ion" (p. 225 ).
Not all beliefs that result from irregular principles
are unstable, however. m fact, indoctrination, which is
the principle that most resembles custom in its operation,
often produces remarkably stable beliefs. But, unlike cus-
tom, it cannot be consistently employed. No amount of
indoctrination will allow us to sustain the belief that
placing our hand on a hot stove will not burn, that walking
off cliffs is harmless, or that we can breathe water. A
belief produced by an irregular principle can remain stable
only when it does not conflict (or at least not obviously
conflict) with a belief based on custom.
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Thus, While Hu^e admits that we cannot justify custom
by Showing that U ts more UKely to lead to true judgments,
he does not conclude that there are no grounds for supposing
It more rational to form judgments according to custom than
to form judgments according to Irregular principles.
enJer
t^tnatlon is allow'd to
embrac'd
PbHo/ophy, and hypotheses
aoreeLie"’®'"®^^ specious andg able, we can never have any steadv
will^suit^' sentiments, which^ common practice and expe-
rpmnv^A these hypotheses oncee o d, we might hope to establish asystem or set of opinions, which if not
that, perhaps, is too much ?obe hop d for) might at least be satis-factory to the human mind, and mightstand the test of the most critical
examination. (p. 272)
We now have a clear answer to the question about the
normative authority of general rules. Following properly
formed general rules will ensure the consistent application
of the fundamental principles inherent in our reasoning.
These principles are the foundation of our thoughts and
actions and it is only be following these principles alone
that we can achieve a consistent system of orderly, coherent
and stable judgments. Although they cannot be justified in
the traditional manner—by showing that following them will
result in true judgments— they can be shown to be rational-
ly preferable to irregular principles.
It is interesting to note an important and marJced
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contrast between Hu.e and Ms rationalist predecessors.
Descartes and Malebranche considered natural judgments the
source of endless error and illusion. According to them,
the principles of scientific thinking are discoverable only
at the abstract level of thought discoverable in the opera-
tion Of the intellect, a level seldom achieved by the
vulgar. m contrast, Hume maintained that the principles of
scientific thinking are Inherent in our most basic natural
judgments. According to him, when answering the door, pre-
paring a meal, or taking a walk, the most vulgar peasants
employ exactly the same principles of reasoning as the most
sophisticated philosophers.
Our scholastic headpieces and logicians
shew no such superiority above the mere
vulgar in their reason and ability, asto give us any inclination to imitatethem in delivering a long system of
rules and precepts to direct our judg-
ment, in philosophy. (p. 175)
Although Hume maintains that the principles of good
reasoning are inherent in the fundamental beliefs of even
the most vulgar reasoner, he does not conclude, to his
credit, that the so-called "common sense" views of the
vulgar have some sort of prima facie validity. He argues
that many such beliefs are simply false. But this is not
inconsistent with the view that the principles of scientific
thinking are inherent in the basic beliefs of the vulgar.
The difference between the reasonings of the vulgar and the
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reasonings of the true philosopher is in methodology,
scientific method requires the consistent application of the
permanent, irresistable, and universal" principles inherent
in the judgments of common life. The decisions of the true
philosopher-the scientific thinker-"are nothing but the
reflections of common life, methodized and corrected”
.
[
5 ]
The Skeptical Limits of General Rules
Hume develops his views on the relationship between
reason, general rules and skepticism in two sections fo Book
I of the Treatise : Part 4, section 1, "of scepticism with
regard to reason", and Part 4, section 7, "Conclusion of
this book
. In the first of these sections Hume attempts to
show how, by consistently adhering to the prescriptions of
reason, we will be led inevitably to skepticism about reason
Itself. In the latter section Hume offers what Robert
Fogelin has aptly called his "skeptical conclusion" to these
doubts
. [6]
For convenience, I will divide the section "Of scepti-
cism” into three parts. In the first part Hume advances a
two-stage skeptical argument purporting to show (1) that
"all knowledge degenerates into probability" and, (2) that,
by following our reason, all probability is "reduc'd to
nothing”. in the second part of the section, Hume links
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this argument to his theory of belief, first by claiming
that our failure to follow reason in forming our beliefs
supports his theory that "belief is more properly an act of
the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures",
and, second, by offering a psychophyslologlcal explanation
Of Why we are unable to follow reason, m the third part of
the section, Hume turns his attention from the psychological
to the philosophical conclusions to be drawn from the
argument in the first part. He concludes that, by refusing
to be influenced by the principles that our reason explicit-
ly condemns, we will inevitably undermine the authority of
reason.
There are two features of Hume's argument in the first
part of the section that link it directly to the subject of
general rules. First, in illustrating how knowledge reduces
to probability, Hume shows how demonstrative reasoning comes
under the influence of general rules. Second, he sows how
reason subverts itself by extending the application of
general rules beyond their natural scope. The first stage
Hume describes as follows:
In all demonstrative sciences the
rules [7] are certain and infallible; but
when we apply them, our fallible and
uncertain faculties are very apt to de-
from them, and fall into error. We
must, therefore, in every reasoning form
a new judgment as a check of controul on
our first judgment or belief; and must
enlarge our view to comprehend a kind of
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^y, . 1 ,
Kind of caus6, of which
onf as bv
and bv th» ?n °‘her causes
powers^ mav f
^^°^stancy of our mental
f y frequently be prevented rvthis means all knowledge degeneratesinto probability, and this probabilltvIS greater or less, accordLg to on?experience of the veracity or deceitful-
to^^the^
understanding, and according
simplicity or intricacy of thequestion. (p. 180) ^
However
-infallible" the rules of demonstration may be,
experience teaches us that we make mistakes in our demon-
strative reasoning.
-There is no Algebraist or Mathemati-
cian so expert in his science, as to place entire confidence
in any truth immediately upon his discovery of it..."(p.
IBO); not because he has any doubts about the truths of
mathematics, but because he recognizes the possibility of
errors in his judgments. Our experience of errors in demon-
strative judgments does not lead us to doubt the principles
of mathematics but, rather, our ability to correctly apply
such principles in our judgments. A simple example illus-
trates Hume's point. Suppose I want to write a check for
$135.00. I consult my check register and note a balance of
$136.08. Knowing that I have often miscalculated and not
wanting to overdraw my account, I recheck my figures. If i
arrive at the same balance my confidence increases; if i
arrive at a different balance my confidence decreases.
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I recalculated my balance because i am in doubt about
original judgment, not because I have any doubts about
mathematics. i ac not believe that, say, 7.5 does not
always equal 12. What I do believe is that I do not always
judge that 7.5=12. Thus, my belief that my balance is
5135.08 is tempered by considering the nature of my judg-
ment. This tempering of belief is the result of a general
rule Of judgment: "We must
. . . m every reasoning form a new
ludgment, as a check or controul on our first judgment or
belief... (p. 180). It is a general rule of judgment in two
senses: it is a rule formed by judgment and a rule applica-
ble to judgments.
A possible objection to Hume's claim that (if „e are
reasonable) we ought to "form a new judgment as a check or
controul on our first judgment" is that in the majority of
what we consider perfectly reasonable judgments we do no
such thing. I believe (judge) that I am sitting in this
chair, drinking coffee, hearing someone upstairs, and so on.
In making these judgments I do not consider the history of
my judgments about such matters and adjust my current
beliefs to reflect the proportion of past cases where I have
been mistaken. It is only in exceptional cases that I
engage in such an examination of past judgments. While this
objection is, l believe, ill-founded, it is useful in
directing attention to the subtilty of Hume's view. His
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dOGS not TGail i r*o 4-V-ir»4-hat in each judgment we consciously
or explicitly consider our failures and successes in past
judgments. what is important is that upon analysing our
Dudgments we discover that our degree of belief is regulated
by a general rule. Once we recognise he rule we can apply
it With more consistency than is apt to occur naturally.
consider my check register example. while in certain
Circumstances I might consciously reflect on my
-history of
Check register judgments, for the most part I simply accept
Whatever balance I initially arrive at, but with limited
confidence. i do not have much conviction in my judgment.
My low degree of belief is reflected in other judgments.
Which depend on this one, and in my actions. i am wary of
writing checks for the full amount of my balance and recheck
my figures before doing so. i am not surprised when my bank
statement shows a different balance from my register and,
unless I have just checked my balance against the bank
statement, I certainly would not place a wager on my balance
being $136.08.
It IS perfectly conceivable that all this could be true
whether or not I had ever consciously reflected on my past
judgments. The modification of belief is the natural effect
of certain occurrences in my past experience (bad judg-
ments)
. Our judgments are as much a part of our past
experience as the objects of these judgments. As the result
of our past success and failure in judging, we begin to have
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different degrees of confidence in our present Judgments.
effect of
.y past failures at mathematical judgments
Will, then, he reflected in my lower degree of confidence in
present judgment. The extent to which present judgments
will reflect the influence of general rnioc hules depends on the
experience and intelligence of the judger:
A man of solid sense and long experience
er^assuranc^'-^''^""""”^ ^ance in his opinions, than one
ignorant,... our sen-timents have different degrees ofthority, even with ourselves, intion to the degrees of our
experience, (p. i 82 )
au-
propor-
reason and
In Chapter
judgments about
Ilf I explained Hume's view of how our
objects are regulated by general rules
formed according to our past experience of objects. These
Dudgments are, in turn, regulated by general rules formed
according to our past experience in making judgments. in
this section Hume is extending the scope of general rules by
Viewing demonstrative judgments as objects of experience,
thus incorporating them into his standard pattern of causal
inference. Whether the subject matter of the judgments is
causal relations or mathematics, the judgments themselves
show various degrees of regularity in their "conjunction"
with truth. We will expect a judgment to be true, i.e.,
believe it, to the extent that that sort of judgment has
been true in our past experience. The more experience we
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have had and, no doubt, the better our natural capacities,
the more our past experience of judgments Is reflected In
our present judgments. The modification of belief according
to general rules is, then, a natural causal process. Hume
indicates the causal structure of this process In the
following passage:
question pro-
ovlr thP Tm,; revolving
senses
memory and
fhom / carrying my thoughts fromt e to such nh’ior't-e
con-inSn'rq commonlyndom d with them, l feel a stronqer
sidp"’°^f-\
conception on the onethan on the other. This strongconception forms my first decision. isuppose, that afterwards I examine myjudgment itself, and observing fromperience, that 'tis sometimes just
sometimes erroneous, l consider it
regulated by contrary principles
causes, of which some lead to truth,
some to error; and in ballancing thesecontrary causes, l diminish by a newprobability the assurance of my firstdecision. (p. 184-85)
ex-
and
as
or
and
The "natural effect" of judgment is truth. But this
effect IS not produced with complete regularity. We are
confronted with what Hume elsewhere calls a "contrariety" in
our past experience. m the section on probability of
causes, he claims that the natural effect of a contrariety
in past experience is to "give us a kind of hesitating
belief for he future ..." (p. 132) . The modification of our
present judgment is the "hesitating belief" produced by the
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contrariety in our experience of past judgments.
It is Significant that the natural causal process is
confined to the initial judgment about the object and the
second judgment about the initial judgment. We do not
naturally go on to form a third judgment to correct the
second judgment. According to Hume, after the first and
second judgments "the action of the mind becomes forc’d and
unnatural...
-,p. 185,. But our reason does not let us stop
with the second decision. Seeking truth and recognizing
that following general rules is a means of correcting
judgment, reason demands that we extend the rule beyond its
natural scope. After the first two judgments:
Of
the
We are oblig'd by our reason to add
a new doubt deriv'd from the possibility
error in the estimation we make of
and fidelity of our faculties.This IS a doubt which immediately occursto us, and of which, if we woul'd close-
y pursue our reason, we cannot avoidgiving a decision, (p. 182)
.
According to Hume, rational judgment requires the adop-
tion of a certain methodology—the consistent application of
the "permanent, irresistable and universal" principles in-
herent in the judgments of common life. We ensure the
consistent application of these principles only be conform-
ing our judgment to general rules. To apply these rules in
a haphazard fashion would, it appears, be inconsistent with
rational methodology. Reason, therefore, requires us to
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spply the general rules hn aii ^
_n judgments. The result of
reflecting on the errors in our past judgments is to reduce
our initial confidence in our present judgment. »„hen i
reflect on the natural fallibility of
.y judgment, i have
less confidence in my opinions, than when I only consider
the object concerning which I reason" (p. 183).
If we were to follow the demands of reason and weigh
into every judgment an estimation of the veracity of our
past judgments we would get the following results: Our
initial judgment is made with a degree of confidence deter-
mined by the nature of the object judged. Applying the
general rule, we consider past errors in judgments and our
confidence in the original judgment is diminished. This
consideration of past errors is itself a judgment and, in
order to meet the demands of reason, we must again apply the
general rule diminishing our confidence in this second
judgment. Inasmuch as our confidence in the initial judg-
ment depends on our confidence in the second judgment, by
lowering our confidence in the second judgment we diminish
still further our conviction in the initial judgment. Our
original conviction in the Initial judgment will continue to
diminish with each successive judgment. "Let our first
belief be never so strong, it must Infallibly perish by
passing thro' so many many new examinations, of which each
diminishes somewhat of its force and vigour" (p. 183) The
final result of following reason is "a total extinction of
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belief and evidence” (p. 183 ).
inasmuch as this argument has been the subject of
numerous and diverse criticisms, U will be worthwhile to
examine it more closely. Hume presents it as follows:
original uncertaintyinherent m the subject, a new uncer-
farni? from the weakness of thatjudges, and having ad-
lia'd^hJ^®^® together, we are ob-
the possibility of error in
the truth and
donhJ faculties. This is a
^"’"'ediately occurs to us,and of which, if we wou'd closely pursueour reason, we cannot avoid giving aecision. But this decision, tho' itshou d be favourable to our precedinajudgment, being founded only on a proba-bility, must weaken still further our
itself be weak-
en d by a fourth doubt of the same kind,and so on iji infinitum ; till at lastthere remains nothing of the originalprobability, however great we may sup-pose it to have been, and however smallthe diminution by every new uncertain-
ty, (p. 182)
For clarity, l will first present the basic form of the
argument and then examine each step in more detail. The
basic form seems to be this: i judge "A" with, say, 90%
conviction. [8] l then assess my ability to make judgments
of type A and judge ”B"—that my judgments of type "A” are,
say, 90% reliable. This reduces my initial conviction in
judgment "A” to 90x90 or 81% conviction. l then assess my
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ability to n,ake judgments of type "B" and judge "C”-that my
Dudgments of type B are only 90% reliable. Hume claims that
this reduces my conviction In '.A" still further. Although
he does not describe just how this occurs, he appears to
have In mind the following process:
When we first make judgment B" we make it with some
particular degree of conviction n u. (I have supposed this to
be 90%)
. But when we examine judgment "B" (make judgment
"C”) we recognize that judgments of type B are only about
90% reliable and this reduces our conviction In judgment ”B"
to 90x90 or 81%. inasmuch as our conviction In "A" depends
upon our conviction In "B” we must now reassess our convic-
tion in "A" from 90x90 to 90x81 or 73%. This same process
occurs when we examine judgment "C" (make judgment ”D").
Noting that judgments of type c are only 90% reliable we
reduce our Initial conviction In "C" to 90x90 or 81%. But
judgment "B" depends upon judgment "C". So we must reassess
our initial conviction in judgment in "B" (90%) to 90x81 or
73%. our conviction in "A" (90%) must be reassessed in
light of our corrected degree of conviction in "B" (73%) and
our conviction in "A" is further reduced to 90x73 or 66%.
With each new judgment the original conviction in "A" is
further reduced until there is what Hume calls "a total
extinction of belief and evidence".
Reviewing the argument, we first note that, having
already shown how our conviction in demonstrative judgments
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IS reduced, Hume begins with a "probable" judgment—one in
Which, given the nature of the object, we judge with less
than complete certainty. inasmuch as a judgment of matter
IS, in Hume s sense, a probable judgment, suppose
that my initial judgment is "that is red" and that i judge
this with 90% conviction. According to Hume, if i am
reasonable, then I should also take into account the relia-
bility of my judgment in such matters or, more specifically,
I ought to proportion my degree of conviction in this
judgment according to my past experience of the veracity of
n>y color judgments. Here, I think, Hume is clearly correct,
for, if I deny that my performance in judging colors is
relevant in determining my degree of conviction in my
present judgment, then there is no reason why I should not
remain fully convinced that I have correctly judged an
object as red even if i have always been mistaken in such
judgments in the past. But to any reasonable person this
would be taken as good evidence that I lack the ability to
identify red. if i remained confident in my judgment that
that IS red" under such circumstances I would, quite
rightly, be considered a fool.
Even if we concede Hume's point here a very plausible
objection might still be raised. We are supposing that my
initial conviction in my judgment is 90% and that judgments
of this sort are 90% reliable. Shouldn't we say that my
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actual degree of conviction
,90%, is appropriate for Judg-
ments Of this sort (90% reliable) and that no further
reduction is required? To answer this objection one need
only point out that it merely skips the first step of Hume's
argument by assuming that the reliability of our judgments
of objects has already been weighed into the initial judg-
ment. This is merely to make implicit a step that Hume
makes explicit. But whether the application of the rule is
explicit or Implicit makes no difference to Hume's argument.
If we suppose that my initial judgment is made with 90%
conviction in part because my past judgments of this sort
have been 90% reliable, then my degree of belief depends on
a judgment about the reliability of my judgments of this
sort just as surely as it would if i had made two separate
judgments. But if my initial conviction rests in part on
the assumption that judgments of this sort are 90% reliable,
then it is still legitimate to question my conviction in the
argument
.
Assessing my past performance in color judgments re-
quires a judgment about a matter of fact, which I determine
by consulting my past experience. l find that my judgments
of this sort are 90% reliable and adjust my original
conviction to reflect this fact. I am, then, 90x90 certain
that "that is red". At this point Hume claims that we are
"oblig'd by our reason to add a new doubt deriv'd from the
possibility of error in the estimation we make of the truth
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and fidelity of our faculties" In other words, reason
demands that I take into account the reliability of my
ludgment^ judgments. This is simply to employ
the same principle I employed in my previous judgment
Furthermore, Hume appears to be correct in his claim that
reason demands this, for the circumstances that led me to
adopt the principle in my judgments about objects are
exactly the same in my judgments about my judgments.
When I judge that "that is red" i consider it an
indication of my good sense that I take into account the
reliability of my judgment in such matters and determine my
conviction in the judgment accordingly. But what basis do I
have for simply accepting such matters without taking into
account my ability to make judgments about my judgments?
Isn't this to accept a judgment as reliable without appeal
to any empirical evidence which might support or contradict
this fact? This is just the sort of thing that was deemed
unreasonable in my judgments about objects, so why should it
be considered any more reasonable in my judgments about
judgments?
In fact, if we examine the evidence, it seems clear
that people's judgments about their judgments are as prone
to error as their judgments about objects. Given certain
human foibles, we might not be inclined to notice this in
ourselves, but we certainly do not fail to notice it in
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others
.
see people believe that they have very good judg-
-nt When, m fact, the evidence points to Just the opposite
conclusion. There are people who consider themselves goodjudges Of character when they are not, people who consider
themselves good Judges of art when they are not, people who
consider themselves good logicians when they are not, and so
There are also people who err in just the opposite way;
those Who consider themselves to have poor Judgment when, in
fact, the evidence points to just the opposite conclusion.
From these general considerations regarding the reliability
of people's Judgments about their judgments it certainly
seems that reason does demand that we consider the reliabil-
ity of our judgment about our judgments in order to deter-
mine the proper degree of conviction we should have in such
judgments
.
If I apply this to the case in question, then it
appears that I am obliged by reason to evaluate the relia-
bility of my judgment about my color judgment. This is a
matter of fact that must be decided according to experience.
But here I might point out the following problem to Hume: I
have never made any judgments about the reliability of my
judgments about color judgment, so there is no evidence to
which I can appeal. Therefore, I have no way of continuing
my evaluations and the regress must come to a stop. i think
Hume would have a ready reply to this. if i have no
evidence to support the reliability of a certain type of
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judgment, then I have no basis for any conviction in that
type Of judgment. To acknowledge that I have no evidence to
support my conviction is to acknowledge that my conviction
unwarranted. i cannot reasonably assign a very high
conviction to an unwarranted judgment; therefore,
I Should reduce my conviction in the judgment I make about
n>y ability to make color judgments and, according to Hume,
this will lead to further reduction in my conviction in my
previous judgments.
I might also appeal to the more general consideration
about the reliability of judgments about judgments mentioned
above. Considerations such as these incline me to think
that i a^tever the degree of reliability of my judgment about
my color judgment, it is not likely to be any greater than
that of my other types of judgments. But if i reduce my
conviction in this judgment in any way this should, in turn.
reduce my conviction in my initial judgment.
The same considerations are going to apply to this last
judgment, requiring me to make another judgment about a
judgment under virtually identical circumstances. Thus I
will have no better grounds for conviction in its reliabili-
ty than I had in the reliability of the previous judgment.
This should reduce my initial conviction still further and
so on for each new judgment. So it appears that, by
following the perfectly rational method of proportioning my
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onviction to the evidence, i will completely undermine my
itial belief. Inasmuch as the argument is perfectly gen-
eral, it would appear that the consistent application of
rational method would undermine all belief.
I have presented Hume's argument in some detail because
I believe that, through their misinterpretations of the
argument, many commentators have underestimated its impor-
tance. A discussion Of the various misinterpretations and
criticisms would constitute a major digression at this
point; therefore, I deal with them in the Appendix. Here I
want to concentrate on the argument's relation to Hume's
view of rational methodology. This requires an examination
of the second and third part of the section.
Having argued that reason, "closely pursued", will
"utterly subvert all belief and opinion", Hume next links
the argument to his theory of belief. The fact that we
continue to believe, and think and reason as usual", even
though we are unable to discover any error in his argument.
proves that "belief is some sensation or peculiar manner of
conception, which 'tis impossible for mere ideas and reflec-
tion to destroy"(p. 184). if we are free to form our
beliefs according to our reflections, then we cannot explain
why we maintain our beliefs when our reflections dictate
that we abandon them. On the other hand, if belief is the
effect of experience— a lively idea related to a present
impression then the failure of "mere ideas” to influence
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beliefs is explicable.
Hu.e recognised that even if we accept this theory of
belief there is another factor that .ust be explained.
„hy
should we be any „,ore likely to retain any degree of
conviction in our judgments given Hume's theory of belief
than we would on the rival thoery of belief?
thei^ Probabilities, which by
th^ orioTnai perpetually diminishne gi l evidence, are founded on
thouah^^ principles, whether ofg t or sensation, as the primarvDudgment, it may seem unavoidable, thatin either case they must equally subvertit....(p. 184 )
Following reason in the form of general rules developed from
our past experience effects our initial beliefs. if Hume is
correct in his explanation of the principles by which such
beliefs are effected, why shouldn't these principles contin-
ue to effect our beliefs in our higher order judgments,
reducing us to total skepticism? Hume explains this by
appeal to psychophysiological mechanisms:
After the first and second deci-
sion: as the action of the mind becomesforc'd and unnatural, and the ideas
faint and obscure; tho' the principles
of judgment, and the bal lancing of oppo-
site causes be the same as at the very
beginning; yet their influence on theimagination, and the vigour they add to,
or diminish from the thought, is by no
means equal. Where the mind reaches not
Its objects with easiness and facility,
the same principles have not the same
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^ natural conception
feJ I the Imaginationsensation, which holds any pro-
tention^ is^ on"‘tl,e^1r
“e^^^h^he ToltSl;
be inn® ts uneasy; and the spirits
course aVe®“:'' their na^tural
m^nirby^rheTamrirws'" 1"/'’®'^
the same degree, a/":henMi®e®y®‘f^ 1°their usual channel. (p. 185)
Thus Hume Claims that his thoery explains both why the
principles of reason cannot produce belief beyond a certain
P int and why the mere ideas of reason cannot Influence our
beliefs.
In the final part of the section Hume turns his
attention from the psychological to the philosophical con-
clusions to be drawn from the argument of the first part.
According to Hume, if we follow our reason we will destroy
all belief and conviction. Including the beliefs that fol-
lowing our reason leads to truth. Thus, consistently adher-
ing to reason must inevitably lead to skepticism about
reason itself. What Hume has in mind appears to be this:
We can reason only insofar as we maintain certain beliefs.
If we reject one belief it is only on the basis of some
other belief. [9] if all beliefs are destroyed, then we no
longer have any beliefs with which to reason. Furthermore,
in eliminating all beliefs, we also eliminate the belief
that following reason is in any way preferable to following
the mere suggestions of the Imagination. But without this
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belief reason loses all claim to authority. Thus, if fol-
lowing reason would ultimately lead to the destruction of
all belief, then following reason would ultimately lead to
the destruction of reason itself.
The response of the dogmatic defender of reason to
skeptical arguments is that such arguments are self-defeat-
ing. Any argument against reason must derive all its force
from the authority of reason. The skeptic must presuppose
the very authority he denies: “If the sceptical reasonings
be strong, say they, ’tis proof, that reason must have some
force and authority; if weak, they can never be sufficient
to invalidate all the conclusions of our understanding" (p.
186). Hume denies that the skeptical position can be so
easily dismissed. Skeptical arguments may destroy them-
selves, but not without first destroying reason:
Reason first appears in possession of
the throne, prescribing laws, and impos-
ing maxims, with an absolute sway and
authority. Her enemy, therefore, is ob-
1 ig d to take shelter under her protec-
tion, and by making use of rational
arguments to prove the fallaciousness
and imbecility of reason, produces, in a
manner, a patent under her hand and
seal. This patent has at first an au-
thority, proportion'd to the present andimmediate authority of reason, from
which it is deriv'd. But as it is sup-
pos'd to be contradictory to reason, it
gradually diminishes the force of that
governing power, and its own at the same
time; till at last they both vanish away
into nothing, by a regular and just
diminution. (p. 186-87)
.
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The Claim that skeptical arguments are self-destructive is
true, but this does not help the dogmatist’s position. The
Skeptical arguments are the arguments of reason; thus the
dogmatist must concede that reason is self-destructive.
Hume concludes:
b^aks tL f ‘*’®t®fore, that naturereak he force of all sceptical argu-ents in time, and keeps them from hav-
g any considerable influence on theunderstanding. Were we to trust entire-ly to their self-destruction, that cannever take place, ’till they have first
subverted all conviction, and have to-tally destroy'd human reason. (p. 187)
Hume evaluates the conclusion reached in this section
in Part 4, section 1
, "Conclusion of this book". We seem to
be faced with the following dilemma: We can "reject all the
trivial suggestions of the fancy, and adhere to the under-
standing
. But, as Hume has already shown, this move would
be disasterous.
I have already shewn, that the under-
standing, when it acts alone, and ac-
cording to its most general principles,
entirely subverts itself, and leaves not
the lowest degree of evidence in any
proposition, either in philosophy or
common life.(pp. 267-68)
Such a result is avoided only by the operation of a
"seemingly trivial propensity of the fancy, by which we
enter with difficulty into remote views of things ..." (p.
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268 ) .
On the other hand, if these
yield to the propensities of the
refin'd or elaborate reasonings",
equally disasterous.
considerations lead us to
imagination and reject all
the consequences would be
of
to every trivial suggestionthe fancy; beside that these sugges-tions are often contrary to each other;hey lead us into such errors, absurdi-ties, and obscurities, that we must at
asham'd of our credulity.Nothing IS more dangerous to reason than
imagination, and
nothing has been the occasion of more
mistakes among phi losophers
. (p. 267)
By allowing ourselves to be guided by mere imagination we
would "cut off entirely all science and philosophy" and
leave ourselves prey to all manner of superstition. Final-
ly, we would be guilty of the "express contradiction" of
accepting an argument produced by reason in order to condemn
all arguments produced by reason. it would appear that our
only choice is between "a false reason and none at all"(p.
268), yet neither position is rationally defensible.
Hume suggests a compromise. We should grant a limited
authority to reason, following it only when it works in
connection with some natural propensity. "Where reason is
lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to
be assented to. Where it does not, it can never have nay
title to operate upon us"(p. 270). Hume's claim here is not
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simply that reason, in fact, fails to influence us beyond
this point. His claim is that reason has no "title" (right)
to influence us beyond this point. it has no right to
influence us because, when carried further, it undermines
its own authority.
Reason, thus limited, is simply the following of gener-
al rules within their natural scope. The general rule tells
that "we ought always to correct the first judgment,
deriv'd from the nature of the object, by another judgment,
deriv'd from the nature of the understanding" (p. 181-82 ).
The first and second judgment are the natural effects of our
experience. But, when we try to extend the scope of the
rule beyond its natural scope, our reason "subverts itself"
and, thus subverted, has no authority to either condemn or
condone our judgments. The limitations of the authority of
general rules turns out to be the limitations of the
authority of reason.
The fact that Hume partially equates following general
rules with following reason has some interesting and impor-
tant consequences. To follow reason is either to adhere to
the a priori principles of demonstrative reasoning, or to
adhere to the established principles of the imagination.
Although we can know a priori that demonstrative principles
lead to truth, we cannot know a priori the extent to which
we are capable of properly employing such principles in our
115
This can only be known by our experience, and
our experience proves that we
.ake „,istakes In the e^ploy-
-nt of such principles. Thus, our demonstrative judgments
are subject to the control of our non-demonstrative judg-
in the sense that our belief that our demonstrative
judgments are true ultimately depends on our past experience
success or failure in employing demonstrative principles
in our judgments.
Hume has, in effect, stood the Cartesian view of reason
on Its head. Instead of making our empirical judgments
subject to the regulation and control of our a priori
judgments, Hume makes our a priori judgments subject to the
regulation and control of our empirical or, more specifical-
ly f our causal judgments.
Causal judgments are, of course, founded on custom.
But what is important to note is that this is the basis
for Hume s skepticism here. Hume's argument presupposes
that rational judgment consists in following general rules—
adhering to those principles that experience has shown lead
to true judgments. Hume's skepticism arises from two fac-
tors. First, by consistently employing these principles of
reason, we will ultimately undermine all belief, including
the belief that following our reason is rationally prefera-
ble to following the "trivial suggestions of the fancy".
Second, this result is only prevented by a principle of
judgment that reason explicitly condemns because experience
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has shown that it leads to false judgments. Thus Hume's
concern is not that reason depends on custom-the extensive
and constant operations of the imagination. To adhere to
such principles constitutes being reasonable. This is
Hume's naturalistrc conception of reason. Hume's concern is
.that reason, correctly understood, is ultimately self-
destructive and that it is only prevented from this fate by
"that singular and seemingly trivial propensity of the
fancy, by which we enter with difficulty into remote views
Of things.
.
. (p. 268)
.
This result is particularly relevant in considering the
relationship between Hume's skepticism and his naturalism.
Beginning with Kemp Smith there has been an increasing
number of commentators who challenge the traditional view of
Hume's philosophy as primarily negative and skeptical. Kemp
Smith viewed Hume's philosophy as consisting of two compli-
mentary elements:
A sceptical discipline to open [men's]
eyes to the deceptiveness of the mis-taken endeavours, both moral and specu-lative, into which his specifically hu-
man powers are ever tending to betrayhim, and a positive naturalistic phi-losophy to mark out the path upon whichhe can confidently travel without any
such attempted violation of human na-
ture [10]
In this two-fold task of philosophy, "scepticism serves
as an ally, but in due subordination, not as an equal". [11]
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Thus, on Ke.p smith's interpretation, the positive task of
presenting a naturalistic interpretation of the nature and
function Of reason takes precedence over the negative,
skeptical task of defining the limitation of reason.
This tendency to emphasize the naturalistic element in
Hume has even led at least one commentator to deny that
Hume s philosophy is in any way skeptical:
Hume'spretense at skepticism was a literary
^-^^tise With Which tohis opponents and to prepare thereader for a more favorable reception ofhis own theory of the passions.... Bythe time Hume wrote the first Enquiry,he went out of his way to ^ mo?eexplicit in showing that skepticism was
a literary device employed to serveother purposes. [12]
But the more common tendency of the "Hume as naturalist-
school is not to deny that Hume's philosophy is in any way
skeptical but to follow Kemp Smith in the claim that many of
the skeptical arguments in the Treatise are aimed at discre-
diting what Hume took to be an incorrect account of the
nature of reason. Thus Stroud claims that Hume's skeptical
arguments were meant to "show that reason, as traditionally
understood, has no role in human life". [14] in this vein
one might argue that "skepticism" about causal inference is
the result of an incorrect view of what constitutes the
operation of reason, a view of reason that Hume himself
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rejects
.
I confess that I am sympathetic to this view. As I
pointed out in Chapter I, one of Hume's primary aims in the
Treati^ was to discover the true nature of the understand-
ing, and this required an extensive critique of the Carte-
sian view. I also believe that there is a good deal of
evidence to suggest that, in many arguments traditionally
interpreted as skeptical attacks on reason, Hume was actual-
ly engaged in a process of redefining what constitutes
reason, reasoning, and being reasonable. [9] But the point I
want to make does not depend on accepting this view. What I
want to argue Is that, even if this view is correct, it does
not entail the conclusion that Hume was not— or was not
primarily — a skeptic.
This sort of conclusion seems to be the result of the
following type of reasoning: If we accept a certain (false)
view of the nature of reason, we are led to highly skeptical
conclusions such as the conclusion that causal inference is
irrational. On the other hand, if we replace this false
account of reason with a correct, naturalistic account,
these sorts of skeptical conclusions do not follow. Thus,
by adopting the correct view of reason, skepticism is
avoided. of course, on the naturalistic interpretation,
reason is much more limited in scope, but this limitation is
primarily psychological. Hume's "moderate skepticism" is
the recognition of the psychological limits of reason.
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properly understood.
Hume's argument In "Of scepticism with regard to rea-
son" belies this sort of conclusion. The conception of
reason in this section is entirely naturalistic. Reason, in
the form of general rules, is viewed as the "general and
more establish'd properties of the imagination". Its princi-
ples derived from experience and founded on custom. But
Hume's skeptical conclusion about reason thus understood is
not merely a claim about our psychological limitations.
Psychological factors explain why we do not, in fact, follow
our reason beyond a certain point. But Hume's claim is
that, if we were to follow our reason beyond these psycho-
logical limitations, we would discover the limitations of
the legitimate authority of reason. At a certain point
reason becomes self-destructive and undermines its authority
to condemn or condone our beliefs.
120
NOTES
and Philo^o^V ’^n%ume'l%hou^ "History
'H.r¥o|^=
[2] John Passmore,
Books, 1968)
, p. 60.
Intentions (New York: Basic
[3] Ibid.
44.
[4] Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
.
of
20
[5] Ibid., p. 112.
[ 6 ]
Human ^ gjsgpticism in the "Treatise
—
(Boston: Rout ledge & Kegan PauT7 1985)
, p.
[7] Hume's reference here is to the
strative inference, not to general rules.
rules of demon-
havp ohoio merely for convenience. i
reason
^ Hump'
particular percentages for the same
argument does not require that the originalgree of conviction be as high as I indicate by "90%”, nor
iudnmpnl conviction in each successivej g e t be the same as in the initial judgment.
[9]
modified
time. Modifications of
sophical probabilities".
Well, not quite. Hume grants that beliefs can bein other ways. For example, they can "decay" over
this sort constitute the "unphilo-
But the philosophically respecti-ble ways of modifying
other beliefs.
belief depend on the acceptance of
[10] Kemp Smith, p. 132.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Capaldi, pp. 200-201.
[13] Barry Stroud, Hume (Boston: Routledge & Keaan
Paul, 1977)
,
p. 14.
121
[ 14 ]
admitted
deal Of
^
io.ne.
Cor^n Sense Moralist.David Hume
:
and
whom argue that at least some ofThTme-
cal arguments are actually criticismsbe an incorrect view of human reason
s purportedly skepti-
of what Hume took to
122
chapter IV
GENERAL RULES AND THE PASSIONS
As I pointed out in Chapter I, gaining an accurate
P cture of Hume s views requires understanding certain pecu-
liarities in his method of presentation. As one commentator
aptly described it, reading the Treatise is like reading a
good detective story.
[
1 ] As the 'plof unfolds, new facts
are revealed, forcing the reader to reassess earlier situa-
tions and incidents in light of the new information. This
feature of Hume's style is particularly evident in the
relationship between Book I and Book II of the Treatise
.
Although his Book I examples of judgments sometimes reveal
the interaction between passions and judgments, Hume's ex-
position of his theory of judgment gives the reader little
reason to suppose that there is any major connection between
the two. But in Book II, it becomes clear that Book I
presents an abstract and artificial view of judgment. How-
ever useful it may be to consider judgment apart from the
passions, in actual practice they are inseparable. [2] in
fact, Hume goes so far as to claim that every impression and
idea is attended with some degree of passion or emotion.
I believe it may safely be establish'd
for a general maxim, that no object is
presented to the senses, nor image
formed in the fancy, but what is accom-
pany 'd with some emotion or movement of
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spirits proportion'd to it....(p. 373 )
Beginning with the work of Kemp Smith there has been an
increasing awareness of the importance of the passions in
Hume's philosophy. Kemp Smith directed attention to the
relation between Hume's theory of the passions and his
epistemology. Pall Ardal emphasized the important role of
the passions in Hume's moral philosophy. Whether or not one
agrees with their particular interpretations, their general
point must be conceded: according to Hume, the passions are
intimately related to judgment.
in this chapter I shall examine this relation and show
how it allows us to regulate and control our passions
according to general rules. i shall begin with a brief
review of Hume's theory of the passions.
According to Hume, impressions may be divided into two
categories: original impressions or impressions of sensation
and secondary impressions or impressions of reflection.
Original impressions he describes as those that "without any
antecedent perception arise in the soul, from the constitu-
tion of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the
application of objects to the external organs" (p. 275). The
passions are impressions of reflection or secondary
impressions
.
Hume makes two further distinctions among the passions,
^i^st
,
a passion may be either calm or violent. The calm-
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ness or violence of a passion is si.ply its degree of felt
intensity. Because any individual passion t,ay vary xn in-
tensity according to the circumstances, a determinate
classification of particular passions as either calm or
Violent is impossible. But a rule of thumb division can be
-de according to how a passion is typically experienced.
The senses of beauty and deformity are typically experienced
as low in intensity and thus may be classed as calm
passions, while love and hatred are generally experienced as
high in intensity and thus may be classed as violent.
Although he admits that the distinction is "vulgar and
specious", Hume adopts it as a useful way of introducing
greater order" into his account (p. 276)
.
The second distinction is between direct and indirect
passions. Direct passions "arise immediately from good or
evil, from pleasure or pain" (p. 276). Hume's examples of
such direct passions include desire, aversion, grief, joy,
hope, fear, despair and security. Indirect passions also
arise from pleasure and pain but only in combination with
other qualities". Examples of indirect passions include
pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, mal-
ice and generosity.
The operation of the direct passions is straightfor-
ward. An object which produces pleasure directly arouses
such passions as aversion and grief. The indirect passions
are more complicated. Their production involves what Hume
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a double relation of impressions and ideas" (p. 286).
The clearest way to explain Hume's meaning is by an example.
Following Hume, i shall concentrate on the indirect passion
of pride.
Suppose I am proud of some particular house. My pride
has both a cause and what Hume calls an object. The cause
of my pride is the house and the object of my pride is my
self. When by pride is aroused "the first idea, that is
presented to the mind, is that of the cause or productive
principle. This excites the passion connected with it; and
that passion, when excited, turns our view to another idea,
which is that of self"(p. 278). The cause of the pride can
be further divided into subject and quality. it is not the
house per se that arouses my pride but some particular
pleasing quality of the house. The same subject might
produce contrary passions. One quality, for instance the
beauty of the house's exterior, may arouse pride, while
another quality, say its taclcy furnishings, may produce
humility. Besides a pleasing quality in the subject there
is one further requirement for the production of pride. The
subject must bear some relation to myself. i may admire a
beautiful house that has no relation to me, but I cannot be
proud of it.
The "double relation" consists in the relation between
two ideas, the idea of the subject and the idea of the self.
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and the relation between two impressions,
pleasure and the impression of pride,
process as follows:
the impres-sion of
Hume explains the
The quality [beauty]
, which operates onhe passion [pride]
,
produces separatelyan impression [pleasure] resembling it;[house], to which the qual^y adheres, is related to self, theobject of the passion (p. 289)
Thus, the double relation of impressions and ideas consists
in the following four relations:
1.
The idea of the beautiful house and
e idea of the self. The house belongsto me. ^
2. The idea of the beautiful house andthe impression of pleasure. The idea ofthe house produces pleasure.
3. The impression of pleasure and theimpression of pride. The impression ofpleasure resembles the impression ofpride
.
4. The impression of pride and the idea
of self. The impression of pride has
self as its object "by an original and
natural instinct" (p. 286).
More generally, whenever an idea of an object related
to me produces pleasure, it will produce pride, which
resembles the impression of pleasure and is naturally relat-
ed to the idea of self. Humility follows the same model.
When an idea of an object related to me produces displeasure
or pain, it will produce humility, which resembles the
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impression of pain and Is naturally related to the Idea of
self.
All the indirect passions take some self as their
Object. Pride, humility, ambition, and vanity take as their
bject the self of the person experiencing the passion.
hatred, envy, pity, malice and generosity are directed
toward some other self. But, in either case, the passions
involved depend on a double relation of impressions and
ideas
.
The above account is admittedly a simplified version of
Hume’s theory but it will be adequate for understanding the
role Of general rules in Hume's theory of the passions.
Although general rules enter into Hume's account in a
number of ways, their primary role is in the regulation and
control of the passions. This regulatory function is evi-
dent in the following passage:
The passions are often vary'd by veryinconsiderable principles; and these do
not always play with perfect regularity,
especially on the first trial. But as
custom and practice have brought tolight all these principles, and have
settled the just value of every thing;
this must certainly contribute to the
easy production of the passions, andguide us, by means of general estab-
lish d maxims, in the proportions we
ought to observe in preferring one ob-ject to another. (p. 294 )
This passage is curious, for it supposes a point that
appears to be at odds with what Hume claims elsewhere. More
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specifically, it implies that there are proper or correct
degrees of passions and improper or incorrect degrees of
passron. „e
-ought- to proportion our passions properly.
But this seems tantamount to saying that passions can be
correct or incorrect and thus reasonable or unreasonable,
and Hume denies both =c rn tnese claims. m the section "Of the
influencing motives of the will-, Hume argues that reason
can never direct the will (provide a motivation to act),
therefore, reason can never oppose a passion. Reason is
concerned with the discovery of truth: demonstrative reason
with truth concerning the relation of ideas, probable reason
with the truth concerning matters of fact and existence.
The
-proper province” of demonstrative reason is
-the world
of ideas, and as the will always places us in that of
realities, demonstration and volition seem, upon that ac-
count, to be totally remov'd from each other” (p. 413).
Probable reason informs us of causes and effects. But
knowledge of causes and effects will not move us to act
unless we have some desire or aversion to them.
'Tis from the prospect of pain or plea-
sure that the aversion or propensity
arises toward any object; And these emo-
tions extend themselves to the causes
and effects of that object, as they are
point'd out to us by reason and experi-
ence. It can never in the least concern
us to know, that such objects are
causes, and such other effects, if both
the causes and effects be indifferent to
us. Where the objects themselves do not
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their connexion can nevergive them any influence; and 'tis plain
ery of this connexion, it
t>y Its means that the
to affect us. (p. 414 )
cannot be
objects are able
Having argued that reason cannot provide a „,otive for
action, Hume goes on to claim that a passion, in and of
Itself, cannot be unreasonable. Reason is the discovery of
truth. "Nothing can be contrary to truth and reason except
What has reference to it...",p. 415). A passion is an
"original existence
... and contains not any representative
quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence
..."(P. 415). Fear, for instance, is a particular sort of
impression or feeling. This feeling does not represent any
qualities or relations of objects or ideas any more than a
pain or a tic)cle. it cannot be true or false, correct or
incorrect, thus it cannot be contrary to reason or unreason-
able
.
Note that Hume is not denying that reason has a role in
directing the passions. Our passions are aroused from the
"prospect of pain or pleasure". Reason discovers the quali-
ties of objects that produce pain or pleasure and it
discovers the means for attaining (or avoiding) objects. A
passion can be considered unreasonable or reasonable only
insofar as it is "accompany 'd with some judgment or opin-
ion" (p. 416). Given the role of reason in the production of
the passions, it follows that a passion can be viewed as
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unreasonable in either of two ways: when it is
..founded on
the supposition of the existence of objects, which really do
not exist or
..»hen in exerting any passion in action, we
chuse
.eans insufficient for the design.d end, and deceive
ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects., (p. 416 ) .
in effect, Hume is saying that a passion can be
considered unreasonable only when it is based on a false
judgment.
..«,ere a passion is neither founded on a false
supposition, nor chuses means insufficient for the end, the
understanding can neither justify nor condemn it..(p, 416).
This claim has drawn quite a bit of (deserved) criticism and
for that reason I want to examine it in some detail. But,
before doing so, i want to point out a few important facts
concerning the relationship between judgments and passions.
As 1 noted above, Hume claims that passions can be
considered reasonable or unreasonable only insofar as they
are based on a judgment. One should note that in actual
fact, barring highly unusual circumstances, almost all the
passions will be accompanied by a judgment. [3] it follows
that most actual passions can be evaluated in terms of
reasonableness. Passions do not exist in a void. They are
the effects of certain objects or, more specifically, cer-
tain qualities of objects. The effect that an object has on
us (the passion it produces) will depend on our view or
conception of the object; in other words, the passion will
131
9s a passion
depend on our belief ^ i-io i . It follows that insofar
depends on any sort of belief if -i c o k-f It IS sub:)ect to an evalua-
tion of reasonableness.
once the importance of the role of judgments or beliefs
in the production of the passions is recognised, the role of
ludgment in regulating and guiding the passions is clari-
Generally, a passion will require a judgment about
the existence or probable existence of an object. Passions
will also depend on the ability to distinguish various
qualities of the object and the causes and effects of such
qualities. If a passion is to be reasonable, the various
judgrnants involvsd in amncinnrousi g the passion must be reason-
able. An example from Book I provides an excellent illus-
tration of the complex Interplay between judgment and pas-
sion, while, at the same time, providing a paradigm of an
"unreasonable” passion.
Consider the case of a man, whobeing hung out from a high tower in a
cage of iron cannot forbear trembling,
when he surveys the precipice below him,tho he knows himself to be perfectly
secure from falling, by his experience
of the solidity of the iron, which sup-ports him; and tho' the ideas of fall
and descent, and harm and death, bederiv'd solely from custom and experi-
ence. The same custom goes beyond theinstances, from which it is deriv'd
and to which it perfectly corresponds;
and influences his ideas of such objects
as are in some respects resembling, but
fall not precisely under the same rule.
The circumstances of depth and descent
strike so strongly upon him, that their
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influence cannot be deqf • /? u
circumstances of support Indsolidxty, Which ought to giveXm pe?-
away wlt^V/s’ ob” ect';\"nV’%‘xc°?te"s
"a
gr°jtu-rra^r;u
and inlivens the idea; which lively idea
i^its^T on the passion, and
llnnl augments it force and vio-e ce; and both his fancy and affe?-
oth^r
" mutually supporting each
qreat'infT^® ^ veryg influence upon him, (pp. 148-49)
The unreasonableness of the passion can be traced to
the unreasonableness of the judgment, and the unreasonable-
ness of the judgment can, in this case, be attributed to a
"rashly formed" general rule. Such a rule "goes beyond the
instances, from which it is deriv'd, and to which It
perfectly corresponds; and influences
... ideas of such
obiects as are in some respects resembling, but fall not
precisely under the same rule" (p. US). The man's experi-
ence has taught him to causally associate height with "fall
and descent", and fall and descent with "harm and death".
But, while his present experience resembles a dangerous
situation in these respects, it differs from such situations
in an essential way. The properties of the iron which
surrounds him make him "perfectly secure".
Under different circumstances the man might have cor-
rected his rash judgment by a judgment based on properly
formed general rules. But, in this example, such correction
is prevented by the intervention of a new factor— the
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arousal of a violent, ainect passion. The onipinal
,u.,.ent
Of danger arouses fear. The violence of this passion in-
fects the imagination, strengthening the belief that aroused
the passion. This strengthened belief increases his fear.
”His imagination runs away with its object, and excites a
passron proportion'd to It. That passion returns bach upon
the imagination and Inlivens the idea; which lively idea has
influence on the passion, and in turn augments its
force and violence ..." (p. 148 ).
According to Hume, judgments made according to the rash
tion of general rules can only be corrected by a
"second influence- of general rules. But, as the example
Illustrates, such correction can be thwarted by the Inter-
vention of a passion, which serves to reinforce the initial
belief. No doubt Hume's awareness of such "passionate be-
liefs" was in some measure responsible for his occasional
pessimism about the ability of human beings to be reason-
able. The difficulty of correcting beliefs reinforced by
passions is obvious. To modify or eliminate the belief, the
passions must be lessened. But, to lessen the passion, the
belief must be modified or eliminated.
Similar examples include cases of religious fanaticism
or deep-rooted prejudices, both major concerns of Hume.
Such prejudices are simply beliefs reinforced by such pas-
sions as fear and hatred. These sorts of beliefs cannot be
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corrected merely by pointing ont contrary facts or reviewing
the original judgment any .ore than the terror-stricken
-n's belief that he is in danger can be corrected by
pointing out the properties of iron. The best defense
against these erroneous passionate beliefs is to avoid the
initial incorrect judgments, and this is best achieved by
cultivating sound judgment. Sound judgment consists in pro-
portioning one's belipf<3 4-r^ 4-u^ jefs to the evidence provided by experi-
ence or, what amounts to the samp pite thing, following properly
formed general rules.
To what extent does the above example accord with what
Hume says about the relationship between reason and pas-
sions? Clearly, the man's fear, considered in and of it-
self, IS neither reasonable nor unreasonable any more than
feeling of pain or a tickle would be reasonable or
unreasonable. it is only in relation to his beliefs about
his situation that his fear can be called unreasonable.
More specifically, we can judge his fear unreasonable only
by assessing how his beliefs were formed.
I emphasize this point because it plainly conflicts
with a claim of Hume's mentioned earlier. Recall that Hume
claims that there are two ways in which a passion can be
unreasonable; first, when it is "founded on the supposition
of the existence of objects, which really do not exist", and
second, "when in exerting any passion in action, we choose
means insufficient for the design'd end and deceive our-
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selves in our judgment of causes and effects" (p. 416 ). m
other words, a passion is unreasonable when it is based on a
false belief or judgment. But, in the example, it is not
that the man's belief is false that makes it unreasonable;
It is that the belief is unwarranted by the evidence. The
man believes that hp> ic -i ^ ^IS in a dangerous situation but has no
good reason to believe this.
If the example is modified, it becomes clear that the
unreasonableness of his belief does not stem from the fact
that it is false. Suppose that the man in the cage has had
enough experience to be aware of the danger of falling from
heights, but no experience of the properties of iron or any
Similar material. Such a man would falsely believe himself
to be in great danger, but, unlike the man in Hume’s
example, this man's belief and subsequent fear would not be
unreasonable. Furthermore, just as a false belief or judg-
ment may be reasonable, so too a true belief may be
unreasonable. The man might correctly believe that he is
perfectly safe, not because he correctly assesses the pro-
perties of iron (which we are supposing he has no knowledge
of) but because a palm reader told him he would live a long
and healthy life.
Hume is certainly wrong in claiming that to be contrary
to reason or unreasonable is equivalent to being false and,
conversely, to be in accordance with reason or reasonable is
equivalent to being true. What is curious here is not that
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mistaken, but that such a claim is completely at
odds With the View of sound judgment developed in Book l.
view that a reasonable judgment is equivalent
to a true judgment is thoroughly Cartesian. On a Cartesian
View Of the understanding, reason is Infallible. The souroe
of error lies in the will's assenting to judgments that are
not recognized by the Intellect as certain. When correctly
employed—guided by reason—our faculty of judgment will
n0V0iT l0ad us to ©ttot fat t-p u0rr r.[ 4 ] if Humo ronoctod the Cartosian
view of the understanding (and, for that matter, the will),
why should he here present a view of reasonableness that is
clearly Cartesian? There is, I believe, a very plausible
explanation for this and other anomalies in Hume's remarks
about reason
. [51 These anomalies stem from Hume's develop-
ment of a theory of the understanding that entails a view of
reason that is substantially different from traditional
views. The problem Hume faced was how to develop his views
about the nature of sound judgment within a tradition where
the nature of reason was defined according to a view of the
und0rst anding that h0 rajactad.
Tha conflict batwaan tha claim mada in Book I, that
sound judgmant consists in proportioning ona
' s baliafs to
tha avidanca, and tha claim mada in Book II, that raasonabla
judgmants (thus, prasumably, sound judgmants) ara trua judg-
mants is simply ona axampla of Huma ' s difficulty. Thara ara
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others. For instance, a similar conflict occurs in Book I
and, interestingly enough, the conflicting statements appear
on the very same page. m a footnote clarifying his view of
the "acts Of the understanding", Hume asserts (against the
popular View, that "„e may^ ^
ing more than two ideas, and without having recourse to a
third to serve as a medium betwixt them"(p. 97n, emphasis
^ine). Hume's example is that "we infer a cause immediately
from its effect" and he claims that "this Inference is not
only a true seecies of reasoning
, but the strongest of all
others....
"(p. 97n, emphasis mine). m the text of the same
page Hume tells us that "reason can never satisfy us that
the existence of any one object does ever imply that of
another; so that when we pass from the impression of one to
the Idea or belief of another, we are not determin'd by
reason, but by custom or a principle of association" (p. 97 ).
Thus, on one and the same page Hume tells us both that, in
causal inference, we "exert our reason" and that, in causal
inference, we are "not determin'd by reason".
I think these conflicts can be explained in the follow-
ing manner: As Hume's footnote makes clear, there was a
then common, traditional view of the nature and operation of
the understanding. Hume rejected this view in the sense
that he offered a different explanation of the operations
involved in the "acts of the understanding". This poses an
immediate problem of how he could intelligibly state his
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position. There are two possibilities. He could retain
What he
.ight call the
-co^on signification of words", in
other words, the common meaning of "reason" that was tied to
traditional view of the nature of the understanding. if
he did so, then he must deny that certain operations of
thought, commonly supposed to be operations of the under-
ding or reason, are really the workings of reason at
all. He must, for Instance, deny that causal inference is
"determin'd by reason" or, as he puts it in the Enguirv
.
that causal inference is "founded on reasoning, or on any
process of the understanding"
. [6
]
On the other hand, he might maintain that the opera-
tions of thought commonly supposed to be acts of the
understanding and determined by reason really are so. But,
given his account of the nature of the understanding, to do
this requires that he assign a different signification to
words, that is, it requires redefining "reason" and "under-
standing". In this way Hume could quite legitimately state
that causal inference is a "true species of reasoning"
. [7]
In fact, for the most part, Hume follows the first course;
he maintains the common meaning of "reason" and denies that
certain acts of thought are really the products of rea-
son. [8] One might note that this way of presenting his
position has considerably more shock value and is, thereby,
more cohducive to his skeptical position. But I do not see
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y reason to suppose that Hume ever explicitly recognized
options and consciously chose to retain the common mean-
ing. in fact, the existence of the conflicting statements
in his sesms to indicafo -ino'i- 4-uxxiaicate just the opposite.
«y discussion of the conflicts In Hume's comments on
reason is meant to emphasize an important point. Hume
claims that a passion is reasonable or unreasonable to the
extent that the judgment ,s, involved in arousing the passion
are reasonable or unreasonable. But, while he claims that a
judgment is reasonable when it is true and unreasonable when
It IS false, this is true only when reason is understood
along Cartesian lines. m fact, according to Hume's own
account of judgment, a judgment is sound-what we would call
"reasonable"-when it is warranted by the evidence and
unreasonable when it is unwarranted by the evidence. m the
example cited, Hume evaluates the passion according to his
own theory, that is, according to whether the judgment
involved is warranted or unwarranted.
I have argued that general rules serve to regulate and
control the passions by regulating and controlling the
judgments necessary for their production. So far l have
concentrated on one type of judgment— judgment about the
existence of objects (or qualities of objects). [9] But
there is often another type of judgment involved in the
arousal of a passion. m addition to judgments concerning
the existence of objects, the production of a passion often
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requires a value judgment. A proper treatment of this
aspect Of Hume’s view win require a review of hts theory of
value, which Includes aesthetic, moral and political
judgments. Although 1 am still concerned with the question
Of how general rules regulate the passions, I thlnjt that the
discussion of the bearing Hume’s value theory has on the
answer to this question warrants a separate chapter.
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from Book III:
^'^’^'’°''^®dges as much in the following comment
"Human nature being compos'd of two
alWte® requisite inll its actions, the affection and
blind^mn?'^^'’^' certain, that the
direof? e former, without the
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CHAPTER V
GENERAL RULES AND OBJECTIVE VALUE
In the last chapter i discussed Hume’s theory of the
passions and showed how the passions can be regulated by
conforming our judgments to general rules. i also argued
that the relationship between the passions and judgment
allows us to evaluate the reasonableness of a passion. m
this chapter I want to extend the discussion to include
value judgments. The connection between the passions and
value judgments serves as the foundation to Hume’s aesthet-
ic, moral, and political theories. Thus, an examination of
the role of general rules in value judgments will reveal
their significance to these areas of Hume’s philosophy.
" Just Value ” of Objects
Hume explicitly links general rules to value judgments
in the following passage from the Treatise:
The influence of general rules and
maxims on the passions very much contri-butes to facilitate the effects of all
the principles which we shall explain in
the progress of this treatise. For 'tis
evident, that if a person full-grown,
and of the same nature with ourselves,
were on a sudden transported into our
world, he wou'd be very much embarass'd
with every object, and wou'd not readily
find what degree of love or hatred.
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he'ough^ "jr aVtrVbute
all ?h
P^^^tice have brought to light
thi principles, and have settled
certalnL''^'”^ °t th?s „ust
t!o^ of ‘° Produc-non the passions, and guide us hvmeans of general establish'd maxims' in
.°“9ht to observe in
293-94)
^ °‘>3ect to another, (p.
TO discover the role of general rules in guiding the
value judgments underlying the passions, it will be neoes-
sary to clarify what Hume means by "just value".
Fundamentally, the value of an object is its power to
produce pleasure or pain. Some care must be taken in
interpreting this. By "power" Hume does not mean to refer
to any hidden force or principle. m discussing the powers
or abilities that we ascribe to persons, Hume explains that
"pov^ has always a reference to its exercise
, either actual
or probable, and that we consider a person endow'd with any
ability when we find from past experience, that 'tis proba-
ble, or at least possible he may exert it"(p. 313). Hume
concludes that "power consists in the possibility of proba-
bility of any action, as discover'd by experience and the
practice of the world" (p. 313)
. [1] Analogously, the power
of an object to produce pleasure or pain is simply the
probability or possibility that the object will produce
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or pain as discovered by experience”
. [2]
While Hume's view concerning the value of an object is
fairly simple, his view on what determines the value of
an Object is substantially more complex. it may seem that
there is no reason for any complexity in this regard.
Granting that the value of an object is its ability to cause
pleasure or pain, we can distinguish between actual and
apparent value. We can be mistaken about whether an object
really does produce pleasure and thus act according to what
is merely its apparent value and not its "just” value.
Hume's reference to "just value” can be taken simply as a
recognition of this distinction.
Hume certainly does acknowledge this distinction and
recognizes the importance of exercising sound judgment in
this respect. But his notion of what is involved in deter-
mining just value requires another, equally important, dis-
tinction. Determining the just value of an object requires
distinguishing between subjective and objective value. This
claim may appear quite out of place in Hume's account, which
is often taken to be a form of subjectivism. Whether an
object is pleasant or painful would appear to be a matter
for the individual to decide, for pain and pleasure are not
qualities of objects but the effects of qualities of ob-
jects. Inasmuch as there are considerable differences be-
tween individuals with respect to what is considered painful
or pleasant, there seems no room for objective criteria.
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Hucne quite explicitly denies this conclusion, maintain-
ing that a person can he mistaken in judging an object
valuable even when that object does, in fact, give him
Pleasure. Understanding this claim will require a more
detailed picture of Hume's theory of value. To obtain this
Picture I want to depart from the methodology i have been
Observing, which has been to rely exclusively on the text of
the Tr_eatise
, and examine Hume's essay "of the Standard of
Taste". inasmuch as my expressed aim is to explain the role
of general rules in the Treatise
, the introduction of views
expressed in another, much later work, requires some justi-
fication. I shall attempt to provide this justification by
answering the two major objections to this change in proce-
dure
.
The first objection is that, given the nearly twenty
years between the publication of the Treatise and the
publication of the "Standard of Taste", it is not implausi-
ble to suppose that Hume either developed new views or
changed his earlier views. While this is certainly not
implausible, I believe that it is false. The views express-
ed in the "Standard of Taste" can all be found, either
explicitly stated or implicitly assumed, in the Treatise
.
The problem with working entirely from the Treat Ise is that
Hume's value theory is not presented in a neat and orderly
manner. Instead it must be pieced together from the various
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cements scattered throughout Boohs ii and m.
ing the theory found in the "standard of Taste", i shall
ampl© ©videnpp o-f the same views expressed in the
Treatise
.
The second objection is that the "Standard of Taste" is
an essay on aesthetic judgment and that one cannot si.ply
assume that the principles involved can be generalised to
cover value judgments in general. it is true that this
cannot simply be assumed but, fortunately, Hume eliminates
the need for any such supposition by making clear that
"fixing the epithets of praise or blame" depends on the same
fundamental principles whether the praise and blame be
aesthetic or moral. This is particularly evident in Hume's
practice of using examples from aesthetics to illustrate
points in his moral theory and vice versa.
In "Of the Standard of Taste" Hume argues against what
he believes to be a common misconception about the nature of
aesthetic judgments. Hume characterizes this Incorrect view
as follows:
All sentiment is right; because senti-
ment has a reference to nothing beyonditself, and is always real, wherever a
man is conscious of it. But all deter-
minations of the understanding are not
right; because they have reference to
something beyond themselves, to wit,
real matters of fact A thousanddifferent sentiments, excited by the
same object, are all right; because no
sentiment represents what is really in
the object.... Beauty is no quality in
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things themselves: it exists merely in
each "'ml'na contemplates them; andmind perceives a different beau-ty. [3]
While the view that beauty is in the eye of the
beholder has gained such currency that it passes for a
matter of simple common sense, Hume argues that, in fact, it
conflicts with another common sense view. Someone who
Claims the works of Ogilby to be just as good as the works
of Milton “would be thought to defend no less an extrava-
gance, than if he had maintained
... a pool as extensive as
the ocean". [4] Someone might well prefer Ogilby to Milton,
but this would be taken not as a mere difference in taste
but as a lack of taste.
To acknowledge that a person can be incorrect in an
aesthetic judgment is to admit that there is some standard
of taste other than individual sentiment. This standard is
discoverable by general observations, concerning what has
been universally found to please in all countries and all
ages"
. [5]
What Hume has in mind here is this: Although, strictly
speaking, beauty is not a quality of objects, there are
properties of objects which, as a matter of contingent fact,
arouse the sense of beauty in human beings. He likens this
to the primary/secondary quality distinction. Sweetness is
not thought to be a quality in any object, but the effect
that certain qualities in an object produce in us. The
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existence of the independent objective quality in the object
and its causal relationship to our sensation allows us to
make the objective judgment that a certain object is sweet.
This objective judgment can be distinguished from the sub-
jective judgment that an object tastes sweet or seems sweet
to a particular individual.
The same is true of the sentiment of beauty. [6] Given
the structure of human organisms, certain qualities of
objects will produce certain effects on human beings.
certain that beauty anddeformity, more than sweet and bitter
are not qualities in objects, but belong
entirely to the sentiment, internal or
external, it must be allowed, that there
are certain qualities in objects, which
are fitted by nature to produce theseparticular feelings. [7]
The relationship between a given quality and he sentiment
(or passion) it produces is causal and, thus, contingent.
But as long as the psychophysiological makeup (what Hume
calls the nature") of human beings remains the same there
will be a basis for objective value judgments.
Amidst all the variety and caprice of
taste, there are certain general princi-
ples of approbation or blame, whose in-
fluence a careful eye may trace in all
operations of the mind. Some particular
forms or qualities, from the original
structure of the internal fabric are
calculated to please, and other to dis-
please; and if they fail of their effect
in any particular instance, it is from
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some apparent
the organ. [8]
defect or imperfection in
Hu.e does not deny that there can be considerable
variations among value judgments, not only between individ-
uals, but even between cultures and ages. There are a
number of factors that might produce such variation. one
common cause of a difference in value judgment is the
failure to distinguish subjective from objective judgments.
This sort of failure can be identified by attending to the
language of the evaluator. The beetle phobic who claims
that Kafka's Metamorphosis, is an inferior work is using the
language of objective valuation to express subjective dis-
taste. The mother who calls her daughter's novels brilliant
to express her personal enjoyment likewise misuses language.
There are, Hume says, "certain terms in every language which
import blame, and others praise; and all men who use the
same tongue must agree in their application of them". [9] To
call a work inferior is not equivalent to expressing dis-
like, and equating the two reveals a basic lack of under-
standing of the nature of evaluative language.
There are other factors that can prevent the discovery
of the just value of objects. Such factors include the lack
of "serenity of mind", a "due attention to the object", and
"all the caprices of mode and fashion, all the mistakes of
ignorance and envy". [10] Hume discusses five requirements
for making correct value judgments: (1) delicacy of taste.
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(2) practice, (3) comparison,
and (5) good sense.
(4) elimination of prejudice
By delicacy of taste Hume means a keen power of
discernment. The passions and sentiments depend on our
judgments concerning the qualities of objects. Many differ-
ences in passions arise from differences in ability to
discern and distinguish such qualities. Developing one's
power of discernment requires practice.
When objects of any kind are first pre-nted to the eye or imagination, thesentiment which attends them is obscureand confused; and the mind is, in greatmeasure, incapable of pronouncing con-cerning their merits or defects Butallow him to acquire experience in those
objects, his feeling becomes more exactand nice; he not only perceives thebeauties and defects of each part, but
marks the distinguishing species of eachquality, and assigns it suitable praise
or blame. [11] ^
The third requirement for correct value judgment is
comparison. "a man who has no opportunity of comparing the
different kinds of beauty, is indeed totally unqualified to
pronounce an opinion with regard to any objects By
comparison alone we fix the epithets of praise and blame and
learn how to assign the due degree of each.” [12] It is only
by comparison that we can differentiate between various
degrees of value. A mass-produced plastic figurine may have
some qualities "fitted to please" and, thus, have some
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measure of beauty. But, when compared to a Micbelanpelo,
Its Pleasing qualities are recognised as few and crude and
we adjust our judgment accordingly.
Freedom from prejudice is a matter of framing a proper
evaluative viewpoint. This involves two aspects: all rele-
vant factors must be considered, and all irrelevant factors
must be ruled out. A Humean "impartial observer" is not
necessarily an observer who ignores his own sentiments, but
an observer who forms his judgments based on his own senti-
ment only after prejudice has been eliminated.
We may observe, that every work of artin order to produce its due effect onthe mind, must be surveyed in a certainpoint of view, and cannot be fully rel-ished by persons whose situation, real
or imaginary, is not conformable to that
which is required by the performance.
An orator addresses himself to a par-ticular audience, and must have a regard
to their particular genius, interests,
passions, and prejudices; otherwise hehopes in vain to govern their resolu-tions, and influence their affec-
tions.... A critic of a different age
or nation, who should peruse this
discourse, must have all these circum-
stances in his eye, in order to form a
true judgment of the oration. [13]
The final requirement, "good sense" or "sound judg-
ment
,
is the most general of the five requirements. Hume
is clearly referring to what we would call "intelligence".
It includes "clearness of conception", "exactness of dis-
tinction", and "vivacity of apprehension"
.
[14 ] Apart from
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checking prejudice, sound judgment Is required for analyzing
work of art. "Mutual relations and correspondence of
parts" must be understood and compared in order to judge the
"consistency and uniformity of the whole". When a work is
designed to achieve some end or purpose, sound judgment is
required to judge "how far means employed are adapted to
their respective purposes
[
15 ]
HOW do general rules enter into the determinations of
the just value of objects? The first and most obvious way
IS in discerning those qualities "fitted to please". As
Hume points out, it is only by experience, or custom and
practice, that we come to discover what qualities please and
displease, and thus, the "proportions we ought to observe in
preferring one object to another" (p. 294). Experience
teaches us the value of money— its ability to obtain objects
which produce pleasure. According to this experience we
develop general rules by which "we form a notion of the
different ranks of men, suitable to the power of riches they
are possest of...", and regulate our passions according-
ly, (p. 293) We respect (or, more likely, envy) those with
wealth, take pride in our own wealth, or are humbled by our
own poverty, all in accordance with general rules involving
the power of money to produce pleasure.
The general rules originate from our experience of the
value of money. When, through some intervening cause, the
money "fails of its usual effect", the attending passions
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Should also cease. But, because general rules often contln- '
to influence us beyond the original circumstances that
9 rise to them, our passions may continue to follow the
general rule even when the circumstances no longer warrant
the passion. We rank men according to their riches, but
circumstances can counter the usual effects of such riches.
Continuing to follow the general rule, we do not change our
view "upon account of any peculiarities of health and temper
of the persons, which may deprive them of all enjoyment in
their possessions" (p. 293). Hume points out that "this may
be accounted for from the same principles, that explain'd
the influence of general rules on the understanding. Custom
readily carries us beyond the just bounds in our passions as
well as in our reasonings" (p. 293).
We can, of course, correct such judgments and, thereby,
correct" the corresponding passions by another, higher
order application of general rules. Surveying past judg-
ments of this sort, we will recognize that failure to
discriminate "efficacious" from "nonef f icacious" causes, or
failure to take into account contrary causes, leads to
mistaken judgments. When the judgment is corrected, so is
the attending passion. A rich man who is unable to reap the
rewards of his riches is to be pitied, not envied.
Another role of general rules is in developing the
point of view necessary for an objective value judgment.
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Passions are aroused and influenced by a variety of factors
including the evaluator's particular relations to objects,
his prejudices, and his psychological or physiological idio-
syncrasies. our passions tend to vary according to an
object's relative proximity in space and time. The passions
depend upon judgments and judgments depend on the imagina-
tion, which is naturally influenced aaccording to he proxim-
ity of an object.
Here then we are to consider two kinds
of objects, the contiguous and remote;
of which the former, by means of their
relation to ourselves, approach an im-pression in force and vivacity, the lat-ter by reason of the interruption in our
manner of conceiving them, appear in a
weaker and more imperfect light. Thisis their effect on the imagination. if
my reasoning be just, they must have a
proportionate effect on the will and
passions. Contiguous objects must have
an influence much superior to the dis-
tant and remote. (p. 428 )
Because the passions depend on judgment and judgment
depends on the imagination, the passions will be subject to
the influence of the "unphilosophical probabilities". Such
passions will be inappropriate or unreasonable because they
are aroused by a view of objects based on faulty judgments.
Besides, that we ourselves often change
our situation in this particular, we
every day meet with persons, who are in
a different situation from ourselves,
and who cou'd never converse with us on
any reasonable terms, were we to remain
constantly in that situation and point
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of view, which is peculiar to us. Theintercourse o sentiments, therefore, insociety and conversation,
some general inalterable
which we may approve or
characters and manners. (p.
makes us form
standard, by
disapprove of
603)
These "general and inalterable standards" are
ing to our experience of those qualities
"universally found to please in all countr
ages"
. [16]
formed accord-
that have been
ies and in all
Moral Sent iment
s
Given the role of general rules in developing an
objective evaluative viewpoint, one aspect of their impor-
tance to Hume's moral theory should be clear. According to
Hume, an objective viewpoint is a necessary condition for
the arousal of a truly moral sentiment. Insofar as general
rules help us distinguish objective from nonobjective view-
points, they will also help us to distinguish moral from
nonmoral sentiments. But, while this is certainly a signif-
icant function of general rules, it is not their most
crucial function. General rules can help us regulate our
moral sentiments. But their major significance is in regu-
lating our moral judgments.
It is impossible to appreciate the extent of the
influence of general rules in Hume's moral theory without
making a clear distinction between moral sentiments and
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moral judgments, m fact, I think it is impossible to fully
understand Hume's moral theory without being clear on this
distinction. i „in support both these claims and, at the
same time, attempt to explalin the relationship between
judgment and sentiment by examining the shortcomings of an
account that falls to make an adequate distinction between
the two. The account I have in mind is found in Thomas
Hearn's article "General Rules and Moral Sentiments in
Hume's Treatise "
.
Hearn points out that, according to Hume, "our senti-
ments are subject to influences which, if uncorrected, would
render morality and moral discourse impossible"
. [17] He
lists what he calls four "general rules" for correcting
moral sentiments.
(1) Our sentiments must reflect a point
of view which abstracts from accidental
relations in space and time between the
observer and the object of evaluation.
(2) The moral sentiments must be founded
upon a general and impartial conception
of their object. (3) They must reflect
an entirely adequate conception of the
object. (4) They must have the motives
and character of agents as their ulti-
mate object. [18]
Hearn does not discuss the relationship between judg-
ment and sentiment; thus he has no account of just how this
correction of the sentiments is achieved. I have already
explained how sentiments are corrected, and it should be
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clear from my description that what Hearn calls "general
rules are not really rules at all, but, rather, necessary
conditions for objective moral judgments. it would be more
accurate to say that we satisfy these conditions by forming
our judgments according to general rules.
The first and second conditions will be met when we
eliminate subjective elements from our judgments. This is
achieved by eliminating prejudice and disregarding personal
Idiosyncrasies. The third condition will be met when we
discern the qualities of objects that are "fitted" to please
or displease, which Involves distinguishing real from appar-
ent qualities. Hearn's fourth condition is a distinguishing
feature of moral evaluation. Moral value is distinguishable
from non-moral value by its object. "The pain or pleasure,
which arises from the general survey or view of any action
or quality of the mind
, constitutes it vice or virtue" (p.
614 ) .
having introduced the "rules" for correcting moral
sentiments, Hearn attempts to specify the connection between
reason, the calm passions, and general rules. The connec-
tion, he believes, can be found in the following passages
from the Treatise:
But however the general principles of
our blame or praise may be corrected by
those other principles, 'tis certain
they are not altogether efficacious, nor
do our passions often correspond entire-
ly to the present theory. "Tis seldom
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men heartily love what lies at a dis-tance from them, and what no way re-dounds to their particular benefit; astis no less rare to meet with persons
their^^
pardon another any opposition tointerest, however justifiable thatopposition may be by the general rules
sLina^^^^?\ contented withying, that reason requires such animpartial conduct, but that 'tis seldomwe can bring ourselves to it, and thatour passions do not readily follow the
eterminations of our judgment. * Thislanguage will be easily understood, if
we consider what we formerly said con-
cerning that reason
, which is able to
oppose our passion; and which we havefound to be nothing but a general calmdetermination of the passions, founded
on some distant view or reflection, (p.583 )
Here Hume describes how the natural tendencies of our
passions are corrected by other principles
—
general rules.
Although these rules do not always correct our passions,
Hearn notes that "they are said to be the determinations of
our judgment and reason". [19] He concludes:
The sense of reason involved here is
then related to the calm passions. What
I principally want to note is that Hume
makes it abundantly plain here that a
calm passion is a corrected passion, one
that has been tested by these general
rules. [20]
In explaining our tendency to confuse the calm passions
with the "determinations of reason", Hume stresses the
similarity in the way they "feel". Both reason and calm
passions produce little or no sensible emotion. "When any
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... passions are calm, and cause no disorder in the soul,
they are very readily taken for the determinations of
reason, and are suppos'd to proceed from the same faculty.
With that, which judges of truth and falsehood" (p. 4i7) .
Hearn argues that the calm passions are corrected passions;
they are precisely
... those states we achieve by following
reflective procedures"
.
[21] He concludes that "the rela-
tionship between reason and the calm passions is closer than
Hume sometimes seems to suggest ”.[ 22
]
I agree with Hearn in his emphasis on the importance of
general rules in determining the reasonableness of the
passions. But I think his attempt to link general rules to
"reasonable" passions by equating calm passions with cor-
rected passions is a mistake. it is a mistake in two
senses. First, it is a mistake in interpretation; it mis-
identifies the actual place of general rules in correcting
the passions. Second, it is a mistake in method. Appeal-
ing to Hume's notion of the calm passions sheds little light
on the relationship between the passions and general rules.
As I will show below, it actually tends to obscure the
relationship
.
A number of problems arise from Hearn's failure to make
any clear distinction between passions and judgments
.
[23]
For instance, consider the consequences of two of his
claims: (1) A calm passion is a passion corrected by general
rules, and (2) Only a passion can correct a passion.
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Together these imply
,3) general rules are also passions.
Surely hearn does not want to make such a claim. To say
that the rule' that "moral sentiments must be founded upon
a general and impartial conception of their object" is a
passion makes no sense whatsoever.
Furthermore, it is clear how a passion can oppose a
passion. I know what it means to say that anger can
overcome fear, or that disgust can oppose curiosity. But it
IS not at all clear how a passion can correct a passion.
Talk of correction only makes sense by making some reference
to judgment. Hume is quite clear on this point.
Finally, Hearn's interpretation entails that a passion
can only be corrected by employing a corrected passion.
This seems to involve a troublesome regress. I am not sure
of this because, as I noted above, it is unclear what it
means to say that a passion can correct a passion. But if
it is viewed as analogous to judgment (and, I confess, I do
not know how else to view it)
,
then it is analogous to
saying that we can correct a judgment only by employing a
judgment. It is difficult to see how we could
ever get any process of correction going under such circum-
stances
.
These sort of difficulties would have been avoided by a
more detailed examination of the relation between moral
sentiments and moral judgments. What Hume is claiming in
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the passage cited is that our sentin,ents do not always agree
With our moral judgments. Numerous commentators have noted
that, according to Hume, a moral judgment must be made from
a certain "general" or objective point of view. This is
certainly true, but it is important to be clear on just what
Hume means by judging from such a viewpoint. I think a more
accurate way of describing Hume’s view is to say that, to
judge morally is to judge ^ one occupied a moral
(objective) viewpoint. The point is that we can judge as if
we were free from subjective influences without, in fact,
being free from subjective influences. This is exactly what
happens when we judge someone we loath virtuous. Our per-
sonal sentiment may prevent us from actually viewing the
person objectively, yet we recognize that a moral judgment
requires an objective viewpoint and we make the sort of
judgment that we know would result from such a viewpoint.
A moral sentiment is aroused when we actually achieve a
moral viewpoint. When our view is completely free of sub-
jective influences, the sentiment we feel will be a truly
moral sentiment. Thus moral sentiments arise only under
ideal conditions and Hume's frequent reminders that people
rarely manage to match their sentiments to their judgments
indicates his recognition of this fact.
If this interpretation is correct, then particular
moral judgments are not always based on moral sentiments.
Having a genuinely objective view of a person's character is
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not a necessary condition for making a „,oral judgment. All
that is necessary for moral judgment is that we recognize
what an objective view involves and that we form our
judgment ^ if this were the view we actually have. This is
achieved by forming our judgments according to general
rules
.
Hume's comments leading up to the quoted passages
strongly support this Interpretation. He first notes that,
if we were to judge characters
-only as they appear from our
peculiar point of view", it would be impossible for us "to
converse together on any reasonable terms" (p. 581). We
avoid this by fixing on "some steady and general point of
view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them,
whatever may be our present situation" (p. 581-82). Hume
compares this to our manner of judging beauty. Our senti-
ment may vary according to the distance of the object
viewed. But when we judge a distant object beautiful, we
judge according to the effect we Icnow it would have if it
were near. We judge it beautiful "because we Icnow what
effect it will have in such a position, and by that
reflection we correct its momentary appearance" (p. 582).
Clearly Hume does not want to suggest that maJcing
an aesthetic judgment requires actually viewing objects from
close by. We need only judge them as if we viewed them from
close by. The same is true of a moral viewpoint. Our
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actual view of a person may not
factors, but we judge as if it were
be free of subjective
free of them.
In general, all sentiments of blame
or praise are variable according to oursituation of nearness or remoteness,
with ^regard to the person blam'd orprais'd, and according to the presentdisposition of our mind. But these
variations we regard not in our generaldecisions, but still apply the terms
expressive of our liking or dislike, inthe same manner, as if we remain'd in
one point of view. Experience soonteaches us this method of correcting ourlanguage, where the sentiments are more
stubborn and inalterable. (p. 582 )
General rules can actually change our passions by
correcting our judgments about the objects that arouse our
passions. But, more importantly, general rules allow the
possibility of making genuine moral judgments when we do not
or cannot correct our passions. Even when I cannot help
viewing someone as my enemy and feeling dislike, I know what
my sentiment would be towards someone with the same charac-
ter who is not my enemy, and this enables me to judge an
enemy as if my view were objective.
Keeping this distinction between passions and judgments
in mind, I shall now return to examine Hearn's view of the
calm passions. While Hearn claims that the calm passions
are corrected passions
—
passions "founded on reflection"—he
does not want to claim that this is the only characterizing
feature of calm passions. He merely holds that "at least
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one sense in which passions are calm is when they are
corrected by rules". [24] Hearn can thus agree with Ardal
that a calm passion is one which "on most occasions involves
low emotional intensity"
, [25] yet argue that this low
intensity is a natural result of correcting a passion. This
interpretation also lends credence to Hearn's view that
"calm passions precisely are those states we achieve by
following reflective procedures" and are, thereby, "reason-
able in the ordinary way of talking"
. [26]
This IS a very tidy picture, but it is far too
simplistic. It entirely overlooks the fact that, among the
calm passions often mistaken for reason, Hume lists such
passions as benevolence and resentment, the love of life,
and kindness to children' (p. 417). Such calm passions cer-
tainly are not corrected passions. Thus, not all calm
passions are corrected passions. Furthermore, while it may
be true that a passion that has been corrected will be low
in intensity and thus experienced as calm, this is equally
true of violent passions. l might correct my anger by
correcting my judgment. As the result of such correction, I
might reduce my anger to the point of calmness. But a
corrected violent passion is still a violent passion (a
passion that is generally high in intensity) even when the
correction results in experiencing it as calm. So, not all
corrected passions are calm passions.
If not all calm passions are corrected passions, and
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not all corrected passions are cal. passions, is there
anything left to Hearn-s claim that a calm passion is a
corrected passion? Given the various other claims that
Hearn makes, the only recourse that I can think of would be
for him to argue along the following lines: Admittedly, any
passion may be corrected by review and reflection. But
review and reflection are necessary conditions for moral
sentiments, and this explains why the moral sentiments are
calm passions. A moral sentiment is aroused only upon a
"distant view". Such a view requires the correction of our
natural sentiments by reflection. Moral sentiments are just
"those states we achieve by following reflective proce-
dures
. [27] This is not true of the violent passions. Re-
flection may be used to correct or modify a violent passion,
but reflection is not a necessary condition for its arousal.
If this is the position Hearn has in mind, then his
talk of calm passions obscures the point, which is merely
that moral sentiments are corrected passions. Calmness is
merely an incidental by-product of correction. But even
this more limited claim is incorrect. Its mistake lies in
the assumption that the objective viewpoint necessary for
the arousal of moral sentiments can be achieved only by
reflection and correction. According to Hume, an objective
viewpoint is a necessary condition for the arousal of moral
sentiments, but there is nothing in Hume's theory that says
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such a Viewpoint can be achieved only by a process of
correction.
Hume held that all (or, at least, most) people )tnow
from experience the sentiments aroused in them when observ-
ing "qualities of mind" objectively. i know the approval I
have felt when observing benevolence that neither hinders
nor serves my own interests. My viewpoint in such circum-
stances was naturally objective, it required no particular
reflection or correction. Yet my approval was moral approv-
al all the same. Hume believed that, given the similarity
of human beings, anyone in relevantly similar circumstances
Will experience the same sentiment upon observing similar
qualities of mind. Our experience of this causal relation-
ship allows us to form general rules. These general rules
guide our judgments, allowing us to adjust our judgments to
varying circumstances.
When, for instance, I have some personal quarrel with a
benevolent person, my sentiment is likely to differ from
those observers who have no such quarrel. Recognizing that
my quarrel acts as a contrary cause, I am able to adjust my
judgment by following general rules. My experience of a
naturally objective viewpoint serves as the basis for form-
ing general rules that guide my judgments when I am influ-
enced by nonobjective factors.
Hearn and I agree that general rules are an essential
element in Hume's moral theory. But we disagree on their
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function. Hearn claims that moral sentiments are calm pas-
sions and that calm passions are passions corrected by
general rules. Thus, a moral sentiment is simply a passion
corrected by general rules. Such passions can be said to be
reasonable because they are the result of reflective proce-
dures. I argue that following general rules allows us to
make the sort of objective value judgments necessary or
genuinely moral judgments
. The importance of general rules
IS not that they correct passions, thereby producing moral
sentiments, but that they allow us to make moral judgments
even in the absence of moral sentiments.
The Rules of Justice
An account of general rules in the Treatise would not
be complete without some mention of the rules of justice. A
full treatment of this subject would require a thorough
analysis of Hume's theory of justice, a large topic in
itself. I shall confine myself to the modest task of
outlining those aspects of Hume's theory which are most
essential for understanding the operations of general rules.
I shall then examine certain parallels between the role of
general rules in Hume's theory of justice and their role in
his theory of judgment.
A virtue, according to Hume, is any quality of mind
that produces a certain sort of pleasure, vice a quality of
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mind that produces a certain sort of pain. The qualities
that produce moral pleasure are those that are agreeable or
useful to the person possessing the qualities or to others.
Hume makes a distinction between two types of virtue:
natural and artificial. a virtue is natural when (1) people
are naturally inclined to be motivated by it (naturally
possess it) and (2) people are naturally inclined to approve
of It. The paradigm natural virtue is benevolence. People
have a natural tendency towards benevolence, albeit in
varying degrees. Hume denies that we have any such passion
as "the love of mankind, merely as such"(p. 481), but this
is not incompatible with the claim that we are naturally
endowed with a more limited benevolence, which is strongest
towards our friends and acquaintances and more limited
towards "strangers and indifferent persons" (p. 488). Benevo-
lence also elicits our natural approval.
Artificial virtues depend on the "invention or contriv-
ance" of man. People do not naturally posses such virtues
(they have no natural or original motivation to them)
,
nor
are people naturally inclined to approve of them. The
artificial virtues become virtues only within some order of
convention, which provides their motivation. Justice is a
paradigm artificial virtue. There is no original motivation
to the sorts of behavior we call 'just'
,
nor is there any
natural tendency to approve of such behavior. To illustrate
his point, Hume considers an example of just behavior:
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rsturning borrowed money.
What motivation might someone have to return borrowed
money? The most obvious answer would be “a sense of duty
and obligation” (p. 479). But, Hume claims, the regard for
the virtue of an action could never be the original motlva-
tion for that action:
We can never have a regard to the virtue
of an action, unless the action be ante-
cedently virtuous. No action can be
virtuous, but so far as it proceeds from
a virtuous motive. A virtuous motive
must precede the regard to the virtue;
and 'tis impossible, that the virtuous
motive and the regard to the virtue can
be the same. (p. 480)
It is a "sophistry" to say that what makes an action
virtuous is a virtuous motive and what makes a motive
is regard for the virtue of the action. This is
"reasoning in a circle". [28]
If a sense of duty cannot provide an original motiva-
tion to return the money, what could provide such a motiva-
tion? Hume considers three alternatives: self-interest,
public interest, and the interest of the lender. Obviously
self-interest could not be the motivation, for it would not
generally be in our interest to return the money. Public
interest could not supply the motivation either. Hume cites
three specific and one general objection to this possibil-
ity. First, particular acts of justice do not necessarily
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promote public interest. Second, public interest would not
provide a motivation to secret acts of honesty, yet such
secret acts are nonetheless virtuous. Third, in actual
fact, people rarely consider public interest when they
just or honest actions. Such a motivation is "too
remote and too sublime to affect the generality of
mankind (p. 481). Hume's final and more general objection
IS that "there is no such passion in human minds, as the
love of mankind, merely as such, independent of personal
qualities, or services, or of relation to ourself" (p. 481).
The only possibility left is the interest of the
lender or benevolence. Hume has two objections. First, if
the lender is an enemy, towards whom we feel no benevolence,
there would be no motivation to return the money, yet
clearly people are motivated to do so even under such
circumstances. Second, it may not be in the lender's inter-
est to return the money. He may be "a profligate debauchee,
and wou'd rather receive harm than benefit from large
possessions" (p. 482).
Hume s conclusion is that it would seem "we have
naturally no real or universal motive for observing the laws
of equity, but the very equity and merit of that obser-
vance (p. 483) . But, as he has already shown, regard for
the virtue of an action cannot be an original motivation.
The only solution is to "allow, that the sense of justice
and injustice is not deriv'd from nature, but arises artifi-
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Cially, tho' necessarily from education, and human conven-
tions (p. 483). It is only when considered within a system
of conventional rules and practices that a motivation for
just actions can be discovered. To see how the motivation
arises, it will be necessary to examine Hume's explanation
Of the origins of justice. [29]
The origins of society cannot be attributed to people's
recognition of its benefits, for people would have no means
of discovering such benefits without experience. But, even
without the recognition of its benefits, the formation of
society is ensured by the "natural appetite betwixt the
sexes". Once a rudimentary society is established, its
members will recognize the benefits that accrue: society
increases the power, ability and security of its members.
Experience will also make clear that certain "outward cir-
cumstances" and man's "natural temper" hinder the preserva-
tion of society. The scarcity of goods and instability of
their possession combined with man's natural self-interest
and biased affections inevitably lead to conflicts. Man's
natural temper cannot be changed, but it can be redirected.
There is no passion ... capable of con-
trolling the interested affection, but
the very affection itself, by an altera-
tion of its direction. Now this altera-
tion must necessarily take place upon
the least reflection; since 'tis evi-
dent, that the passion is much better
satisfy'd by its restraint than by its
liberty.
. .
.
(p. 492)
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the interest of
Recognizing that their own interests and
their friends and loved ones are
society than without it, people
natural temper.
Given man's natural acquisitiveness, biased affections
and the scarcity of goods, the major impediment to maintain-
ing society will be the instability of possessions. if
society is to be preserved this situation must be remedied.
The remedy is supplied by artifice.
When men, from their early education in
society, have become sensible of theinfinite advantages that result from it
... and when they have observ'd that the
principal disturbance in society arises
from those goods, which we call exter-
nal, and from their looseness and easy
transition from one person to another,
they must seek a remedy, by putting
these goods, as far as possible, on the
same footing with the fix'd and constant
advantages of the mind and body. (p. 489)
The remedy consists in establishing a general rule,
which Hume describes as "a convention enter'd into by all
members of society to bestow stability on the possession of
those external goods, and leave everyone in the peaceable
enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and indus-
try" (p. 489). This convention for stabilizing possessions
creates property, which is "nothing but those goods, whose
constant possession is establish'd by the laws of soci-
better satisfied within
are led to check their
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ety”(p. 491). Justice consists, at least in part, in abid-
ing by such laws. [30]
Hume stresses that the agreement to abide by the rules
of justice IS not based on a promise. "it is only a general
sense of common interest, which inclines them to regulate
their conduct by certain rules" (p. 490). Promises arise in
same manner as the rules for stabilizing property. Both
are the product of a convention, which "arises gradually,
and acquires force by slow progression, and by our repeated
experiences of the inconveniences of transgressing it"(p.
490) .
As noted above, there are no natural motivations to be
just. I may have a motivation to refrain from taking
another's possessions under certain circumstances
—for in-
stance, when it would be dangerous to myself or when I have
some particular affection for the other person. But I have
no natural motive for restraining myself in all circum-
stances. Within a conventional order of society such a
motive is supplied. The original motive for observing the
rules of justice is simply enlightened self-interest. I can
best satisfy my own interest within society; it is thus in
my interest to abide by the conventions developed for
preserving society. This is what Hume refers to as the
"natural obligation to justice" (p. 498). We ought to ob-
serve the rules, if we want to preserve society, and thus
foster our own best interests. The 'ought' here is purely
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prudential
.
But, according to Hume, natural obligation is merely
the original motivation to justice. Once society has grown
and conventions have become firmly established, people are
no longer motivated by natural obligation, or regard to
self-interest, but by moral obligation, or regard to virtue.
Within a conventional order an act of injustice will be seen
as “prejudicial to human society, and pernicious to everyone
that approaches the person guilty of lt”(p. 499). This
arouses our displeasure, and "as every thing, which gives
uneasiness in human actions, upon the general survey, is
call d Vice", injustice elicits our moral disapproval. it
is only within a conventional order that a just character
will always appear useful or agreeable from an objective
viewpoint, and it is these qualities that give rise to moral
approval
.
The general rule for stabilizing possessions is worked
out over time by our experience of its advantages and the
disadvantages of transgressing it. But the rule itself is
much too general to guide us in particular cases.
Tho' the establishment of the rule, con-
cerning the stability of possession, be
not only useful, but even absolutely
necessary to human society, it can never
serve to any purpose, while it remains
in such general terms. Some method must
be shown, by which we may distinguish
what particular goods are to be assign'd
to each particular person, while the
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rest of mankind are excluded from thei]possession and enjoyment
. (p. 501 - 502 )
We must determine some particular means for applying
the rule. Ideally, it would seem best if "every one were
possess'd of what is most suitable to him, and proper for
his use..."(p. 502). Thus, we might be tempted to believe
that the best way to stabilize possessions is according to a
principle of utility, assigning to each person those goods
which would be most useful or advantageous either to the
person himself or to society. However agreeable such a
scheme may appear in theory, it is not acceptable in
practice.
Besides, that this relation of fitness
may be common to several at once, 'tis
liable to so many controversies, and men
are so partial and passionate in judging
of these controversies, that such a rule
wou'd be absolutely incompatible with
the peace of human society. (p. 502)
Following such a rule would introduce an endless source
of controversy and disagreement. Consider a simple example.
Is an apple orchard more useful or advantageous to an expert
fruit grower or to an impoverished family?— To someone
disabled and unable to till the soil or to a vegetarian
whose food sources are more limited than others? A rule
requiring that such decisions be made for every case would
be a source of perpetual dispute, and would thus undermine
the original purpose for introducing a rule that would
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stabilize possessions.
Rather than pursuing such theoretical solutions to the
problem, Hume examines actual practice. [31] He discovers
five rules by which people actually assign property. These
rules are succinctly summed up in the following account of
David Miller:
(1) Possession: A person shall have the
right to whatever objects he currentlyholds in his possession.
(2) Occupation: A person shall have a
right to whatever objects he possessesfirst, i.e. prior to other persons.
(3) Prescription: A person shall have a
right to whatever objects he has held
over an extensive period of time.
(4) Accession: A person shall have a
right to whatever is 'intimately' con-
nected with objects he already owns
(e.g. the fruits of his trees, the off-
spring of his cattle)
.
(5) Succession: A person shall have a
right to objects owned by his close
relatives upon their death. [32]
The application of the first rule, present possession,
is limited to the initial formation of society. Once soci-
ety is established the observance of it would not only cease
to stabilize possessions, it would actively promote destabi-
lization.
These five rules, though more determinate than the rule
that property must be stable, are still not determinate
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enough to settle all controversies. Two types of problems
are Ukely to arise. First, there will be questions such as
"What should be counted as first possession?" and "How long
must an object be possessed before it becomes rightful
property?" Second, there is the possibility that the rules
will conflict. Both problems are resolved by an even more
determinate set of general rules—municiple laws.
Hume claims that the origin of the rules for assigning
property is not reason, but the imagination. The imagina-
tion has a "natural propensity to join relations, especially
resembling ones..."(p. 509). We ascribe property relations
according to the "natural union betwixt the ideas of a
person and that of an ob j ect
. .
.
" { p . 510). This natural
union is the result of our observation of a natural rela-
tion, primarily contiguity and cause and effect. Accession,
for instance, is based on both the contiguity between person
and object and cause and effect between objects.
If the rules for assigning property are the product of
the imagination, what is their claim to legitimate authori-
ty? They are not based on reason, but only on "the more
frivolous properties of our thought and concept ion" (p . 504).
Thus, they appear to be entirely arbitrary. Hume's reply is
that reason cannot supply any workable principles for as-
signing property. The type of principles supplied by reason
are not simply impractical; they are self-defeating. They
reintroduce the sort of destabilizing influences that the
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rule for stabilizing property is designed to eliminate.
The imagination can and does supply workable princi-
ples. This, according to Hume, is a simple matter of fact.
His five rules are taken from actual practice. Hume ex-
plains this fact by appealing to "known properties of human
nature"—our natural propensity to join relations. Because
the rules are the product of a natural propensity, they will
Immediately occur to everyone as the "most natural expedi-
ent and people will "easily acquiese in this expedient" and
"naturally agree in preferring lt"(p. 503-504). if we re-
ject these naturally formed rules because they are not the
product of reason, we are left with no way of stabilizing
possessions and this undermines our effort to maintain
society.
In discussing the influencing motives of the will, Hume
claims that we are unreasonable when "in exerting any
passion in action, we chuse means insufficient for the
design’d end..."(p. 416). in his discussion of the above
rules, he argues that reason is incapable of providing
principles that achieve our desired end—stabilizing posses-
sions. The paradoxical conclusion is that it would be
unreasonable to employ our reason. To achieve our end we
must grant authority to custom.
There are a number of striking parallels between Hume's
argument here and his Book I argument concerning the role of
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custom in judgment
. [33) Both arguments
showing the limits of reason. m Book I
reason does not and cannot support causal
al Inference is based on the imagination.
are concerned with
f Hume argues that
inferences. Caus-
er custom. Reason
loses its title to grant or deny authority to custom because
reason, when consistently pursued, is self-destructive. if
we allow that only judgments based on reason have legitimate
authority, then we must conclude that no judgments have
legitimate authority. But reason gains its title by its
claim to lead to truth. if following reason would undermine
all judgments, then it clearly thwarts its own aim; it
cannot lead to true judgment if it undermines all judgment.
Similarly, reason does not and cannot provide princi-
ples for property distribution. These rules are based on
the imagination, or custom in the form of convention. Here
too reason loses its title to grant or deny authority to
these conventions because rational principles are self-
defeating. Attempts to assign property according to ratio-
nal principles undermines the purpose of the rules, which is
to maintain "peace and order" in society.
In both cases the limits of reason are revealed by its
tendency to undermine its own end. This tendency can be
arrested only by granting authority to custom. If we were
entirely consistent in following reason and rejecting cus-
tom, we would undermine all judgment and belief. Likewise,
if we were to follow only rational principles in property
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distribution and reject convention or custom-derived rules,
we would undermine the social order. To achieve the aim of
reason we must limit reason and acknowledge custom.
Another important parallel between Hume's account of
the general rules of judgment and the general rules of
justice IS that in both cases general rules can be seen as
natural propensities correcting natural propensities. m
his discussion of judgments, Hume notes that the unphilo-
sophical probabilities are the result of certain natural
propensities of the imagination. We correct judgments
formed according to unphi losophical probabilities by follow-
ing general rules. But these general rules are the product
of the same propensities of the imagination as the unphilo-
sophical probabilities. Thus we correct our judgments by a
"new direction of the very same principle" (p. 150 ).
There are also certain natural propensities of the
passions. "in the original frame of our mind, our strongest
attention is confin'd to ourselves; our next is extended to
our relations and acquaintances; and 'tis only the weakest
which reaches to strangers and indifferent persons" (p. 488 ).
Our self-interest and biased affection lead us astray in our
behavior just as our natural propensities of the imagination
lead us astray in our judgment. The self-interested passion
can only be corrected by redirecting the same passion.
'Tis certain, that no affection of the
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human mind has both sufficient force
the
to counter-ballanc4
liL of gam.... There is no pas-therefore, capable of controllingthe interested affection, but the very
i
alteration ofIts direction. (p. 492)
This alteration of direction is achieved by general
rules.
-Tis by establishing the rule for the stability of
possession, that this passion restrains itself ..." (p. 492-
93) .
Although Hume claims that the redirecting of self-
interest must necessarily take place upon the least reflec-
tion” (p. 492) and that "nature provides a remedy in the
judgment or understanding, for what is irregular and incom-
modious in the affections" (p. 484), it is clear that he does
not consider the formation of the general rules of justice
as a conscious reflective process. The rules are the result
of "a progress of the sentiments" that is "natural and even
necessary
"
(p. 500). Given time and experience, the passion
of self-interest is self-correcting. Thus the rule that
property must remain stable "arises gradually, and acquires
force by a slow progression, and our repeated experience of
the inconveniences of transgressing it"(p. 490).
The general rules of judgment arise in a similar
manner. we do not reflect on the history of our past
judgments, weighing successes and failures and consciously
develop rules to avoid failures. The modification of belief
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and correction of certain natural
ral effect of certain occurrences
false judgments. General rules
flectively as we experience the
judgments
.
propensities is the natu-
in our past experience
—
arise gradually and unre-
"inconveniences” of false
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[1] Hume points out that, while it follnwc =
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opera^ n^r^bv°"erate upon them by means of the idea and suDoositinn ofpower, independent of its actual exercise" (p. 311-12).
pain are pleasure and
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[3] David Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," ed.(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merr i 1 1 , 1965), p. 6.
John W.
[4]
Ibid., p. 7.
[5]
Ibid.
[6]
What Hume here calls the "sentiment of beauty"the calm passion called the "sense of beauty" inTreatise.
is
the
[7] "Standard of Taste", p. 11.
[8] Ibid., p. 9. The scope of this passage clearly in-
cludes more than aesthetic judgments. In the Treatise, Hume
maizes the same point about both the passions and the moral
sentiments. Discussing the passions, Hume claims:
"We may ... maJce it a greater question,
whether the causes that produce the
passions, be as natural as the object,
to which it is directed, and whether all
the vast variety proceeds from caprice
or from the constitution of the mind.
This doubt we shall soon remove, if we
cast our eye upon human nature, and
consider that in all nations and all
ages, the same objects still give rise
to pride and humility. .." (pp. 280-81).
Discussing moral sentiments, Hume claims:
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"When you pronounce any action or char-
vicious, you mean nothing,but that from the constitution of your
have a feeling or sentiment
1
^ f r om the contemplation of
evaluLVi distinction between subjectiveat on as a expression of individual preference andobjective evaluation baaed on certain objective quaUt?es in
basis theory; it serves as a
„
claim that a moral judgment must be made from
view". Hume's awareness of the impor-
correct use of evaluative language is evident intne following passage from the Treatise;
"In general, all sentiments of praise orblame are variable, according to our
situation of nearness or remoteness,
with regard to the person blam'd or
prais'd, and according to the present
disposition of our mind. But these
variations we regard not in our general
decisions, but still apply the terms
expressive our liking or dislike, in the
same manner, as if we remain'd in one
point of view. Experience soon teaches
us this method of correcting our senti-
ments, or at least, of correcting our
language, where the sentiments are more
stubborn and inalterable.... Such cor-
rections are common with regard to all
the senses; and indeed ' twere impossible
we cou'd ever make use of language, or
communicate our sentiments to one
another, did we not correct the momen-
tary appearances of things, and overlook
our present situation" (p. 582).
[10]
Ibid.
, pp. 8-9
.
[11]
Ibid., p. 13. Hume is here making essentially the
same point made in a previously quoted passage from the
Treatise (pp. 293-94) . A person "full-grown and of the same
nature as ourselves" but totally inexperienced would not
know the proper degree of passion he "ought to assign" to
any object. It is only by custom and experience that we
learn to "settle the just value of every thing".
[12]
Ibid., p. 14. The same view is expressed
repeatedly in the Treatise. Cf. pp. 291,303,323,372,389,
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390,593.
[13] Ibid., p. 15
. For
svaluativ© viewpoint
602-603.
similar passages regarding
see Treatise
, p. 472 and
the
pp.
[14] Ibid., p. 16.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid., p. 7.
in Hume'l and Moral Sentimentss Treatise,” Review of Metaphysics 30 (1976)
, p. 60.
[18] Ibid., p. 61.
[19] Ibid., p. 62.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid., p. 63.
[22] Ibid.
[23] This failing is the source of a fundamentalproblem in Hearn's main thesis. Hearn tries to argue thatHume's moral sentiments are attitudes as opposed toemotions. Hearn characterizes an attitude as "highly
rational, in the sense that it presupposes a certain
conception of an object. One can only have attitudes where
certain beliefs concerning the objects ... are involved" (p.63) . Emotions, on the other hand, "can be experienced in
the context of few or no beliefs" (p. 63). Attitudes are
within our control", whereas "emotions are relativelybeyond our control" (p. 68). Even a cursory examination of
Hume's view of the relationship between passions and judg-
ment reveals that this sort of distinction between emotions
and attitudes would be unacceptable to Hume. Even the
direct violent passions such as anger or fear depend on a
certain conception of objects and require a context of
belief. Such 'emotions' are within our control to the ex-
tent that our belief is within our control. One might argue
that, on Hume's view, belief is not within our control, but
this will then present an equal problem for Hearn's account
of an attitude.
[24] Hearn, p. 62.
[25] Pall S. Ardal, ^ssion and Value in Hume's
Treatise (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1966), p. 94.
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[26] Hearn, p. 63.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Although he
an action cannot be
Hume acknowledges that
argues that a regard for the virtue of
the original motive for that action,
a sense of duty can become a motive:
I ask. What reason or motive have I to
^ money ? it will, peThi^sT b^
that my regard to justice, and
abhorance of villainy and knavery, are
sufficient reasons
... if i have the
least grain of honesty, or sense of duty
and obligation. And this answer, nodoubt, is just and satisfactory to man
in his civilized state, and when train'd
up according to a certain discipline and
education. But in his rude and more
natural condition, if you are pleas'd to
call such a condition natural, this an-
swer wou'd be rejected as perfectly un-
intelligible" (p. 479-480).
[29] Presumably, in explaining the origins of justice,
Hume means to offer a causal hypothesis. He is arguing from
effects our actual rules and practices— to causes.
[30] Hume s notion of justice clearly encompasses much
more than the mere observance of property rights. Justice,
according to Hume, is the observance of the conventional
rules and practices for the preservation of society. This
explains why he includes sections on allegiance to govern-
ment, the laws of nations, and even chastity and modesty in
his discussion of justice and injustice.
[31] In the second Enquiry, Hume examines and
criticizes two other theoretical solutions: distribution
according to individual merit and equal distribution. He
argues that both solutions are self-defeating. His
objection to individual merit is the same as his objection
to utility:
"So great is the uncertainty of merit,
both from its natural obscurity, and
from the self-conceit of each individ-
ual, that no determinate rule of conduct
would ever result from it; and the total
dissolution of society must be the imme-
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Enquiry Concerninqtl^ Principles
^ Morals ed. L.A. Selby-igge, third edition, reyised with notes
pLss!'?975?,‘^p“?53.'°^^°‘^‘^= Clarendon
h"r‘evin“‘^e°e; prTcr\«^r
'.-a^^
— Pl--ble
Historians, and even common sense, mayinform us, that however specious theseIdeas of perfect equality may seem, they
are really, at bottom, impracticable;
and were they not so, would be extremelypernicious to human society. Render
possessions ever so equal, men's differ-
ent degrees of art, care, and industry
will immediately break that equality.
you check these virtues, you re-duce society to the most extreme indi-
gence; and instead of preventing want
and beggary in a few, render it unavoid-
able to the whole community. The most
rigorous inquisition too is requisite to
watch every inequality
... and the most
severe jurisdiction, to punish and re-dress it .... So much authority must
soon degenerate into tyranny and be ex-
erted with great par t ia 1 i t ies . . . " ( p
.
194) ^
Miller, Philosophy and Ideology in Hume's
Political Thought (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 'Sl~.
[33] Hume's Book I argument is discussed in Chapter III.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
In the preceding chapters I have tried to present a
thorough account of the role of general rules in Hu.e •
s
philosophy as presented in the Treatise
. This task has
often required examining certain of Hume's doctrines and
arguments in great detail. Such detailed analysis was nec-
essary, not only for understanding how general rules func-
tion, but, also, for appreciating their Importance to major
areas of Hume's philosophy. As necessary as a detailed
analysis may be, it is, I think, most profitable when
combined with a more general view. Thus, in this chapter, I
shall review the major conclusions of the previous chapters
in light of their relevance to certain general features of
Hume's thought.
One important aspect of Hume's philosophy is his natu-
ralism, and the considerations in Chapters I and ll reveal
the crucial role of general rules in this regard. Inasmuch
as there are substantial differences among commentators
concerning the nature of Hume's naturalism, it is important
to be clear on my use of the term. I use "naturalism" in a
loose but limited sense meant to include two features of
Hume s thought: (1) his expressed intention of employing
"experimental reasoning" in his examination of human
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can be
•nature, and (2) his view that all mental phenomena
explained in terms of psychophysiological principles.
Hume explains his use of experimental method in the
introduction to the Treatise:
It seems to me evident, that the essence
mind being equally unknown to us with
bodies, it must beequally impossible to form any notion ofIts powers and qualities otherwise thanfrom careful and exact experiments, andthe observation of those particular ef-fects, which result from its different
circumstances and situations. And tho'
we must endeavor to render all ourprinciples as universal as possible, bytracing up our experiments to the ut-
most, and explaining all effects fromthe simplest and fewest causes, 'tis
certain we cannot go beyond experience?
and any hypothesis, that pretends todiscover the ultimate original qualities
of human nature, ought at first to be
rejected as presumptuous and chimerical,
(p. xvii)
What we know of the nature of the understanding we know from
observation and experience" alone, and any hypothesis that
appeals to mysterious or supernatural agencies and powers or
to refin d and spiritual" faculties must be rejected as
"presumptuous and chimerical".
The second element of Hume's naturalism is closely
^®l^ted to the first. As I pointed out in Chapter I, in
eliminating what he considered the suspect faculty of pure
intellect, Hume was free to base all the workings of the
understanding on purely natural physical processes. Al-
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though the physiological aspects of the workings of the mind
clearly of little Interest to Hume, his frequent
references and allusions to them indicate his concern that
his psychological principles be fully explicable at the
physiological level. Hume's ideal, although, perhaps, not
always realised, was to eliminate as much mystery as possi-
ble from the workings of the understanding. if, after
rendering all our principles as universal as possible by
"tracing up our experiments to the utmost”, we can find "no
reason for our most general and most refined principles,
besides our experience of their reality", we must not be
tempted to offer "chimerical" explanations. Instead we must
sit down contented” and be "satisfied with our Ignorance",
consoling ourselves with the recognition that "this impossi-
bility of explaining ultimate principles is a defect com-
mon to... all the sciences ..." (p. xviii)
.
Although the Malebranchian theory of natural judgments
provided Hume with the means of eliminating what he consid-
ered chimerical explanations of the operations of the under-
standing, it needed supplementing if it was to account for
the observable fact that we are able to regulate and correct
our natural judgments and distinguish between good and bad
judgments. Malebranche accounted for these facts by appeal
to the faculty of pure intellect, which does not depend on
any psychophysiological processes. This sort of appeal was
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Hume
not possible within Hume's naturalistic framework,
needed an account of the correction of natural judgments
that was fully explicable within the theory of natural
judgments. He achieved this by developing his theory of
general rules.
General rules are the natural result of our experience
of successes and failures in past judgments. Their forma-
tion IS explained by exactly the same principles used to
explain all our judgments—customs and experience. By em-
ploying them we learn to distinguish the "extensive and
constant" principles of the imagination form the "capricious
and uncertain" principles, and to guide our judgments ac-
cording to the former rather than the latter.
General rules also play a major role in Hume's concep-
tion of reason and rational method. Although he generally
confined himself to a particularly narrow usage of the term
"reason" (viz . , "the discovery of truth and falsehood"), a
legitimate question to ask is whether his views display
^^ything akin to a broader and, what we would consider, more
natural conception of reason. The answer is clearly, yes.
The extensive and constant principles of the imagination are
not based on reason in the narrow sense, because we cannot
show that such principles are likely to result in true
judgments. Yet, throughout the Treatise
,
Hume insists that
wise and judicious reasoners adhere to these principles,
while foolish and vulgar reasoners do not. "Wise men" guide
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their judgments by properly formed general rules; thus men
of "solid sense and long experience" proportion their
beliefs to the evidence. The vulgar are guided by irregular
principles, which "are observ'd only to take place in weak
minds ” (p. 225) .
In Chapters in and iv, i explained how Hume's notion
of reasonableness is based on his conception of warranted
judgment. A judgment is warranted when it is formed accord-
ing to scientific method—proport ioning beliefs to the evi-
dence. we proportion our beliefs to the evidence by employ-
ing general rules. Thus, general rules embody the standards
of rational judgment. These standards are simply the prin-
ciples operative in the extensive and constant operations of
the understanding. Although Hume acknowledged that we can-
not show that these principles will lead to true judgments,
he did not conclude that we have no reasonable grounds for
preferring them. According to Hume, we can (1) keep our
judgments mutually consistent, (2) keep our principles of
reasoning mutually consistent, and (3) attain the stability
of judgment necessary for coherent experience only by form-
ing judgments according to the extensive and constant prin-
ciples
.
Although Hume believed that we have good grounds for
preferring the scientific method of proportioning beliefs to
the evidence to the irregular principles of "mere imagina-
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tion”, he did not place unlimited confidence in the former,
nor did he entirely reject the latter. if our inability to
show that our fundamental principles of reasoning are likely
to result in true judgments is not enough to curb any
pretentions of our understanding, then the consideration
that it is only a "trivial propensity of the fancy" that
prevents the fundamental principles of our thought from
undermining all belief should lead us to "always preserve
our scepticism".
In Chapters IV and v, l discussed another important
area of Hume's philosophy influenced by general rules—his
theory of passions and sentiments. Our moral and aesthetic
sentiments cannot be true or false; thus, they cannot be
considered the product of reason in what Hume understood as
the "strict and philosophical sense" (p. 459). But our
passions and sentiments depend on our judgments about
objects and can be considered reasonable insofar as they
arise from warranted judgments. This is another illustra-
tion of Hume's broad conception of reasonableness. We
cannot show that our matter of fact judgments about objects
are likely to be true. Yet, as long as they are warranted
by the evidence, Hume considered both the judgments
themselves and the sentiments that arise from them reason-
able .
In addition to their role in regulating our passions
and sentiments by guiding our judgments about objects.
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general rules are essential to Hume's theory of value.
Moral and aesthetic judgments depend on determining the
"just value" of objects. Determining the just value of
objects requires more than the ability to accurately distin-
guish their qualities and calculate their usual effects; it
requires developing "general inalterable standards: that are
not influenced by "spite or favour". These standards are
simply general rules, which we develop by learning to
disregard those circumstances that are "peculiar to our-
selves" and fixing on "some steady and general point of
View". By them we distinguish objective value judgments
from subjective expressions of personal taste. it is his
theory of general rules that allows Hume to claim that we
can make genuine value judgments even when we have no
corresponding sentiments, thus preventing his moral theory
from degenerating into any sort of pure subjectivism.
Finally, in Chapter V, I have shown that general rules
have a substantial role in Hume's political theory. What
Hume terms the "laws of nature" are simply general rules of
justice developed according to our experience. Our natural
propensities toward self-interested behavior and our biased
affections combined with the scarcity of goods and instabil-
ity of possessions are destabilizing influences on society.
We recognize from experience that we are best able to
satisfy our interests and the interests of those we love
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society. This leads us to form general rules that
redirect our propensities to better realise these interests.
Once these rules are established within a conventional order
and the benefits of adhering to them generally recognized,
they elicit moral approval. Transgressions of the rules
then become vice, adherence to the rules, virtue.
I have tried to show that general rules play a funda-
mental role in Hume's philosophy. They are essential to his
naturalism, his views on the nature of reason, his skepti-
cism, and his moral, aesthetic and political theories. it
was with good cause that Hume spoke of the "mighty influ-
ence" of general rules on the actions and understanding.
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appendix
Hume's argument in the section "Of scepticism with
regard to reason" has drawn almost universal criticism from
Hume commentators.
[ 1 ] Some typical comments on the argument
include self-refuting",
"question-begging", and "sophisti-
cal
. [2] An examination of the criticisms reveals an almost
equally universal tendency to misinterpret Hume's argument.
I cannot possibly discuss every criticism here. Instead l
shall concentrate on some of the major criticisms and
attempt to show that they are not particularly damaging to
Hume's argument.
For convenience I will divide these criticisms into
three categories. The first are focused on the initial
stage of Hume's argument, where he claims that reflection on
past errors in judgments reduces our conviction in our
present judgments. The second are focused on the next stage
of Hume's argument, where he argues that the unreliability
of our judgments infects our judgments about our judgments,
thereby adding further doubt to our initial belief. Final-
ly, the third group of criticisms accuse Hume of begging the
question by ignoring the possibility that some judgments are
intuitively certain and thus not subject to any initial
doubt
.
The first type of criticism is made by Robert Fogelin:
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7
certain or uncertain we are
calculate proba-
^ proposition has a certain
(tautologically) isthe probability it has. For example, in
whether
<^3se we may be uncertain
to assign the probability 1 or 0to a mathematical proposition, yet thisdoes not affect the first-level assign-
intermediate
value
. [3]
Hume would certainly agree that, if a proposition has a
certain probability, then that is the probability it has.
But, presumably, the probability a proposition has is not
necessarily the probability we happen to assign it. We do
sometimes make mistakes in our probability assignments and
Hume claims that, given this fact, we should not be fully
confident in the judgments we make about a proposition's
probability. More generally, the problem with this criti-
cism IS that it does not address the point Hume is trying to
make. To see this it is important to keep in mind Hume's
conception of judgment. A judgment is an "act of mind"
whereby we form a conception with a particular degree of
belief. "By probability [I mean] that evidence, [4] which is
still attended with uncertainty" (p. 124). Hume also distin-
guishes two senses of 'probability': "Probability is of two
kinds, either when the object is really in itself uncertain,
and to be determin'd by chance, or when, tho' the object be
already certain, yet 'tis uncertain to our judgment ..." (p.
444) .
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claiming that "all knowledge degenerates into proba-
bility
, Hume IS not claiming that mathematical propositions
become merely probable. He is claiming that the felt con-
viction of our mathematical judgments is reduced to some
lesser degree of belief. The uncertainty here is in our
:udgment, not in the object. "m all demonstrative sciences
the rules are certain and infallible; but when we apply
them, our fallible and uncertain faculties are very apt to
depart from them, and fall into error"(p. 180). in short,
Hume's concern is with epistemic probability. Given the
fact that we make errors in our judgments, what degree of
conviction should we have in our judgments? To note that
"if a proposition has a certain probability, that (tauto-
logically) is the probability it has” is totally irrelevant.
The second type of criticism is represented by Pri-
chard :
If we judge that the faculty by which
we, considering the nature of two and
two, judge it to be four is infallible
only to the extent of three-quarters, we
inevitably are judging as a matter of
certainty that two and two is probably
four to the extent of three-quarters and
we cannot then take further account of
the fallibility of our faculties, for we
have already taken full account of
it. [5]
First of all, this is a misuse of the terms 'fallible'
and 'infallible'. A faculty cannot be infallible (incapable
of making errors) to the extent of three-quarters. If it is
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capable o-f making errors at all it is, by definition,
fallible. second, Hume would not claio, that two and two
equalling four is only probable. He would clai. that what
IS only probable is that, when we make a methematical
judgment that we believe to be correct, our judgment actual-
ly is correct. Finally, when we judge that it is only
probable that we correctly judge that two and two equals
four, we are inevitably judging this as a "matter of
certainty". But Hume's whole point is to question the
legitimacy of taking this judgment as certain.
Suppose we accept as fact that all judgments, with the
e_xception of one, are uncertain. We then have no real
problem. We simply take account of this fact when making
judgments by modifying our degree of belief or conviction.
According to Hume, those who are considered to have good
judgment normally operate on the basis of just such a
supposition. But, he asks, what possible justification can
we have for making the above exception: If we accept the
view that the general reliability of our judgments is an
important factor to consider in determining a proper degree
of conviction, then we must make some sort of evaluation of
our judging ability. Yet there appears to be no non-
arbitrary way to exclude the judgment involved in this
evaluation from the verdict of the evaluation. Passmore
correctly characterized this aspect of the problem as fol-
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lows
:
This analysis demands that we stop at acertain point (the examination of ourfaculties) in the estimation of relia-
provide no
xplanation why, if we must proceed tothat point, we should not for preciselythe same reasons continue to a furtherpoint, and then again to a further one,
with no possibility of ever reaching apoint at which we can properly rest. [6]
The third type of criticism accuses Hume of begging the
question by failing to consider the possibility of intui-
tively certain judgments. The criticism is directed at the
following passage:
Tis easily possible, by gradually
reducing the numbers, to reduce the
longest series of addition to the most
simple question, which can be form'd, to
an addition of two single numbers; and
upon this supposition we shall find it
impracticable to shew the precise limits
of knowledge and of probability, or dis-
cover that precise number, at which one
ends and the other begins. But know-
ledge and probability are of such con-
trary and disagreeing natures, that they
cannot well run insensibly into each
other, and that because they will not
divide, but must be either entirely pre-
sent, or entirely absent. Besides, if
any single addition were certain, every
one wou ' d be so, and consequently the
whole or total sum; unless the whole can
be different from its parts. (p. 181)
Fogelin's response is typical of the third type of criti-
cism:
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argument assumesnat a long addition can yield onlvprobablltiy. Then, by a slippery slope
direct ionsf, HuL
addition however simple. The reply, ofcourse, IS that this ignores the possi-ity that our grasp of a simple "pro-position concerning numbers" may not in-
volve calculation at all but, instead,
an immediate insight. m this way, thefallibility that infects our calcula-tions (and demonstrations) need nottouch our intuitive understanding
.[ 7]
I have already argued that Hume does not assume that
long addition can yield only probability in the sense
Fogelin ascribes to him. There is no uncertainty (probabil-
ity, in Humels sense) in the object; the uncertainty is in
the judgment. So, if an addition has a certain sum, then
that is necessarily the sum it has. But, of course, the sum
we judge it to have is not necessarily the sum it has. But
Fogelin' s point can be made without the supposition that
Hume thought mathematical propositions only probable. The
basic criticism is that Hume ignores the possibility of
intuitively certain judgments.
Consider the form of Hume's argument. If each simple
addition were certain, then the whole would be certain. The
whole is not certain; therefore, it is not true that each
simple addition is certain. As one critic has pointed out,
this argument cuts both ways:
If we were to accept a premiss of one of
his arguments, namely, that any sin -
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were certain, every one
^ consequently the v;^le
t a 1 sum we should, ir^cTTw
at h = n;^
choice on the evidencea d but to affirm the antecedent andconclude that he is, despite himself,providing an argument for the infalli-
least some total sums asopposed to the fallibility of immediateinference per se, as he had intended. [8]
That we sometimes err in long addition simply shows
that sometimes the whole is not certain and, thus, sometimes
simple additions are not certain. But this does not elimi-
nate the possibility that sometimes simple additions are
Intuitively certain and that the long additions composed of
such intuitively certain simple additions are likewise cer-
tain
.
The case can be made in a more straightforward way by
noting that, although we sometimes make mistakes in simple
additions, this does not warrant the conclusion that no
simple addition is certain. The defender of intuitive cer-
tainty can claim that such errors merely show that in some
instances we do not judge with intuitive certainty. Haste
or inattention can lead us to judge that 1 + 1 = 3, but this
does not mean that in more attentive moments we cannot
grasp with intuitive certainty that 1+1=2. If, as defenders
of intuition claim, this is the actual situation, then it is
false that all knowledge "degenerates into probability".
Hume's critics are correct in accusing him of failing
to address this possibility. But the assumption that the
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proper criterion for establishing he reliability of judg-
ments is experience is in keeping with Hume's basic princi-
ple; thus this failing can be easily remedied. There is no
necessary connection between feelings of intuitive certainty
and correct judgments. Not only is there no necessary
connection, but experience proves that there is not even a
constant conjunction'. People have held (and continue to
hold) all manner of false and even absurd judgments to be
intuitively certain. Thus, the feeling of intuitive cer-
tainty is no guarantee of truth. The extent to which it is
an indication of truth is determined entirely by experience.
It might well be that judgments in which we feel an
intuitive certainty are highly reliable (usually true), in
which case we are warranted in being highly confident about
them. But this confidence is based on experienced reliabil-
ity, not on any assumption about the self-certifying nature
of intuition.
Whatever decision one makes about the ultimate merits
of Hume's argument, this discussion of the criticisms re-
veals an important point. The aim of the argument is not,
as the critics seem to assume, to question or eliminate the
distinction between knowledge and probability (however one
characterizes this distinction). Hume's aim is to show the
limitations of rational method. Although we can show that
proportioning beliefs to the evidence is more rational than
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other methods of forming beliefs, we cannot, Hume argues,
adopt it as a perfectly general principle of reason. What
we consider rational methodology at one level of judgment
cannot be extended to all levels of judgment without under-
mining all belief and conviction. The reasonableness of
scientific method depends on limiting its scope of appllca-
t ion
.
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NOTES
Wilson'i a''rtlcle’'"Htme'rsce..i^ criticisms is Fred
1^ ^dies 9, NO. 2 (November
hrstoLVl'’Lsfir;?s\ncoLTt".‘—
Passmore indicates that Hume's argument is self-refuting in Hume ' s Intentions
, p. 137; Robert Imlay calls itquestion-begging in his article "Hume's 'Of Scepticism wi fh
Stud^e^s No^^2^/N
^ Contrasting Themes," Hume
H^ "snnhl;^ 1981): 124; MacNabb refers tTTt
Vi 1 gj^^^y^lQPedia of Philosophy articleHume
,
ed. P. Edwards (New York: Macmfri alT
, 1967) 4 :84.
[3] Fogelin, p. 18.
[4] One should note that, in Hume's usage
often refers to the evidence ojf something, i.e.,it is, not to the evidence for something,
provides proof or support for it.
"evidence"
how evident
i.e., what
[5]
(London
:
H.A. Prichard, "Hume" in Knowledge and PerceptionOxford Univ. Press, 1950)
,
~p. 195.
[6]
Passmore, pp. 135-36 . Passmore is not as acute in
explaining the point of Hume's argument: "The real outcome
of Hume's argument is that 'antecedent' scepticism is illog-ical. The 'reliability of our faculties' cannot be the test
of a proposition's probabi lity" (p. 136). As I have repeat-
edly emphasized, Hume is not assessing the probability ofpropositions, where this is understood as some property that
such 'objects' possess. Furthermore, assuming that Hume's
argument is supposed to show that 'antecedent scepticism' isillogical makes complete nonsense out of the entire section.
Hume claims that reason can discover no error in the
argument and it is this claim that serves as a basis for his
skepticism about reason at the end of the section.
[7] Fogelin, p. 15.
[8] Imlay, p. 124.
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